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ABSTRACT:  
This thesis considers the veracity, within the land use planning and development 
context in the Western Cape, of the claim that South Africa has a constitution that gave 
us accountable government1. The study necessitates consideration of the meaning of 
terms such as accountability and sustainable planning and development. 
 
There is a dearth of South African literature on government accountability.  The main 
focus of the literature from abroad is on elections as a mechanism for achieving 
government accountability, to the exclusion of other issues and with a distinct 
disregard for legal questions. Much of the available overseas literature draws on the 
descriptive models of how democratic accountability should work. The writers 
seemingly have little interest in moving beyond the descriptive. The available body of 
literature is static in nature as little theoretical development in the field of government 
accountability has taken place for decades.  This thesis argues that, as a result, the 
literature from abroad on accountability is of limited value in South African context. 
 
Accountability has an important role to play in curbing the abuse of public power and 
for maintaining conditions of peace and stability.  Central concerns with the study are 
to assess the current measure of government accountability within the stated context 
and to establish whether the existing system for achieving effective government 
accountability is adequate.   
 
The research commences with thorough literature and law reviews, supplemented by 
the development of a questionnaire on accountability in the land use planning and 
development field. The assessment of the current measure of government 
accountability in the context of land use planning and development is supplemented by 
the views of people active in that field. Those views are pieced together from the 
results obtained from questionnaires and personal observations. The findings are that 
government is presently not regarded as accountable in the field of study. 
 
This thesis demonstrates how difficult it is to achieve effective government  
                                                 
1
  Skjelten, 2006: 11 
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accountability - in particular, towards the local population - and how ineffective the 
current accountability mechanisms are for this purpose. It argues that the challenges 
facing South Africans in this regard are complex and that everyone is required to 
accept responsibility as the actual agents of accountability, to make accountability work 
as a personal concern and a matter of individual responsibility.  
 
This thesis reflects on the need for new accountability mechanisms and calls for a 
radical reform of the current approach to government accountability.  It inter alia 
recommends that the reform should involve the establishment of a new structure 
empowered to enquire into the merits of decisions taken by public authorities.  On the 
basis of this discussion, the thesis concludes by advocating specific steps required to 
improve government accountability at the local-level within land use planning and 
development context. 
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OPSOMMING:  
Hierdie tesis oorweeg die geldigheid, binne die konteks van grondgebruik beplanning 
en ontwikkeling in die Wes-Kaap, van die aanspraak dat Suid-Afrika 'n grondwet het 
wat vir ons 'n verantwoordbare regering gegee het. Dit noodsaak oorweging van die 
betekenis van uitdrukkings soos verantwoordbaarheid en volhoubare beplanning en 
ontwikkeling.   
 
Bykans doodse stilte heers oor regeringsverantwoordbaarheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
literatuur. In buitelandse literatuur val die klem hoofsaaklik op verkiesings as 
meganisme om regeringsverantwoordbaarheid te bewerkstellig, met uitsluiting van 
ander kwessies en 'n besliste verontagsaming van regsvrae. Baie van die beskikbare 
oorsese literatuur steun op die beskrywende benadering van hoe demokratiese 
verantwoordbaarheid behoort te werk. Die skrywers het oënskynlik min belang daarin 
om meer as beskrywend te wees. Die beskikbare literatuur is staties van aard 
aangesien vir dekades min teoretiese ontwikkeling op die gebied van 
regeringsverantwoordbaarheid plaasgevind het. Hierdie tesis argumenteer dat, ten 
gevolge, die buitelandse literatuur oor verantwoordbaarheid van beperkte waarde is in 
Suid-Afrikaanse konteks. 
 
Verantwoordbaarheid het 'n belangrike rol om te vervul in die beperking van misbruik 
van openbare mag en vir die instandhouding van toestande vir vrede en stabiliteit.  
Sentraal tot hierdie studie staan pogings om te bepaal wat die huidige stand van 
regeringsverantwoordbaarheid is binne die vermelde konteks en om vas te stel of die 
bestaande stelsel vir bereiking van verantwoordbare regering voldoende is. 
 
Die navorsing begin met deeglike literatuur en regsresensies, aangevul deur die 
ontwikkeling van ‘n vraeboog oor verantwoordbaarheid in die veld van grondgebruik 
beplanning en ontwikkeling. Die huidige stand van regeringsverantwoordbaarheid 
binne die konteks van grondgebruik beplanning en ontwikkeling is aangevul deur die 
sienings van persone wat aktief is in daardie veld.  Daardie sienings is saamgestel 
vanuit resultate wat bekom is uit vraeboë en eie waarnemings. Die bevindinge is dat 
die regering in die algemeen tans nie as verantwoordbaar beskou word nie.  
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Hierdie tesis toon aan hoe moeilik dit is om effektiewe verantwoordbaarheid van die 
regering te bereik - in die besonder teenoor die plaaslike bevolking - en hoe 
ontoereikend die huidige meganismes vir hierdie doel is. Dit argumenteer dat die 
uitdagings wat Suid-Afrika in hierdie verband in die gesig staar, kompleks is en dat van 
elkeen verwag word om verantwoordelikheid te aanvaar as die werklike agente van 
verantwoordbaarheid om verantwoordbaarheid as 'n persoonlike aangeleentheid en 'n 
saak van individuele verantwoordelikheid te laat werk. 
 
Hierdie tesis besin oor die behoefte aan nuwe verantwoordbaarheidsmeganismes en 
bepleit 'n radikale hervorming van die huidige benadering tot verantwoordbaarheid van 
die regering. Dit word onder andere aanbeveel dat as deel van hervorming 'n nuwe 
struktuur voorsien moet word wat gemagtig sal wees om ondersoek in te stel na die 
meriete van die besluite wat deur die publieke owerhede geneem is.  Op grond van 
hierdie bespreking eindig die tesis deur voorspraak te maak vir bepaalde stappe wat 
nodig is om die regering se verantwoordbaarheid op die plaaslike vlak te verbeter 
binne die konteks van grondgebruik beplanning en ontwikkeling. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 AN OVERVIEW 
This thesis is concerned with accountability within a democratic system of government, more 
particularly with vertical government accountability of appointed administrators and elected 
representatives towards the public. It focuses more narrowly on their democratic and legal 
accountability in land use planning and development context within the Western Cape.  
 
Democratic and legal accountability within this context are concerned with whether and how 
government may be obliged to answer to the electorate or a court for government's acts or 
omissions. Land use planning is the purposive activity of working out in advance a detailed 
scheme for land use management and the accomplishment of land use objectives. Land use 
management, in turn involves, amongst other things, the investigation of potential impacts of 
land use development proposals on the receiving built, natural and cultural environments, the 
assessment of those impacts and the granting or withholding of approval for the proposed 
activities. Land use development is concerned with the construction of something physical on 
land or the conversion of the use of land to another purpose.  
 
Land use planning and development have to take place in a dense and complex legislative 
setting. The authorities are required to exercise their functions and perform their duties within the 
applicable statutory framework. A myriad of legislation relating to planning and development 
existed at the advent of South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation. Pre-constitutional laws 
that continue to apply in the field of study inter alia include the Land Use Planning Ordinance 
(No. 15 of 1985, known as “LUPO”), the Removal of Restrictions Act (No. 84 of 1967), the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (No. 70 of 1970), the National Building Regulations and 
the Buildings Standards Act (No. 103 of 1977).  Zoning schemes (i.e. legislation that is 
peculiar to a specific municipal area aimed at regulating land uses and which generally also 
stipulates applicable land use parameters such as height restrictions and building lines) apply 
in addition to the national and provincial legislation.   
 
National and provincial legislative competences in terms of the South African Constitution 
(RSA, 1996) include “regional planning and development”, “environment” and “municipal 
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planning”, whilst “provincial planning” is an area of exclusive provincial legislative 
competence2. Those legislative powers relate to undefined areas of competence and the lack 
of definition is likely to give rise to practical problems.  The national, provincial and municipal 
legislatures exercise their legislative competences within the land use planning and 
development context without any attempt to coordinate their legislative actions. The lack of 
coordination amongst legislatures has created a legislative environment which is not 
conducive for the promotion of socio economic development. Processes, for example, are 
duplicated.  A person may have more than one right of appeal on the same set of facts under 
different laws. The various appeals that one may lodge in those circumstances are not dealt 
with concurrently by the authorities, but successively, causing extensive delays with the final 
determination of applications. No effective mechanism exists with which a member of the 
public may force the three spheres of government to co-operate in respect of their legislative 
or other functions or to speed up decision-making. 
 
Post-Constitution laws have been added to the long list of legislation that applies in the field of 
study, contributing to the complexity of the situation. Currently the legislative setting entwines 
pre-constitutional national, provincial and municipal legislation, the legislation straddling the 
transition to the Constitution, and the post-Constitution laws. Our legal system displays a 
dualism or split personality observed as a result of the continued survival of pre-democracy 
legislation. Roodt (2001: 474) points out that some older statutes are sometimes inconsistent 
with constitutional guarantees or create institutional obstacles to legal accountability. There 
exists a need for further legal reform if socio-economic development is to be promoted.  
Legislation that discriminates against people on the basis of their race should be repealed. 
Even if a difficult task, state structures should be transformed and de-racialised as proposed 
by Davids and Maphunye (2005: 62). 
 
The post-Constitution laws have been adopted to achieve many different purposes. The Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000, the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act, No. 2 of 2000 and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No.3 of 2000 aim, for 
example, to restructure local government and to promote accountability. Two of the main 
purposes of the Development Facilitation Act, No. 67 of 1995 (the “DFA”)  are “to introduce 
                                                 
2
 See Schedule 4 and 5 respectively to the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996). 
. 
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extraordinary measures to facilitate and speed up the implementation and reconstruction and 
development programmes and projects” and “to lay down general principles governing land 
development throughout the Republic”. In terms of section 2 of the DFA, the general principles 
set out in section 3 of that Act, apply to the actions of a local government bodies in South 
Africa and shall serve to guide the administration of any structure plan or zoning scheme. In 
terms of the DFA those principles also serve as guidelines by reference to which any 
competent authority shall exercise any discretion or take any decision in terms of any law 
dealing with land development. Included amongst those principles are that administrative 
practice should promote efficient and integrated land developments in that they optimize the 
use of existing resources, discourage the phenomenon of “urban sprawl” in urban areas and 
contribute to the development of more compact towns and cities.  A more detailed discussion 
of the methods, statutory devices and available mechanisms employed in legislation to 
promote and enforce accountability has been provided in Chapter 3. There clearly is no 
shortage of legislation that applies in the field of study, yet that legislation is ineffective. For 
example, although all three spheres of government should be held responsible for addressing 
the growing housing backlog, it is primarily the local authorities with their insufficient funds 
and shortages of competent staff that are by law required to address the problem.  
 
The exercise of legislative competences by the three spheres of government within land use 
planning and development context aimed at introducing more effective legislation has not 
gone smoothly to date.  In the municipal sphere, a number of factors frustrated attempts to 
revise existing municipal legislation during the last sixteen years of local government 
transition. For example, an attempt to revise the Strand Zoning Scheme (originally adopted in 
1947) was halted when the Strand, Somerset West and other municipalities combined to form 
the Helderberg Transitional Council. Each of those municipalities had their own zoning 
schemes before the combination of the municipal areas. In some other areas situated within 
the boundaries of the Helderberg Transitional Council, zoning schemes did not apply (e.g. the 
regional services council areas such as Macassar and Sir Lowry’s Pass and the historical 
“Black townships” such as Llwandle and Nomzamo). In places such as Macassar and Sir 
Lowry’s Pass regulations applied which were made under section 8 of LUPO as “default” 
zoning schemes. In places such as Llwandle and Nomzamo the regulations that were made 
under the Black Communities Development Act, No. 4 of 1984, performed the same function. 
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The Helderberg Transitional Council soon realised that the different standards laid down in 
various zoning schemes and regulations applicable in different areas within the new municipal 
boundaries were no longer appropriate. It commissioned the consolidation and rationalisation 
of those schemes and regulations and subsequently approved a new consolidated zoning 
scheme. Before it could obtain the final approval of the competent provincial authority of the 
new scheme, the Helderberg Transitional Council was disestablished and its area was 
incorporated into yet a larger area known as the City of Cape Town. A fresh attempt has been 
underway for the past six or seven years to consolidate and rationalise the many zoning 
schemes that apply in various areas within the City's boundaries. However, at the time of 
writing of this thesis the outdated 1947 scheme still applied and was still enforced by the City 
of Cape Town within the erstwhile municipal boundaries of the Strand municipality. The same 
is true for the zoning schemes of the other former substructures within the city of Cape Town. 
 
In the Western Cape attempts to introduce a new piece of provincial legislation that would 
have replaced LUPO as an interim Act - while a more comprehensive Act could be written - 
survived seven provincial ministers of planning. The researcher was the co-author of the law 
that was to become the Western Cape Planning and Development Act, No. 7 of 1999 (the 
“PDA”). It was eventually approved by one of a line of provincial Premiers, but before it could 
be implemented, there was a change in political leadership and the finalized Act was never 
implemented. A new professional team was appointed to write a new provincial law on 
planning and development, trying to integrate planning, environmental and heritage 
legislation. The new provincial legislative effort lost steam along the way and was abandoned 
for reasons unknown. Fresh attempts are currently underway to revive and update the PDA, 
which by now is 10 years old. In the national sphere the so-called “Land Use Bill” which has 
been in the offing for nearly a decade, was yet again placed on the back-burner during 2008, 
which some see as a blessing in disguise.  
 
In instances where national government managed to pass legislation, the validity of some 
laws were subsequently challenged successfully in court. For example, on 22 September 
2009 the Supreme Court of Appeal declared chapters V and VI of the DFA that purports to 
confer authority on provincial development tribunals equivalent to that of local authorities to 
be invalid (City of Johannesburg v Gauteng Development Tribunal (335/08) [2009] ZASCA 
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106). However, the obligation of competent authorities to exercise any discretion or take any 
decision in terms of any law dealing with land development by reference to the principles 
contained in chapter I of the DFA was not affected by the judgment.   
 
The national, provincial and municipal spheres of government are charged by law with many 
responsibilities. The decisions of the authorities to permit the use of land for specific 
development projects must balance the needs of the people, their economic development 
opportunities and the availability of natural resources in a manner that will facilitate the 
achievement of development goals and objectives without harm to natural resources and 
systems (see “sustainable planning” and “sustainable development” in glossary).  Amongst the 
government responsibilities are developmental duties and the requirement that local 
authorities should undertake integrated development planning (see sections 153 of the South 
African Constitution and section 25 of the MSA). The legislatures have not placed a duty on 
the national and provincial spheres of government to undertake pro-active planning. As a 
result those two spheres of government cannot be held to account if they fail to undertake 
such planning. No effective mechanisms exist in terms of which members of the public can 
force them to undertake land use planning. 
 
Rather than undertake land use planning, the authorities seem to concentrate their efforts on the 
adoption of policies to clarify legislation and to provide guidelines within which the 
implementation of laws has to take place. Examples of such policies are the National Spatial 
Development Perspective (NSDP) and the Provincial Spatial Development Framework 
(PSDF). The NSDP was produced by the Presidency and endorsed by Cabinet in March 2003 
(PCAS, 2004) without first following a process of public participation. It provided an initial 
interpretation of the potential of different localities and sectors, but not a definitive measure. It 
required provincial strategies and municipal plans to provide rigorous assessments of 
provincial and local development potential.  An updated version of the NSDP (2006) was 
released during June 2007 (PCAS, 2007). It was intended to focus government action and to 
provide a platform for greater alignment and coordination across the three spheres of 
government. In the Western Cape, the provincial government adopted the PSDF during 
November 2005, and it was recently approved as a Structure Plan in terms of LUPO. It called, 
amongst other things, for a tight urban edge to be drawn around all towns and cities in the 
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province to restrict the outward growth of urban settlements until such time as density targets 
have been achieved.  
 
The adoption of government policy is by itself insufficient to correct the wrongs of the past. 
Zoning schemes have, for example, been a contributing factor to urban sprawl over past 
decades.  This is due to the outdatedness of these schemes and the planning ideals of former 
times that these schemes were originally based on, such as low densities (the Garden Cities 
model) and high rise buildings surrounded by open space (Le Corbusier’s Radiant City), as 
discussed in the Draft Green Paper on Planning and Development of 1999. Zoning schemes 
generally lay down the maximum permissible bulk (i.e. floor factor) and coverage (i.e. the 
maximum size of the footprint of the building) as land use restrictions. A permissible bulk 
factor of say 0,8 would translate into a maximum permissible floor area of a building 
(excluding balconies and other listed items) of 800 m² if the plot size was 1000 m².  The 
permissible bulk and coverage factors may impact negatively on the achievement of higher 
density targets. Policy can in itself not amend legislation, but requires a legislative act. The 
amendment of the applicable legislation (e.g. zoning schemes) may be required to achieve 
statutory and government policy objectives (e.g. to promote “socio and economic” and 
“sustainable land use” development). 
 
Whilst government policies are an essential component of land use planning, it would be 
wrong to liken those policies to land use planning. Government policies in the field of study 
(e.g. the NSDP and the PSDF) do not provide a detailed scheme worked out in advance for 
land use management or the accomplishment of land use objectives.  Those policies 
generally lack implementation plans and are not linked to funding arrangements. In the 
absence of clear measurable policy targets, usually no attempt is made to measure the 
success of those policies. Pieterse (2006: 289) is convinced, based on his field research in 
Cape Town, “that policy intentions as expressed in planning frameworks, are bound to remain 
paper-ideas whilst established patterns of organisational (and spatial) practice continues”. 
Muller (2009: 31) argues that pro-active, rational or technical planning “is an important part of 
negotiating and inventing the future”. This thesis argues that pro-active land use planning is 
required to convert the thinking encountered in government policies into practical measures 
for achieving policy objectives.  However, pro-active land use planning is mostly encountered 
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in the literature, but is an extremely rare occurrence in the Western Cape and the rest of the 
country, although it seems that this is now busy changing. 
 
The enforced pre-democracy spatial development process in the Western Cape resulted in 
racialised segregated urban and economic spaces. It marginalised the vast majority of the 
province's population spatially and economically. It was within that environment that a dream 
was created leading up to the first democratic elections in South Africa; a dream of a Better 
Life for All. It captured the imagination of the many millions of residents who before, have 
been socially and otherwise marginalised. It also captured the imagination of many of the 
privileged minority who, before, almost exclusive enjoyed the spoils of the country's bounty. 
Soon after the induction of our first democratically elected national government, the Legislator 
was tasked to translate the electoral dream into legislation. New legislation3 followed, 
encapsulating promises in legal format and more particularly, some as fundamental rights.  
 
Socio-economic development is generally regarded as the passport to reduced poverty, 
reduced inequality and improved social well-being. It holds promise to correct some wrongs of 
the past. Land use development (i.e. physical township establishment and rural development) 
can potentially make a major contribution to socio-economic development.  However, patterns 
of production and consumption associated with urbanisation may seriously jeopardize the 
continued existence of a safe, healthy, clean and diverse environment. Limits to physical 
growth and a balance between human life and the environment are therefore essential.  Pro-
active land use planning is a pre-requisite for achieving the best results with socio-economic 
development and environmental management objectives. Such planning may serve to change 
the way in which local authorities operate, to exercise development control, guide capital 
investment programs and to evaluate development proposals in terms of desirability. It may 
also serve to contribute to remaking urban and rural communities in ways that will reverse the 
negative apartheid heritage, promote integrated land development and balance the competing 
needs for socio-economic development and environmental protection.  
 
The Legislator put the public sector at the heart of the challenge to reduce poverty and 
promote sustainable development for the benefit of all South Africans. The key-role that 
                                                 
3
   E.g. the National Environmental Management Act, No. 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and the Promotion of 
 Access to Information Act, No. 2 of 2000 (PAIA).  
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government has to play in this regard includes the promotion of the public interest within the 
legal framework, inter alia by passing legislation, undertaking planning, performing regulatory 
functions in respect of land use planning and development and ensuring lawful, reasonable 
and fair administrative government practices.  The keystone of this legal construct is 
accountability (i.e. being obliged to answer to an authority for one's own acts or omissions 
and sometimes for the conduct of others).  The government bodies and their public 
administrations responsible for giving effect to the laws of South Africa are required to be 
accountable. So, for example, section 152(1) of the South African Constitution stipulates as 
an objective of local government that it should provide democratic and accountable 
government for local communities. It is a basic value and principle in terms of section 195(1) 
of the South African Constitution that the public administration must be accountable.   
 
An effective system of government accountability in the public arena can provide a 
reasonable assurance that public power will not be abused and, where such abuse would 
occur, that corrective action and redress are reasonably easy to achieve. On the other hand 
rising unemployment, growing poverty and inequality coupled with an ineffective system of 
government accountability carry with it the threat of ‘self-help’ and socio-political instability. 
Unanswerable government may lead to unstable conditions endangering the democracy. 
Without accountability as an essential ingredient our democratic principles may be of little 
relevance and our fundamental rights little more than a literary fantasy. It is evident from 
media coverage that the manner in which the public sector uses public power and impacts 
daily on the quality of life of the people of this country is a matter of increasing concern.  
 
At the heart of this thesis lies the question whether the mechanisms and processes (e.g. 
elections and judicial processes) available to members of the general public to enforce 
government accountability in respect of its statutory land use planning and management 
obligations, are adequate.  This thesis is about government accountability in terms of the 
South African laws that apply within the field of land use planning and development in the 
Western Cape.  It critically examines the issue of government accountability within that 
context. The emphasis is on local government, the sphere of government that is regarded as 
the closest to the people, the one that is required to deliver services and has as an objective 
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to promote socio and economic development. The accountability of the other two spheres of 
government is also briefly considered, but in more general terms. 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
Accountability is both an important philosophical and practical issue of our day, yet has not 
received any noteworthy attention either in the South African literature or daily government 
practices. Whilst a wealth of literature has been published on sustainable planning and 
development, accountability has almost disappeared from the academic horizon.  
 
The researcher joined local government as an administrative assistant during 1975 and was  
initially employed in a section responsible for "works and planning", mainly active in the field 
of property acquisitions for authority purposes. The sudden resignation of a person in charge 
of the low cost housing section resulted in his transfer to that section during 1976. It was his 
first real introduction to the fascinating world of land use planning and development.  He was 
soon to discover that this wonderful new world was fraught with difficulties. Complex legal 
requirements and processes that had to be complied with, emotions ran high from time to 
time and clashes between the "have's" and the "have not's" were at the order of the day. The 
researcher attempted to be a relatively neutral observer and as such to listen to most if not all 
sides of the story and came to realise that the legal and administrative system within which 
the land use planning and development processes had to take place, was far from perfect.  
Often objectors believed that they were being ignored by their elected representatives. Often 
those who were in dire need of basic accommodation believed that the very same councillors 
(elected by objectors only), were unsympathetic and in no hurry to get on with the job.   
 
The researcher subsequently worked for two other local authorities and resigned during 1987 
to join the legal fraternity as an article clerk with a firm of attorneys. Whilst serving his articles 
he was elected as a part time non-party-political municipal councillor. Councillorship enabled 
him to discover the planning and development field from a completely different perspective. 
This time around he had to contend with angry applicants and their professional consultants 
on the one side and sometimes even angrier objectors and their legal advisors on the other 
side. In the middle were a bunch of frustrated municipal officials. Subsequently as a practicing 
attorney and township developer, the researcher in his regular encounters with government 
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witnessed many incidents that smacked of the abuse of public power or failure to act as 
required by law on the part of government. Usually such action would go unchallenged, often 
because no effective mechanisms existed to challenge the abuses.  It was also at this stage 
that the prominent role that politicians sometimes play in the planning and development 
processes became more evident to the researcher.  
 
The most striking feature of all the researcher’s experiences in the field of study since 1976 
pertain to the inadequacy of the available mechanisms that should ensure government 
accountability and the inability of the authorities to promote socio and economic development.  
Based on his experience the researcher regards Skjelten's claim (2006. 11) "[w]e succeeded 
in making a constitution that gave us ... an accountable government - ..." at best as partially 
correct only.  The road to achieving government accountability is indeed difficult. It is argued 
that the mere existence of the present very progressive South African Constitution does not 
give us accountable government. In order to ensure a reasonable measure of government 
accountability effective mechanisms are at the very least required to achieve that state of 
affairs.  The realisation that the researcher’s perceptions in this regard may not be an 
accurate reflection of the actual state of affairs coupled with the desire to make a positive 
contribution to the improvement of the situation, were amongst the driving forces for this 
research.  
 
As a first step the researcher undertook exploratory research of the available literature to 
improve his knowledge on the subject of government accountability. It also served to ensure 
that he would avoid repeating research previously undertaken. Although he has been in legal 
practice since 1987, the idea of government accountability has never featured prominently in 
research or work previously undertaken by him. The literature review undertaken provided 
valuable insights, but proved to be inadequate by itself. For these reasons the researcher also 
undertook exploratory research of the South African case law as well as the numerous pieces 
of legislation and the legal rules and principles which may potentially have an impact on 
government accountability, all to improve his knowledge on the subject. The results of the 
literature and law reviews are reflected in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. The aim with those 
chapters was to provide a solid theoretical and practical foundation for the assessment of the 
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government's accountability. The literature and law reviews were also considered necessary 
to assist with the selection of appropriate supplementary research questions. 
 
Having completed the literature and law reviews, the researcher entered into the further 
methodological dimension of the study where he was concerned with the question: How do I 
attain knowledge on the subject from the perspective of the people actively involved in the 
land use planning and development field?  The researcher supplemented his research by 
obtaining the views of persons active in the field of land use planning and development within 
the Western Cape on how accountable the three spheres of government are within the field of 
study.  The researcher regards the opinions obtained from respondents as secondary to the 
findings made in terms of the literature and law reviews, but nevertheless as a reasonably 
clear indicator that government accountability within the field of study and the mechanisms 
supposed to obtain such accountability, are inadequate. 
 
The respondents included development applicants, government officials and professional 
consultants. The researcher’s emphasis was on obtaining the perspectives of people 
experienced in land use and development matters that are actively involved in that field on a 
daily ongoing basis. As a result, for example, town planners with a limited number of years 
experience, those who carried on other types of business to supplement their income from 
town planning and non-principals in private practice were not considered for inclusion into the 
target group. Part-time developers and members of the marginalised communities and 
objectors did not satisfy the above criteria and were also not considered for inclusion in the 
target group. Municipal councillors and other elected politicians were specifically excluded 
from the sampling frame as they were the object of the research and because the researcher 
had serious misgivings about the validity of responses that would be obtained from them. The 
researcher estimates that the number of persons that may have satisfied the above selection 
criteria may have been in the order of 150 persons. He managed to identify a core group of 
47 persons as potential members of the target group. The perspectives of respondents are a 
view pieced together from the results obtained from questionnaires and personal 
observations.  Chapter 4 aims to show how the researcher developed a theoretical framework 
within which the supplementary research was undertaken.  
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This study aims to make a contribution to the improvement of government accountability in 
the field of land use planning and development by adding to the existing body of knowledge 
on the subject, by identifying the weaknesses in the current system and by recommending 
specific steps to be taken to improve government accountability. 
 
1.3 EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMS 
An introductory overview was provided in par 1 of the legislative and policy framework within 
which the complex planning and development system in the Western Cape has to function. It 
is against that background that this part provides three examples of problems that ordinary 
people have experienced in relation to government accountability in the context of the field of 
study. The aim is to contextualise the researcher’s pragmatic approach to the field of study. 
 
1.3.1 Example No. 1 
Mr X4 purchased as an investment a number of beach-front erven and then consolidated 
them to achieve a saving on availability charges (a form of taxation payable in respect of 
undeveloped erven). When market conditions improved he applied to re-subdivide the 
consolidated erf to achieve the exact same situation that existed immediately prior to 
consolidation.  
 
Crudely stated section 36(1) of LUPO stipulates that applications for subdivision, rezoning 
and departures “…shall be refused solely on grounds of the lack of desirability …” taking into 
consideration the effect that the proposal might have on existing rights concerned. [My own 
emphasis]. The LUPO provision seeks to restrict the grounds on which applications may be 
refused. The word “desirability” is not defined in LUPO, but the applicable provincial directives 
state that it relates to the compatibility of the proposed development with the character of the 
area.  
 
The legislative framework within which applications of this nature must be considered 
remained the same at all relevant times. The applicant expected the approval of the re-
subdivision to be a mere formality and problem-free, inter alia as most of the neighbouring 
                                                 
4
  The researcher has refrained from using real names in some of the examples to protect the privacy of 
 the individuals concerned. As the third example discussed in 1.3.3 relates to reported court cases, it was 
 not considered necessary to do the same in respect thereof. 
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landowners acquired their properties before the consolidation took place and must have 
accepted the subdivision as previously approved. The application was first refused, but on 
appeal approved by the municipality.  However, more onerous building lines (i.e. the 
distances from the erf boundaries within which no building work may be undertaken) were 
imposed in respect of the subdivided erf than those that applied originally, leaving a smaller 
area that could be developed. The result was that a much larger area of the property had to 
be kept free of any building work. However, the more onerous building lines with which the 
applicant was required to comply, were not made applicable to any of the other remaining 
undeveloped erven in the residential estate concerned. 
  
1.3.2 Example No. 2 
The consolidated zoning scheme which the Helderberg Transitional Council approved to inter 
alia replace the applicable 1947 zoning scheme discussed in par 1.1, provided for an increase 
of the bulk factor of erven in a certain area from 1.6 to 3.2. It is generally recognised that 
outdated zoning schemes often promote urban forms no longer seen as desirable. In addition 
local government is required in terms of the DFA and provincial policy directives to promote 
land development that optimizes the use of existing resources and contribute to the 
development of more compact towns and cities. Although the Helderberg Transitional Council 
failed to obtain provincial approval of the consolidated scheme as mentioned above, one 
might have expected the City of Cape Town (that succeeded the transitional council) to be 
amenable to favourably consider applications for relaxing the 1947 bulk factor restriction.  
 
Two owners of erven situated roughly 100 m apart in the same road within the Strand in 
which the increased 3.2 bulk factor would have applied if the provincial government would 
have approved the consolidated zoning scheme, intended erecting blocks of apartments on 
their respective properties. They applied for departures from the applicable bulk restriction of 
1.6 as set out in the 1947 Strand Zoning Scheme. The applications were advertised and no-
one objected to the first application. A neighbour objected to the second application.  
 
A municipal official approved a bulk factor of 2.6 under delegated authority for the unopposed 
application. The municipal committee that considered the opposed application refused an 
increase in the same bulk factor that applied from 1.6 to 2.1 in respect of the second 
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application. An appeal against the refusal was subsequently lodged. The municipal appeal 
committee dismissed the appeal, decided to enforce the 1947 zoning scheme and 
disregarded the DFA principle calling for the promotion of more compact cities. A subsequent 
appeal to the provincial government against the decision of the municipal appeal committee 
was upheld and the departure applied for, was approved. It took more than two years to 
achieve that result. During the month of September 2009 a notice board was erected on the 
property concerned, confirming that it will be sold in liquidation. The favourable decision of the 
provincial government could not rescue the “would-be” developer from financial ruin. 
 
1.3.3 Example No. 35 
Section 42(2) of LUPO empowers the decision-maker to impose conditions of approval 
relating to the “cession” of land which is “directly related” to the needs arising from the 
approval concerned for the provision of engineering services to the property.  LUPO fails to 
specify what norms and standards apply for a determination in this regard or how one is to go 
about to establish whether more land has been required by the local authority than warranted.    
 
A company lodged land use applications with a municipality for the development of its 
property. The municipality approved those applications. At the time a regional feeder-collector 
road with a 32 m road width, that would partially cross a portion of the company’s property, 
was contemplated by the local authority. Normally a road reserve of 16 m for internal 
residential roads is regarded as adequate. The company was therefore prepared to give off a 
16 m strip of land that would accommodate one half of the regional road, once constructed, 
as it would also serve to provide access to the company’s property. However, the municipality 
required as a condition of approval that a 32 m strip of land should be given off to the 
authority free of compensation for road purposes.   
 
The company knew of many decisions in terms of which our courts have consistently ruled 
against authorities that attempted to take land without compensation. However, the company 
decided against lodging an appeal against the above-mentioned condition. It knew from past 
experience that appeals to the provincial authority could take more than a year to finalise, that 
an appeal would suspend the approval and that an appeal would imply that whilst the 
                                                 
5
  Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another: Supreme Court of Appeal 
 Case Number 291/07. 
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company had to continue servicing the development bond, it would not be able to do anything 
on site for at least a year or more.  Although the company did not lodge an appeal in respect 
of the requirement, it indicated to the municipal officials that the condition was regarded as 
ultra vires and continued with the development in phases. It also instituted action against the 
municipality in the Cape High Court to obtain compensation for one-half of the area which it 
was required to make available for the planned external road. 
 
The Cape High Court subsequently upheld the company's claim for compensation for the land 
concerned. The City of Cape Town appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the 
decision of the Cape High Court. The SCA inter alia (a) reduced the amount of compensation 
ordered by the court below; and (b) held that, as the company had a choice whether or not to 
develop and elected to develop, it could not be said that the manner in which the municipality 
acquired the additional land amounted to expropriation. No mention was made of the fact that 
the municipality exceeded its powers by requiring more land than that to which it was entitled, 
without compensation and that the company did not really have a choice not to develop or to 
first appeal, as these options had very high financial costs. The Constitutional Court refused 
to hear the matter as "there was no reasonable prospect of success" in challenging the SCA 
judgment.     
 
In example No. 1 the prospect of Mr X succeeding with an appeal to the provincial 
government was regarded as slim as “beach front” property owners’ smack of exclusivity, a 
concept not sitting comfortably with those in government.  Yet it can hardly be suggested that 
the onerous building lines imposed in respect of the applicant's property on municipal appeal 
is fair. Those that have objected to the subdivision were not required to comply with more 
onerous building lines. That onerous requirement implied a potential violation of the 
applicant's right to equal treatment.  In example 2 the enforcement of the outdated land use 
restriction combined with the disregard of the DFA principle calling for more compact towns, 
could not be described as unbounded faith in the rationality of the zoning instrument. Value-
free objectivity clearly did not prevail. The appeal to the provincial government regarding the 
municipal refusal for increased bulk did eventually enjoy success, probably because the 
proposal would have served to discourage urban sprawl.  It was an empty victory, however, 
as the applicant faced liquidation by the time that a positive decision was taken. In example 3 
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the company had one option only, namely to accept the refusal of the Constitutional Court to 
hear the matter. 
 
The results obtained in the three examples are bewildering and serves to discourage 
development. It falls outside the scope of this thesis to explore the different theoretical 
approaches and theories6 that may potentially explain the confusing decisions. The 
inconsistency of the authorities in dealing with land use planning applications is clear from 
those examples. The practical question remains why numerous aggrieved applicants still do 
not exhaust their internal remedies or approach the courts for relief. Possible reasons for their 
failure to take such action will become clear from the law review in Chapter 3. 
 
 1.4 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The Grootboom Constitutional-case7 serves as yet a further example of the type of problems 
experienced by ordinary people in relation to government accountability in the context of land 
use planning and development. Many years of government failure to undertake adequate and 
timeous land use planning and development to cater for the most basic needs of the poor 
resulted in the appalling conditions under which a large number of people are living in South 
Africa. Mrs Grootboom was one of a large group of people illegally occupying land earmarked 
for low-cost housing. They were forcibly evicted from the land, their shacks were bulldozed 
and burnt and their possessions destroyed. The Cape of Good Hope High Court ordered all 
three spheres of government immediately to provide them with tents and certain rudimentary 
services. That decision formed the basis for an appeal to the Constitutional Court, raising the 
state's obligations under the South African Constitution and concerned questions about the 
enforceability of fundamental rights.  The Constitutional Court judgment that followed made it 
clear that although the state is required to give effect to those rights, the question is always 
whether the measures taken by the state to realise the constitutional rights are reasonable. 
The court found that the local authority programme in force at the time fell short of the state's 
constitutional obligations and ordered the responsible authority to devise and implement a 
programme that would also provide relief for the people who had not been catered for in the 
initial local authority programme. 
 
                                                 
6
  E.g. the modern and post-modern approaches and complexity theory. 
7
  Grootboom judgment 2001(1) SA 46 (CC). 
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The Constitutional Court judgment could be regarded as a victory for justice. Yet it was an 
empty victory for Mrs Grootboom who died eight years after the judgment was handed down, 
still occupying her shack.  The importance of her story is that it raises a critical question about 
accountability; whether the current mechanisms for achieving effective government 
accountability are adequate. If not, it may be the Achilles-heel of our new democracy. 
Meredith gives many examples of the results of unanswerable authority in Africa.8 Every 
reasonable endeavour should be made to avoid a repetition in South Africa.  
 
In the researcher’s experience government is often permitted to abuse public power without 
risk of any challenge from members of the public. It raises the question why members of the 
public so often are not prepared to do anything in an attempt to curb the abuse of public 
power. The large number of reported court cases dealing with the abuse of public power may 
seem to indicate that there is indeed many members of the public that do take up the 
challenge. The researcher argues that the reported cases only represent the proverbial ears 
of the hippopotamus. This is so because numerous factors militate against the use of judicial 
processes to curb the abuse of public power.9 The reported court cases do, however, serve to 
confirm that a significant degree of maladministration exists in government. It raises the 
further question whether, in the face of maladministration persisting and apparently 
increasing, the judicial and legal mechanisms available to achieve government accountability 
should not perhaps be described as materially ineffective and defective.  
 
It is known that a reasonably large measure of dissatisfaction and discontent exist amongst a 
substantial proportion of the public regarding the manner in which government continues to 
act or fails to act. In these circumstances one would have expected higher voting percentages 
in elections. The relatively low voting percentages may indicate that the electorate do not 
regard elections as an effective mechanism for obtaining government accountability. The 
more people that regard the existing mechanisms aimed at achieving government 
accountability as ineffective, the higher the likelihood of non-accountable government.10  The 
less accountable government is, the more likely one is to encounter violence and other forms 
                                                 
8
  Meredith (2005). 
9
  See chapter 3 for a discussion of these factors, such as the high costs of litigation, the complexity of the 
 legislation, principles and other stringent legal requirements that have to be complied with and the 
 unwillingness of the courts to intervene as a result of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
10
  See argument of Adejumobi (2000: 11) in 3.5 above. 
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of ‘self-help’ to counter the impact of the abuse of public power. Counter-actions may disrupt 
peace, stability and orderly government processes.11 A healthy democracy requires an 
environment of peace and stability and an answerable government is unlikely to maintain 
such conditions of peace and stability.  In essence, if government is unanswerable, 
fundamental rights such as those contained in the Bill of Rights will be unenforceable and 
meaningless. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this research was to establish what exactly is meant by the 
constitutional requirements that local government and the public administration should be 
accountable and more particularly, to explore, describe and explain the available mechanisms 
for achieving government accountability and to assess the effectiveness and adequacy of 
those mechanisms.  This required thorough literature and law reviews (including a review of 
the South African case law). These exploratory studies inter alia aim (a) to provide an 
understanding of the accountability requirements found in legislation; (b) to provide an 
understanding of the available mechanisms for achieving government accountability; (c) to 
identify the reasons behind the perceived weaknesses of those mechanisms; (d) to describe 
the key challenges which one is likely to face and the guiding principles one should employ in 
a quest for improved government accountability; (e) to make suggestions as to solving 
accountability problems; and (f) to contribute to the existing body of scientific knowledge 
regarding government accountability. 
 
Secondary objectives of the research are to assess the current state or measure of 
government accountability within land use planning and development context from the 
perspectives of people actively involved in the field of study and to test the existing theories 
and explanations found in the literature.12 
                                                 
11
  Meredith's overview (2005) of occurrences within Africa over the past fifty years paints a truly horrifying 
 picture where opportunities have invariably been squandered and predatory opportunism combined to 
 create a downward spiral of human suffering and mayhem. 
12
  Mouton (1996: 119) refers to it as "embedding" or incorporating one's research into the body of 
 knowledge that is pertinent to the research problem being addressed. 
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1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Surprising little research has to date been undertaken in South Africa in the field of 
government accountability. In addition to the vacuum existing in the local literature, the 
researcher faced three major perplexing questions in considering the research methodology: 
how to measure the effectiveness of the available mechanisms intended to promote 
government accountability; how to locate the major weaknesses in the field of government 
accountability; and how to ensure that the data obtained would be valid and reliable.  No 
objective criteria exist for such an exercise. Even if it did, the analysis might have failed to 
identify the exact weak points in the system. The researcher settled on the idea of using the 
perspectives of persons in a target group identified as described above, as the best available 
indicator of the measure of effectiveness of the available mechanisms for government 
accountability. In addition the study aimed to locate the major weaknesses in the field of 
government accountability in order that meaningful recommendations could be made 
regarding steps to be taken to improve accountability at the local level.  
 
The need for the study arose out of a lack of basic information on the constitutional 
requirement of government accountability.  The research attempted to find answers to the 
following and related questions - what are the legal requirements relating to government 
accountability; what are the key mechanisms currently in place to promote government 
accountability; what is the role of our courts and public participation in the accountability 
process; are the available mechanisms adequate to ensure a reasonable measure of 
accountability; if inadequate, what are the main reasons behind the failure of the existing 
mechanisms; what could be done to overcome those weaknesses and to improve the system 
of government accountability in planning and development context? The first aim was to 
become conversant with basic facts and to create a general picture of what accountability is 
all about, to extend the knowledge base and understanding of government accountability. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The problems experienced in the field of land use planning and development, as highlighted 
by the examples discussed above, raised the critical question whether the current 
mechanisms for achieving effective government accountability were adequate. The research 
provided a contextual analysis of government accountability in the planning and development 
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field within the Western Cape. It was therefore subjective and exploratory in nature. For this 
reason a qualitative (as opposed to a quantitative) approach was used.13  The research 
followed the methodology of first undertaking thorough literature and law reviews, 
supplemented by the development of a questionnaire.  
 
The literature review firstly involved an attempt to identify all literature concerning government 
accountability held at the Stellenbosch University Library and available in the electronic 
media. It was followed by a thorough study of the literature thus identified and a critical 
assessment of the many opinions expressed by the learned authors concerned. The 
researcher inter alia examined the theoretical models used to describe the mechanics of 
elections, the purposes that elections supposedly serve and the effects of particular 
institutional arrangements on voters' control over politicians. The discretion with which elected 
office-bearers are endowed and the essential role of public participation in the processes of 
government were explored. 
 
The law review involved the identification and study of the many South African laws  
applicable in the land use planning and development context in the Western Cape. It was 
followed by the identification and study of potentially applicable reported judgments handed 
down by the South African superior courts over the years. The law review included a study of 
law text books dealing with matters related to government accountability, such as the doctrine 
of separation of powers, the rules governing the interpretation of laws and justiciability 
requirements. These matters are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.  
 
Through the literature and law reviews the researcher became more conversant with basic 
facts relating to government accountability, managed to create a general picture of what 
government accountability was all about and established what mechanisms were available to 
achieve such accountability. Those reviews enabled him to locate perceived major 
weaknesses in the field of government accountability.  
 
Against that background the researcher decided to place reliance on the perspectives of 
persons active in the field of study to serve as an indicator of the major weaknesses in the 
                                                 
13
  See Mouton (1996: 35) for a discussion of the two methodological paradigms. 
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field of government accountability within land use planning and development context. The 
researcher elected to use a questionnaire as an indirect measuring instrument for purposes of 
data collection. His choice was motivated by the desire to avoid direct interaction and to 
create distance between him and the participants in order to hopefully reduce any influence 
that he otherwise might have exerted on answers provided by participants. A list of 
characteristics denoted by the concept "accountability" for purposes of measurement was 
compiled, based on the knowledge gained in the process of the literature and law reviews.  
This was followed by compilation of a list of questions that were assumed to be elements of 
the phenomenon called accountability and presenting them to a sample of individuals in a 
questionnaire, from which the researcher could gain an overall impression.   
 
Since this research provided a contextual analysis of accountability, it was subjective in 
nature.  The data obtained was mainly qualitative in nature. Secondary sources of data 
included case law and since the researcher was active in the field of study, information 
obtained from his direct observation in his working environment was used to perform a control 
function for qualitative data obtained from respondents, not to serve as basis for such 
findings. The researcher used "content analysis" as the data analysis method, as this was 
considered to best reflect how government accountability appeared from a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective. Deduction logic was used and the study outcome was expected to be a basic or 
fundamental one. Further particulars regarding the approach used by the researcher in his 
supplementary study and the assumptions and limitations that applied in the research, will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
 
1.8 GLOSSARY 
Abstract terms, multiple and dissenting perspectives and ideological positions abound in 
accountability language. Most of the terms that one encounters when exploring the concept of 
accountability and key concepts for purposes of this thesis (e.g. planning, development and 
sustainability), are contested concepts.  A comprehensive overview of the emergent history, 
meanings, scope and functions of those concepts is beyond the scope of this thesis. Practical 
considerations do not allow the luxury of engaging fully with the very many fascinating 
debates in respect thereof.  Suffice to acknowledge that the meanings assigned to the 
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following words are necessarily incomplete, that it may be regarded as too narrow 
interpretations, representing a limited perspective and may not be appropriate to all contexts. 
 
As a point of departure the following words and phrases have the following meanings in this 
thesis, unless the context otherwise indicates.  
 
"accountability" means being obliged to answer to an authority for one's own acts or 
omissions and sometimes for the conduct of others and to "own your results" and 
"answerability" carries the same meaning;14 
 
"direct accountability" means that the agent is obliged to answer to the principal directly 
for the agent's own acts or omissions and sometimes for the conduct of others serving 
below the agent in the government (e.g. elected office-bearers are accountable to the 
legislatures); 
 
"legal accountability" means being obliged to answer to a court for one's acts or 
omissions and may include civil and criminal liability; 
 
"horizontal accountability" entails that the democratic institutions or separate public 
powers of government, respond and render accounts to one another; 
 
"mediated accountability" means indirect ways of accomplishing accountability 
between the agent and the principal, such as via the electoral process; 
 
"vertical accountability" refers to the relationship between the principal and the 
administrator (e.g. between those elected and the electorate or within a particular 
government hierarchy); 
 
“administrative action” generally means any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, by- 
 
                                                 
14
   Australasian Study of Parliament Group (2006). 
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(a) an organ of state, when exercising a power in terms of the South African Constitution 
or a provincial constitution or exercising a public power or performing a public function 
in terms of any legislation; or 
 
(b) a person or body, other than an organ of state, “when exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely 
affects the rights of any person, and which has a direct, external legal effect”;15 
  
"administrator" means an organ of state or any natural or juristic person taking administrative 
action16 in the exercise of public power and includes elected and appointed office bearers 
(such as ministers and municipal councillors), political structures (such as mayoral 
committees) and officials; 
  
"agent" means the elected candidate, government body and officials in the public 
administration that must give account to the principal; 
 
"consent uses" means land uses which are not primary use rights attaching to a property, but 
which may in the discretion of the competent authority be permitted; 
 
"culpability" means being blameworthy and may include liability for damages; 
 
"development" in relation to land use and as used in this thesis in a narrow sense, means to 
construct something on land or to convert the use of land to another purpose (i.e. physical 
land use) and may include, as part of a broader concept of development, economic,17 
human,18 and social19 development; 
 
"field of study" means the field of study of this thesis, namely government's accountability 
within the land use planning and development context in the Western Cape; 
                                                 
15
  See section 1 of the PAJA for a complete definition covering more than half a page. 
16
  As per section 1 of the PAJA.  
17
 I.e. the upward movement of an entire social system, which includes both economic and non-economic 
 elements (Seasons.1994: 10). 
18
  According to Burkey (1993: 35) development must begin with human (personal) development. 
19
 Social development includes investments and services carried out or provided by a community for the 
 mutual benefit of that community, such as health services and facilities. 
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"government" includes the spheres of government, the organs of state within each sphere of 
government, and the public administration that supports it;  
 
"jurisdiction" means a court's competence to adjudicate on and dispose of a matter;  
 
“organ of state” means “any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or 
local sphere of government” or any other functionary or institution “exercising a power or 
performing a function” in terms of the South African Constitution or a provincial constitution or 
any other legislation, “but does not include a court or a judicial officer”;20 
 
"planning" in relation to land use means the purposive activity of working out in advance a 
detailed scheme for land use management and the accomplishment of land use objectives;  
 
"planning law" means the statutory devices employed by the Legislatures to manage and 
regulate planning and development;21 
 
"principal" means the authority to which the administrator must give account, which includes 
all ordinary members of the public; 
 
"public" means each and everyone inside the boundaries of South Africa and may even 
include citizens travelling outside the country, whether singular or plural, whilst "public power" 
refers to the power of government as provided for in law;22 
 
“public administration” means that part of government which manages public affairs; 
 
“public power” means a power which an organ of state may exercise or a function that it may 
perform in terms of the National Constitution, a provincial constitution or any other legislation; 
 
                                                 
20
  Compare section 239 of the Constitution. 
21
  A term coined by Van Wyk (1999: 81) 
22
  The term "public" is preferred above "citizen". Citizen denotes a person who has full rights in a state and 
 excludes visitors to the country. Our Constitution distinguishes between a citizen (e.g. section 19) and 
 "everyone" or "no one". See fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights.  
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"responsibility" means the sphere or extent of the duty which has been entrusted to one by 
way of assignment or delegation and refers to the "charter powers entrusted to government" 
(Dunn, 1999a: 299); 
 
"rezoning" the change of the permissible land use from one purpose to another (e.g. from 
residential to commercial purposes) in terms of legislation such as LUPO;  
 
“spatial planning” refers to comprehensive planning undertaken for the physical organisation 
of space (i.e. to influence the distribution of people and activities in space) by way of 
geographical expression to an overall strategy derived from various government policies and 
directed towards balanced development and includes land use planning; 
 
"spheres of government" means the national, provincial and local spheres of government and 
include all organs of state within each sphere; 
 
"state" means the legislatures, the executives, the judiciary and all organs of state, including 
all the elected office bearers in government and staff in the public administration; 
 
"sustainable development" in relation to land use development means efficient and equitable 
physical land use "within the physical limits of the ecological systems of the earth sustaining 
it" aimed at making it possible for everyone to acquire the basics of food and improve their 
quality of life;23   
 
"sustainable planning" means to strike a balance between the many competing interests in 
the ecological, economical and social fields in a planned manner and to provide a clear 
pathway or direction in which to move or direct growth or progress that will offer the best 
chance of achieving sustainable development; 
 
"zoning" means a category of provisions stipulating the permissible land uses within that 
category and "zoning scheme" means legislation adopted by the authorities to regulate land 
uses. 
                                                 
23
  Hattingh, 2001: 6. 
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1.9 DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Many different types of accountability are encountered in the literature, ranging from 
accountability of pet food companies to accountability in the religious context. This thesis 
focuses on the category government accountability. Within that category there are many sub-
types of accountability, such as democratic, public, political or electoral accountability (which 
may basically be the same thing), legal accountability and social accountability (see glossary).  
The differences between the types of accountability are not of much practical significance. 
They are all important in their own right. The important fact is that effective government 
accountability is unlikely to be achieved if reliance is placed on one type of accountability 
mechanism only. 
 
Democratic accountability, to be accomplished via the electoral process, is always mediated 
and never direct. Mediated accountability may be explained by reference to the relationship 
between the voters and the elected representatives, that can be described as a multilinked 
chain of accountability. The elected agents are only indirectly accountable to the principals. In 
our democracy the elected office-bearers are accountable to the legislatures. The legislatures 
are in turn accountable to the broader public through elections. Their accountability is at best 
mediated. If the electoral mechanism of accountability were to be employed when a municipal 
official has abused public power, it would imply that the aggrieved party would have to wait 
until the next election to sanction the elected representative for the action of the non-elected 
official.  Overall appointed government officials are then relatively unaccountable to the 
electorate.  This thesis argues that a more direct form of accountability (as opposed to 
mediated vertical accountability between administrators and members of the public) is 
essential to make government officials answerable to the public. 
 
A distinction is inter alia made between horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal 
accountability would include accountability amongst the three spheres of government who, 
theoretically at least, is supposed to be on the same level. In this thesis the importance of 
horizontal accountability lies therein that some of the spheres of government have 
constitutional supervisory rights in respect of other spheres of government (see for example 
section 155(6) of the South African Constitution).  Such accountability also comes into play if, 
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for example, the national or provincial spheres of government should exceed their limited 
legislative powers concerning municipal planning. This they would do if they went beyond 
monitoring and support of local government as contemplated in section 155(6)(a) of the South 
African Constitution.  Vertical accountability is first of all the hierarchical types of 
accountability found in organisations where those in lower positions are answerable to those 
higher up in the ladder. Ironically the accountability of elected and non-elected administrators 
to members of the public is also a form of vertical accountability and it is this relationship 
which is the main focus of this thesis. The accountability required in this relationship is 
primarily in response to human rights and sustainable land use concerns. 
 
Practical considerations dictated that this thesis has a narrow focus. Firstly it is only 
concerned with government's accountability in land use planning and development context 
within the Western Cape. Secondly its main focus is consideration of government 
accountability from a ‘bottom up’ perspective, vertical accountability towards the public. 
Thirdly the focus is primarily, although not exclusively, on the accountability of appointed 
administrators (as opposed to elected representatives) as they take by far the most number of 
decisions in the government sphere that impact on the daily lives of people in this country. 
Obviously government accountability is much wider than that, encompassing major elements 
such as "horizontal accountability", the procedures and institutional arrangements to induce 
political representation (e.g. the ‘no-confidence’ mechanism), the role of checks and balances 
between government and the parliament (e.g. ministerial accountability) and so forth. These 
latter issues have either been relegated to the background or have not been discussed at all 
in order to focus this thesis. 
 
1.10 FURTHER ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
Accountability mechanisms are not restricted to elections and judicial processes. In law it is 
for instance possible through administrative measures to promote accountability (e.g. internal 
appeals) and provision also exists for alternative approaches that may be employed when the 
formal accountability mechanisms fail (e.g. demonstrations and service delivery protests). A 
number of state institutions were also established to strengthen constitutional democracy in 
the Republic, such as the Public Protector and the Electoral Commission. In order to focus 
this thesis only an overview was provided in Chapter 2 of administrative courts and in Chapter 
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3 of administrative measures and alternative approaches for attaining government 
accountability. For the same reason practical constraints dictated only a brief reference to 
those state institutions in Chapter 3, without detailed examination.  
 
Public participation in government processes is an essential mechanism and ingredient for 
achieving government accountability within the field of study.  The mechanisms provided for 
achieving government accountability are primarily intended for use by members of the public. 
The essential role of public participation in the processes of government will be explored in 
Chapter 2, whilst the different mechanisms provided through legislation for promoting 
government accountability will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
1.11 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, of which this introduction is the first. Each chapter 
commences with an overview or brief introduction, a description of the purpose of the chapter, 
followed by a more detailed body and a conclusion. 
 
Chapter 1 provides a brief background to the topic, emphasising the important role of 
accountability in curbing the abuse of public power. It provides a problem definition and 
describes the research objective and theoretical framework within which such research had to 
be undertaken.  Examples were given of cases that the researcher regards as typical of 
everyday experiences of people active in the field of study. Those examples have led to the 
development of a supplementary study and the identification of gaps in the literature, 
discussed below. Several research questions were raised and the theoretical framework and 
research methodology employed in the study were discussed. Chapter 1 incorporates a 
glossary. 
 
In Chapter 2 a literature review related to the research problem was carried out to illuminate 
the idea of accountability in general, to provide a solid theoretical foundation for the 
assessment of the government's accountability in later chapters and to review some of the 
basic concepts underlying accountability. Practical considerations dictated that this thesis has 
a narrow focus as described above. Chapter 2 commences with a conceptual analysis of the 
term "accountability" and explores the notion of accountability with reference to its 
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philosophical underpinnings.  It explores the substance, dimensions and processes of 
accountability within the context of elections, the essential role of public participation in the 
processes of government and the limitations to accountability within democratic institutions. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of administrative courts as employed abroad to obtain a 
measure of government accountability. 
 
Accountability must take place within a given legal framework. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of some of the Constitutional provisions aimed at establishing and strengthening 
democracy in South Africa. The researcher observed in his literature review that the literature 
from abroad on accountability shows a distinct disregard for legal questions. To overcome this 
blindspot the researcher included in chapter 3 an overview of our judicial system and 
available judicial processes and highlighted some of the more important shortcomings of the 
court system as an accountability mechanism.  This overview was considered necessary for 
the proper interpretation of the data collected in the study. 
 
Chapter 4 provides further particulars of the researcher’s approach to the supplementary 
study that was undertaken to establish whether others active in the field of study also viewed 
government as unaccountable within the field of study. Attention was invited to some of the 
assumptions underlying the research questions, pointing to the existence of limitations that 
might potentially prevent one from attainting the truth. It describes the actual process of fact-
finding involving a target group, provides analyses of the data obtained, describes and 
discusses the research findings and relates the findings to the literature and law reviews. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the contemporary position of government accountability in the field of 
study on the basis of insights from practical examples. It explores contextual challenges, such 
as understanding the complexities of accountability and reflects on the problems of diversity 
and clashes of interests, in the context of the problems experienced and the difficulties that 
arise with accountability in the Western Cape. Consideration is given to the changes required 
to achieve and maintain effective government accountability. Key challenges facing those 
who wish to achieve a continuous improvement in effective accountability to the local 
population have been described. Suggestions are put forward in chapter 5 on interventions 
required for promoting genuine government accountability. The intention is to consider how 
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practical effect can be given to the right to accountability without the need to rely on social 
movements and resort to alternative methods. The need for urgent action to improve 
accountability of all three spheres of government within the stated context was highlighted. 
This thesis calls for a radical reformation of the current approach to government 
accountability, involving inter alia the establishment of a new structure empowered to enquire 
into the merits of decisions taken by public authorities.  It concludes by recommending a 
people-driven bottom-up incremental approach for achieving effective government 
accountability and by making suggestions for future research. 
 
1.12 CONCLUSION 
This thesis is concerned with the measure of government accountability within the Western 
Cape within the context of land use planning and sustainable development, as described 
above. The main objectives of this Chapter was to introduce the topic of government 
accountability, to clarify the meaning of some of the concepts encountered when exploring the 
concept of accountability, to provide the motivation for the study, the problem statement and 
research objective, to sketch the theoretical framework for the study, to report on research 
related matters and to describe the structure of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 provided a brief background to the topic of government accountability and 
emphasised the important role of accountability in curbing the abuse of public power. In this 
chapter a conceptual analysis of the notion of accountability and a literature review of 
selected concepts are undertaken to ascertain the current state of knowledge regarding 
government accountability. It would appear from the literature discussed in this chapter that 
government accountability is primarily based on democratic accountability through elections, 
although further methods such as administrative and legislative measures are also employed 
to achieve government accountability. This chapter examines the theoretical models used to 
describe the mechanics of elections, the purposes that elections supposedly serve, the 
effects of particular institutional arrangements on voters' control over politicians and the 
discretion with which elected office-bearers are endowed. The writer sought to expose the 
substance of democratic government accountability. Some of the basic concepts and 
assumptions underlying accountability and the theories are explored to identify potential gaps 
in research undertaken to date and to frame appropriate research questions.  
 
Internal and external dimensions of government accountability are distinguishable. Elections, 
the role of parliament, other local dimensions such as revitalising24 and reconfiguring the state 
institutions and expanding the scope of civil society activities are all internal dimensions of 
government accountability. Contested elections fall short of being a sufficient condition for 
accountability (Dunn, 1999a: 334). Engendering accountable governance must take a wider 
range of transactions than giving or withholding one's vote. Therefore the other internal local 
dimensions that are germane to evolving accountable government are critical when 
considering ways and means of improving government accountability. Public participation by 
the governed in their government is a critical component of government accountability and the 
cornerstone of democracy. It therefore is an essential ingredient of planning and development 
(see par 2.4 below).  Abroad administrative courts also offer the opportunity for the public to 
obtain government accountability and a brief overview of those courts will be provided in par 
                                                 
24
  It includes law reform, insulation from undue political influence, capacity building, decentralisation and 
 reduction of external control and influences. Adejumobi, 2000:7. 
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2.6 below. In Chapter 3 the legal framework within which democratic accountability should be 
accomplished (including the statutory devices employed to promote government 
accountability) is explored.  The statutory devices are supplemented by government policies 
inter alia aimed at promoting transparency, oversight by citizens and pro-active planning, 
some of which have been discussed in par 1.1.  
 
The external dimensions of accountability include accountability to and of donors, agencies, 
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations and so forth (Adejumobi, 2000: 12; 
Bouckaert & Peters, 2004: 22; Talbot, 2004: 6).  The potential negative impact of those 
external influences on government accountability warrants consideration as part of developing 
an overall strategy to improve government accountability. The major emphasis in the literature 
from abroad on accountability and the narrow focus of this Chapter is on the role of elections 
as a dominant process to achieve accountability in the public sphere and, to a lesser degree, 
on administrative courts. In order to focus the thesis the other internal and external 
dimensions of accountability were therefore not examined.  
 
The examination of the literature aims at understanding what activities or performance 
government is accountable for, the nature of the citizen's instruments for sanction or reward, 
and whether or to what extent elections are sufficient to induce government to act in the 
interests of citizens.  Certain gaps in the literature are identified and a number of examples 
are described that raise particular concerns about government accountability.  
 
2.2 THE NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
This section explores the notion of democratic accountability. According to the literature it is to 
be achieved via the mechanism of elections. The public power relationship in which 
accountability is embedded, the meaning of accountability and the related concepts of 
responsibility, representivity and responsiveness are considered. The notion of accountability 
is explored with reference to its philosophical underpinnings in political theory. Limitations to 
accountability within democratic institutions are considered and questions are raised 
regarding the validity of the theories advanced in the literature.  
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2.2.1 Meaning of accountability 
Three near synonymous terms, accountability, responsibility and answerability, provides a 
starting point for arriving at an operational definition of "accountability".  An examination of the 
meaning of the concept of accountability essentially requires simultaneous consideration of 
the meanings of the other two terms. Elster (1999: 255) confirms that these terms are 
essentially defined through each other. Accountability is also tied up with other concepts such 
as blame, liability and punishment.  Examination of the terms of responsibility and 
answerability in turn leads to further terms to be explored, such as the concepts of 
representivity and responsiveness.  Responsibility and answerability have been briefly 
defined in the glossary. A more detailed analysis of the terms responsibility, representivity and 
the requirement for responsiveness is undertaken in this part. 
 
Accountability is an ambitious yet vague concept with several different and divergent 
meanings. It defies simple definition. It can serve conflicting agendas and means different 
things to different people and organisations, depending on their values or the ideological 
stance adopted.  In its most basic sense accountability means to be answerable for one's 
actions or behaviour (Dunn, 1999a: 298). In a narrow sense it suggests the act of accounting 
for something, of providing an explanation, reason or justification for something.  
 
“As with all contested concepts, there is a shared core meaning of accountability. It is linked 
to the meaning of responsibility” (Lakoff & Smith, 2007: 2). It implies that one has a 
responsibility and may be required to account for one's own conduct or the conduct of others. 
An administrator who is responsible can be made to answer for not acting in accordance with 
that responsibility. That is where the commonality ends.  Responsibility in turn implies the 
existence of a power relationship between the one being required to give account and the one 
to who account is to be given. One could think of accountability in this sense as a relation of 
power between members of the public and administrators, as an ‘interactive game’ (Dunn, 
1999b : 335). 
 
Accountability is sometimes used synonymously with concepts such as liability and 
responsibility (Dutch, 1966: 367 par. 917). It is argued here that accountability must also be 
understood in a broader sense of liability, that ‘answerability’ implicitly includes the idea of 
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liability. The mere explanation of what went wrong and why would, on its own, be 
meaningless.  An idea contained in the concept of accountability is that, once the account has 
been given and taken, something can be done if such an account is not satisfactory. This 
"something" which can be done in respect of unsatisfactory account-giving could, for 
example, take the form of redress or corrective action. In order to be meaningful, 
accountability for unsatisfactory account-giving should lead to either avoidance of a repetition 
of problems and/ or improvement of the situation in respect of which account has been given. 
This can, for example, be achieved by termination of the culprit's employment contract. 
 
2.2.2 Context: Public power relationship 
The specific context within which accountability is embedded qualifies it. In the chosen 
context accountability is an aspect of governance and relates to problems in both public and 
private worlds. The specific, narrower focus of this thesis is the exercise of public power by 
those in positions of authority within the three spheres of government in the field of study. 
 
Democracy is generally recognised as a system through which rulers are elected. The 
proposition relies on the arguments that democracy is a system that is supposed to bring 
about rule according to the will of the people because it requires accountable government and 
that accountability is enforced by elections (Fearon, 1999: 82).  
 
The agency model is dominant in literature concerning democratic accountability.25 In terms of 
that model accountability is conceived as a relation between two parties, namely the agent 
and the principal (see glossary).  Ferejohn (1999: 134) refers to at least two applications of 
this model in a democracy; firstly the relationship between the voters and the elected 
politicians is conceived in principal-agent terms and secondly such a relationship also exists 
between the executive branch and the legislature. The literature review is concerned with the 
relationship between voters and the elected politicians, as the agency model does not apply 
to the relationship between the public administration and the voters.  Within the relation 
between voters and the elected representatives the ‘agent’ is regarded as being accountable 
to the ‘principal’ if the agent is empowered and obliged to act in some way on behalf of the 
                                                 
25
  E.g.  Ferejohn (1999: 134), Maraval (1999: 155) and Stimson (1999: 199). 
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principal and the principal is empowered by formal or informal rules to hold the agent 
effectively liable or reward the agent (Fearon, 1999: 55-6; Dunn, 1999b: 334). 
 
Public power may be exercised in many ways. The promulgation of legislation, the adoption of 
zoning schemes and the approval or refusal of land use applications serve as examples. 
Understandably the activities of administrators impact on a daily basis on the quality of the 
lives of everyone in South Africa, both directly and indirectly. It may take the form of 
environmental impacts (e.g. approval of insensitive development or failure to impose 
appropriate conditions of approval to ensure mitigation of negative environmental 
consequences). It may also take the form of economic impacts (e.g. resulting from the 
approval of inappropriate development on a neighbouring property) and socio-economic 
impacts (e.g. job creation resulting from implementation of approved development).  In terms 
of their instruments of control the prior approval of the competent authorities are required for 
undertaking controlled activities.  Those authorities may impose excessively onerous 
conditions when granting approval that may have dire financial consequences for applicants, 
if acted upon.   
 
The activities of administrators must also be understood to include inactivity,26 in the sense  
that the failure or refusals to act by those in positions of public authority also constitute 
"activity".  If, for example, an applicant has funded the acquisition of land by raising a loan, 
the failure of government to process a development application within a reasonable time 
period will result in the applicant being required to service interest payments on the 
development bond for an extended period. Such inactivity on the part of government may 
therefore have dire financial consequences for the applicant.   
 
The exercise of public power may call for the interpretation of applicable legislation, zoning 
schemes, planning documents and policy directives and usually involves the exercise of 
discretion. This is especially so when contested applications are assessed and conflicting 
views have to be evaluated.  It would appear from media coverage that people from all walks 
of life are increasingly concerned as to how well the administrators are using public power 
                                                 
26
  E.g. section 6(3) of the PAJA provides for the right to apply for judicial review in the event that the 
 authority concerned fails to take a decision within the time period specified in the applicable legislation. 
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and how wise they exercise discretion in these circumstances. Accountability is at the heart of 
these concerns.  
  
2.2.3 Responsibility examined 
Returning now to the concept of ‘responsibility’, it is useful to examine the meanings, pre-
requisites and implicit requirements in its definition. Basically responsibility implies having to 
respond when questioned. With responsibility then comes accountability (Lackoff & Smith, 
2007: 5). Responsibility itself is contested and has different meanings. In the USA, 
progressives and conservatives, for example, “mean systematically different things when they 
use the word” (Lakoff & Smith, 2007: 3). To progressives it would mean social as well as 
personal responsibility - responsibility for oneself (i.e. personal or individual responsibility) and 
everyone else who could be harmed by the administrator's action or failure (i.e. social or 
public responsibility).  To conservatives it usually means individual responsibility only. This 
thesis considers the conservative approach as insufficient for achieving effective government 
accountability and supports the broader progressive approach.  
 
Empowerment (i.e. the authority to perform certain acts) is a pre-requisite for responsibility. 
Without such empowerment there is no requirement for action.  In the absence of legislation 
providing anything to the contrary, the accountability of administrators is generally limited, 
consistent with their direct responsibilities.  Administrators are generally not accountable for 
matters over which they have no authority.27  It is the act of empowerment that establishes the 
relationship between the administrator and the principal (Burke, 1986 cited by Dunn, 1999a: 
299.).  Empowerment may take place through instruments of appointment, assignment or 
delegation of authority.  The individual or body that makes such appointment, assignment or 
delegation of authority (e.g. the municipal council or the legislature) will be the principal in 
those circumstances. 
 
A further dimension of the concept of responsibility is acceptance of the responsibility of the 
authority granted by the administrator, and discretion to act on that authority. (Dunn, 1999a: 
300).  Acceptance of responsibility is implicit in the administrator's acceptance of office or 
appointment.  Office bearers are required to manage a complex set of multiple 
                                                 
27
  Provision exists for ministers to attract collective and individual responsibility and accountability. See, 
 for example, section 92(1) of the Constitution. 
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accountabilities28. One must accept, for example, that delegations are essential within 
government context and that with delegations decision will have to be made by other people 
lower down in the hierarchy. The delegator nevertheless remains responsible, inter alia to 
insure that procedures are in place that will ensure that the delegatees do not make party 
politically-motivated decisions, requiring delegatees to make the bases for decisions 
transparent and providing for internal challenges of decisions taken under delegated 
authority. The delegator should not be permitted to disassociate herself from responsibility in 
respect of matters delegated to sub-ordinates. Real accountability means accepting 
responsibility for the outcome of your choices. In other words, it means ‘owning your results’ 
(Freedman, 2003: 1). The evasion of responsibility and adopting a passive role would imply 
non-accountability. 
 
Dunn (1999a: 300) argues that accountability seeks to assure that administrators act within  
the legal framework of their empowerment. Implicit in the definition of ‘responsibility’ is 
limitations on the power granted and the manner in which it may be exercised. Such 
limitations and requirements may come about in various ways. The administrator's powers 
may be expressly limited in terms of the empowering or applicable legislation, e.g. section 
17of LUPO in respect of rezonings. It may also be expressly limited in terms of the acts of 
assignment or delegation, e.g. the conditions imposed by the Provincial Administration when 
local authorities were given delegated authority to decide applications for rezoning 
(Community Services Branch, 1988). Implicit limitations on the powers of administrators may 
also be found in the conditional nature of the empowerment (e.g. provisions that make the 
exercise of the power conditional upon compliance with procedural requirements) or in the 
South African administrative law.29  If an authority has undertaken pro-active planning and 
has adopted policies, such planning and policies could potentially create boundaries to 
powers that have been delegated. Without limitations and accountability the administrator's 
discretion would be unfettered and could lead to the abuse of public power.  
                                                 
28
  The responsibility of administrators for the stewardship of assets is important within accountability 
 context, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider same.  
29
  E.g. the rules of natural justice. The audi alteram partem rule and the administrative law requirement 
 to "apply one's mind" are perhaps the best known examples. 
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2.2.4 Philosophical underpinnings 
The origin of the concept accountability, from a philosophical point of view, is not clear. To a 
certain extent the theoretical arguments and propositions on which the idea of accountability 
is based, tend to display links with the social contract theory, a dominant theory in the western 
tradition of political philosophy. It was popularised by Jean Jacques Rousseau more than two 
and a half centuries ago. The social contract sees principles of justice as the outcome of a 
notional social contract among putative equals (Solomon, 1990: 10). The justification for 
government, according to this theory, is a voluntary agreement among individuals "that each 
will yield all his rights to the community as a whole, and freely submit to the general will" 
(Rousseau, 1762: 378). [Emphasis added].  This thesis makes no attempt to re-invoke the old 
idea of the social contract. Suffice it to say, as Manin et al (1999: 12) does, that the 
construction adopted in democratic models of accountability of voters offering the government 
a contract and so forth, is obviously artificial.  
 
The theoretical link between democracy and accountability passes via elections.  
Traditionally elections have been regarded as the ultimate instrument intended to secure 
representivity and continuing government responsiveness30 to the dynamics of public 
preference on the part of the elected office-bearers.  In this view accountability induces 
representation and responsiveness.  Political theory on democratic accountability traditionally 
relied on mandate and representation to explain elections as the mechanism through which 
democratic accountability is enforced. It is based on two propositions (Cheibub & Przerworski, 
1999: 222). The first is that accountability of the government to the electorate is the 
distinguishing factor of democracy as a political regime. The second proposition is that 
elections are the mechanism for enforcing accountability.  
 
In theory the vote is used in elections for one of two purposes or as a combination of the two.  
In terms of the literature (Fearon, 1999: 70; Cheibub & Przerworski, 1999: 239; Laver & 
Shepsle, 1999: 285 & Manin et al, 1999: 44) elections primarily serve to work as a selective 
device (the "mandate view") or as a sanctioning device (the "accountability view").  
Responsiveness plays a major part in political philosophy. The process begins with interests 
and values. Theoretically preferences over policies are signalled to politicians though 
                                                 
30
  Dahl,1970 as quoted by Maraval (1999: 155). 
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elections and other forms of political expression (Manin et al, 1999: 8).  If government adopts 
the preferred policies it is regarded as responsive.  The electoral candidates are motivated to 
produce responsiveness and mould their behaviour to anticipated voter preferences. In the 
"mandate view", an election is a form of control exercised ex ante. In terms thereof elections 
involve prospective voting and voters allegedly think about elections more in terms of 
selection than sanctioning.  In this view, voters use elections to choose good governments 
(Fearon, 1999: 60). The winning policy platform becomes the mandate of government. 
According to Manin et al (1999: 29), “elections serve to select good policies or policy-bearing 
politicians”. Government representivity is achieved because good policies or representatives 
are selected (Cheibub & Przerworski, 1999: 238).  Representation is not induced by the fear 
of electoral sanctions. It is the candidates themselves that enforce the principal-agent 
relationship in this model (Maraval, 1999: 155).  
 
The emphasis with prospective voting is primarily on what the voter believes the candidate 
will do once elected (based on statements made and policies proposed in the course of the 
electoral campaign, rather than on past performance). Voters who use their votes 
prospectively generally choose on the basis of their observations, although it may include 
reliance on retrospective information (i.e. the past performance of the incumbent). With 
retrospective voting, on the other hand, the voter places more emphasis on past performance 
of the electoral candidate (to sanction or reward) rather than on statements made in the 
course of the electoral campaign. 
 
The mandate view of accountability entails prospectively an adverse selection problem for the 
voter: how to avoid electing a bad representative. The sad truth is that there is no way of 
ensuring prospectively that those elected will act in accordance with voter preferences once in 
office (Dunn, 1999b: 342; Maraval, 1999: 158). Using the vote prospectively is regarded as 
costly in terms of voters control over incumbents. Cheibub and Przerworski (1999: 239) 
argues that the power of the incentives is less for the incumbent if the vote is used 
prospectively.  
 
In contrast in the pure "accountability view" an election is understood in the tradition of 
democratic theory exclusively as a sanctioning device of political accountability, a form of 
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control exercised ex post (Cheibub & Przerworski, 1999: 225). According to Manin et al 
(1999: 41) the “… standard view of how electoral accountability operates relies on 
retrospective voting”. In terms of this view voters set performance criteria against which 
government performance may be evaluated. The voter is enabled to hold the elected 
politician democratically responsible for past performance and to either sanction the principal 
with defeat or reward the principal with re-election (Maraval, 1999: 155).  Elected office-
bearers who desire to retain their positions are fear induced to act in terms of voters 
preferences. They choose in the public interest in anticipation of judgment of the voters, to 
ensure positive evaluation at the time of the next election (Manin, 1999: 42). 
 
In the accountability view model a form of "adverse selection" is also at play but in a different 
sense: the incumbents who strayed are not re-elected (Stimson, 1999: 198). The incumbents 
are accountable if the probability of them remaining in office decreases the more they stray 
from voters' preferences.  Manin et al (1999.4) and other proponents of democratic theory 
claim that democracy systematically causes governments to be representative as a result of 
the continued responsiveness of the government to voter preferences.   
 
Elster (1999: 275) suggests that all political systems rest on a combination of control ex ante 
and accountability ex post.  This means that voters have one instrument only (namely 
elections) to achieve two goals, namely to select good government (i.e. the best politicians 
and policies), and to induce them to act in accordance with voters preferences whilst in office 
(Ferejohn, 1999: 131). Responsiveness, on this view, is a consequence of interaction with the 
institutional structure. 
 
The general consensus of opinion appears to be that accountability is critical for effective 
government and its credibility with the public, with the emphasis being on the promotion of 
public trust in government.  Elster (1999: 276) distinguishes between two further purposes of 
accountability: incapacitation and deterrence. Dunn (1999a: 298) in turn argues that the 
mechanisms that impose accountability ultimately seek to achieve responsiveness (i.e. a 
narrow view adopted from the perspective of electoral accountability). Effective government 
accountability calls for a broader view. The purpose of accountability includes redress and 
correction. The vertical relationship of authority seeks to provide at least some degree of 
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remedy.  Accountability must ultimately focus on the obligation of administrators to the public 
for explanation and justification of their use of public power  
 
The theories on which the idea of democratic accountability relies, in turn rely on a number of 
untested assumptions and propositions that often assume without argument or analysis.  The 
theory of representivity, for example, is based on the proposition that politicians are elected 
because the policies that they support or are likely to support, are representative of the 
electorate's preferences. The second assumption is that the politicians, once elected, will 
continue to act in accordance with the electorate's preferences or will adjust their actions to 
bring it in line with those preferences.  Further assumptions include that the elected 
incumbent will seek re-election; that the voter's choice of a candidate is a rational (not 
emotional) decision; that those elected would like to be believed next time around and that the 
voters are sufficiently well informed to reach the correct decision. This thesis argues that 
there is no factual basis for these assumptions as there is no indication in the literature 
reviewed that the theories are based on empirical evidence. The validity of the apparently 
untested speculation to the underpinnings of elections as a mechanism to obtain 
accountability is therefore doubtful. This practical question remains whether the fact that 
politicians are elected to government is sufficient to cause government to act in a 
representative manner.  
 
2.3 THE SUBSTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Dunn (1999b: 331) confirms that accountability is designed to accommodate the fact that in 
any government rules will always in fact be implemented (or not implemented) by persons.  
This section seeks to expose the substance of government accountability by asking the 
following questions: For what is government accountable and to whom?  The questions what 
government is required to do, includes a question as to how government should do it. Those 
questions are discussed in turn.  
 
It has traditionally been accepted that government is required to act in the public interest or in 
the best interest of the people31 or community. According to Alexander (2002, as cited by 
Hillier, 2003: 161) the initial position in Western liberal democracies was that planning has 
                                                 
31
  See for example Manin (1999: 5) and Alexander, 2002 as cited by Hillier, 2003: 161. Section 42(3) of 
 the South African Constitution provides that Parliament is elected to represent the people.  
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therefore traditionally demonstrated implementation of the broadly utilitarian notion of ‘the 
public interest’. This approach reflects the need for representing the collective interests of the 
community (Klosterman, 1985: 162).  The key concepts of ‘public’, ‘people’ and ‘community’ 
are, however, not neutral and have been interpreted in many ways over the years. And the 
fact that the concept of public interest can be interpreted differently has opened up the 
opportunity for administrators to abuse the term as the façade for the defence of decisions 
taken in the exercise of public power. 
 
It is generally acknowledged that there is not a single public interest to be served, but a 
heterogeneous public with many voices and conflicting interests (Campbell & Fainstein, 1996: 
10). Furthermore that each group encompasses a host of divergent points of view, "competing 
vested interests, and splintered subgroups” (Arnstein, 1969: 217) which Healey (1992: 151) 
argues can only be resolved through power struggle between conflicting forces. Campbell and 
Fainstein (1996: 7) also confirm that within society at large the values of democracy, equality, 
and efficiency often clash. Administrators are therefore required to attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting interests as well as the conflicting goals of economic development, social justice, 
and environmental protection.  All of this leads to recognition that sustainable development 
does not have a ‘one-size-fits-all meaning’ and, as Muller (2006: 4) argues, that local meaning 
for sustainable development should be constructed through a bottom-up learning process and 
"making connections [between various] ideas and people" . 
 
Individuality should retain a central place in the conception of accountability and the 
community. Virtually all activity and enterprise takes place in social context, within the 
community as the primary, basic unit of social life. Communal values determine the norms 
and expectations that define accountability. Solomons (1990: 100) points out that the word 
community can serve as a euphemism for a sense of enforced group solidarity, an illusory 
fantasy of "harmonious togetherness".  He warns against the danger of a potentially 
totalitarian image of a coherent, single-minded state, "… one in which our identities are wholly 
tied up with the community from which we can not escape".  Communities are made up of 
independent and often obstinate individuals, whose membership in that particular community 
is almost contingent rather than essential. Most of us are also simultaneously members of 
several communities (e.g. in the neighbourhood and at work) and the character of the 
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community may well lie in its diversity (Solomons, 1990: 93). The exploration of the 
community as a major actor in accountable government should therefore start of with the 
ordinary citizen, the marginalized and oppressed, the rich and the poor, the reader and the 
researcher. The individual has fundamental rights. This thesis argues that even if the 
collective of persons should be disinterested in the rights of a particular individual, it should 
not disqualify that individual to participate in government processes as an individual and to 
demand accountability on her own.  The idea is to locate the elements of accountability within 
and towards the individual, not on external influences and constraints imposed upon the 
individual by society.  
 
This thesis now turns to consider the second related question, i.e. how government is 
expected to perform its functions. Traditionally government was required to act within the law 
and to be reasonable and fair in the exercise of public power. According to Collins (2004: 558, 
1352) ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ mean, amongst other things, to show sound judgement and to be 
free from discrimination. This thesis argues that, implicit in those requirements is that 
administrative decisions should satisfy the requirement of objectivity or value free decisions. 
These requirements relate to the impersonal stance that the decision-maker should adopt in 
order to arrive at a fair and reasonable decision. The difficulty is that administrative action is 
not the simple mechanical application of a formula or standard rules that will tell one how to 
arrive at the correct decision or that apply in all circumstances, a nifty decision-making 
procedure that will always render the correct results.  
 
Cilliers (1998:122) argues convincingly that all our decisions have an ethical or value-based 
nature, referring to the inevitable choices that cannot be backed up scientifically or 
objectively. As there is no final objective or calculable ground for our decisions, we cannot 
shift responsibility for the decision on to something or someone else. The ethical components 
encountered in organisations may relate to the values and preferences of the members of the 
organisation and are often referred to as merely “politics”, something separate to the 
organization’s real operation and goals. Cilliers (2000: 29) argues that the political aspects of 
the interactions in an organization are not something extraneous to the working of that 
organization, but integral to its working. In other words, the ethical position is not something 
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imposed on an organisation from outside. It is part of the governance culture, which Healey 
(2004) calls "deeply embedded cultural assumptions" (see “administrative obstacles” below). 
 
What is reasonable and fair mostly involves the exercise of discretion and consideration of a 
broad range of aspects, often requiring the weighing of competing interests and may involve 
internal contradictions and conflicts.  It requires judgement, is contextual and not primarily a 
matter of abstract principle or a postulated ideal state against which the real world should be 
contrasted. Administrators are required to cope with a multiplicity of discourses – not one 
single truth, but different perspectives. The planning system is multidimensional and complex, 
and, by its nature, requires a multi-perspective and holistic approach. When the basic thinking 
is applied to real people who differ in all sorts of ways, consensus is lacking as to how the 
different considerations are to be weighed against each other.  
 
Solomons (1990: 211) argues convincingly that no such impersonal stance is humanly 
possible. Objectivity presupposes some subjective orientation, some framework within which 
anything matters. The administrator will always have her own set of values. Our sense of 
what is fair and reasonable begins not with principle but with a feeling.  Personal sentiments 
shall always, to a greater or lesser degree, interfere with the properly dispassionate and 
impartial workings of reason. In the same vein this thesis argues that it is not possible to 
comply with the statutory requirement that municipal officials should act impartially and treat 
all people equally.32 It is a praiseworthy ideal, nothing more and nothing less. Clear guidelines 
contained in government policies as to the weight to be attached to competing interests and 
clear government directives on what should receive preference in terms of government 
thinking, may go a long way towards reducing the influence of personal sentiments on the 
part of the decision-maker. Pro-active planning may also make decisions by administrators 
less ad hoc.  Overall the mere existence of an independent body exercising supervisory 
jurisdiction, such as administrative courts discussed in par 2.6 below, may additionaly serve 
to discourage decision-makers to allow their personal sentiments to play too prominent a role 
in the manner in which they exercise discretion.  
 
                                                 
32
  Item 2(e) of Schedule 2 to the MSA. 
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What government is required to do in terms of the present South African legislation, should 
not just be restricted to specific functions and duties entrusted to the authority concerned (e.g. 
to provide basic municipal services to the community). That which government is required to 
do, extends beyond the express statutory obligations of government.  For example, although 
the South African laws may not contain express provisions that require the national 
government  to ensure an effective and efficient public administration, it is implicit in the 
legislation that national government is required to do just that. Without such an administration 
the spheres of government will not be able to effectively accomplish express statutory 
objectives set by the Legislatures.  Government must therefore be held to account for 
effective and efficient public sector management, underpinned by strong accountability 
mechanisms.  It must improve all aspects of governance for the fulfilment of statutory 
obligations and objectives, such as effective service delivery and the promotion of socio-
economic development.  
 
The view of democratic accountability encountered in the literature, which emphasises only 
the relationship between voters and those elected/ to be elected is regarded as too narrow a 
view.  Traditionally it has been accepted that government owes an obligation of accountability 
to the public.  In a rather narrow view, some theorists have required that the elected be made 
accountable to their constituents. Constituents are only part of the public. It is clear from the 
wording of inter alia the present South African Constitution that everyone within the country 
has certain fundamental rights, which includes visitors and children who may not have voting 
power. The obligation to be accountable should furthermore not be restricted to the elected 
only, but should extend to those appointed to the public administration. As appointed officials 
are not elected, the electoral mechanism is not available to induce them to be accountable. A 
broader perspective is therefore required in terms of which the elected representatives and 
the appointed officials will be accountable not only to the electorate, but to the broader public. 
 
Democratic accountability implies accountability to the majority. Przeworski (2009: 1) points 
out that even “… in a direct democracy, decisions of a majority are binding on everyone, 
including the minority…”. It is the majority vote that puts the victorious political party into 
power. It is therefore the majority that can potentially use the vote effectively to reward or 
sanction the elected in office by re-election or withholding their support at the next election.  It 
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fails to provide effectively for accountability towards individuals. Although the collective 
interest may generally be the yard-stick for measurement of government performance, it will 
be shown that there are instances where individuals (as the building blocks of the democratic 
society) should "call the shots" and where democratic accountability is ineffective to protect 
individual rights. At the heart of democratic accountability lies public participation. 
 
2.4 ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Theron (2005: 119) suggests that public participation is best understood holistically and 
multidimensionally, as a means of empowering people to have control "over which and how 
things are done" and a process of building social and human capital.33 Suffice it to say that it 
always denotes a continuous ongoing process, usually to identify and satisfy multi-
dimensional ever-changing and competing needs and to achieve sometimes conflicting goals.  
 
As public participation of the governed in their government is a critical component of 
government accountability, the Legislatures have created local factors that are germane to 
evolving accountable government. They have inter alia provided for citizenship and related 
rights, democratised political power at the local level, expanded the scope of civil society 
activities and authorised public inquiries (see par 3.3 further on).   
 
Several possible levels of public participation may be distinguished. It may range from 
manipulation, with a powerless public, where the concept is used as a public relations vehicle 
by those in power, to a situation where the public has a sufficient degree of public power and 
control to govern a project (Arnstein, 1969: 218). Accountability begins with the public, not 
with the government. Dunn (1999b: 334) claims that most of the weight in seeking to secure 
accountability has to be carried by the vigour of citizen participation and by the scope of rights 
and liberties open to citizens. Yet writers tend to emphasise the collective, the group, the 
community, whilst pushing the individual to the background when dealing with concepts such 
as the public interest and accountability. Theron (2005: 114) states that the "primary unit of 
participation is a collective of persons" who stands in a relationship with the state. This thesis 
argues that individuality should retain a central place in the conception of accountability and 
                                                 
33
  Also see Burkey (1993: 56), Kok & Gelderblom (1994: 57) and Muller (2006: 12). 
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public participation. It is first and foremost an individual responsibility, a matter of personal 
concern for everyone.  
 
Evans (2002: 244) argues that each type of actor (e.g. the individual, the NGO, communities, 
and so forth) “has a complimentary contribution to make” to the fight for more liveable cities.  
Social organisations and interest groups do have a prominent role to play in the realisation of 
government accountability. The features of NGOs theoretically give them a comparative 
advantage over public and private sector institutions for the promotion of accountability. 
Those voluntary bodies may potentially resonate the opinions and views of the private sphere 
and transform the public influences it possesses into communicative power. Given the 
imperfections of the individual members of the public, it is within organisations that the 
potential exists for synergies between members that compensate for individual imperfections 
and where overall effects may transcend the capabilities of individual members. One must, 
however, guard against over-emphasising their role with the result that the importance of 
individual involvement becomes obscured. NGOs too have the ability of disempowering 
people and may purport to speak for communities, whilst in reality they are only mandated by 
a minority within them. Often a serious limitation of NGOs is their limited self-sustainability 
due to their dependence on grants. 
 
The public should be the vanguard of government accountability. Passive participation in the 
sense of being told by government what has already happened or what is going to happen, 
cannot be equated to public participation. Participation implies active engagement on the part 
of the public, an interactive relationship with the state not restricted to participation in 
decision-making only. The public should demand that items be placed on the government 
agendas for discussion purposes and must influence the willingness of the elected 
representatives to consider issues and influence the outcome of government action. They 
should act as the purveyor of democratic values and get representatives to vote in ways 
responsive to their preferences.  The public should act as a watchdog and engage in the 
evaluation of policy, planning and development proposals and in the process of law-making.34  
Finally they should promote responsible behaviour on the part of the elected representatives 
and demand effectiveness, integrity and accountability and, when required, call the elected 
                                                 
34
  The Annual Report of the Constitutional Assembly 1996: 145, referred to by Skjelten (2006: 161). 
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representatives to account. Thus far, the reality is that most of the state structures do not 
show a predilection of participatory decision-making in their internal affairs and generally 
offers little opportunity for public engagement in the process of lawmaking. Often the first 
chance for participation is in parliament, when minds are already made up and people 
committed to getting certain laws approved. 
 
Public participation is rife with difficulties. Numerous operational and other obstacles may 
contribute to ineffective public participation. Johnson (2003, quoted with approval by Theron, 
2005: 123) argues that structural, administrative and social obstacles are the three basic 
categories of obstacles that require careful negotiation.  Structural obstacles relate to the 
bureaucratic structure of government. A top-down political system which is prescriptive in 
nature may be at variance with bottom-up public participation. As Theron (2005: 123) points 
out, it may even fail to provide adequate opportunity for public participation, leaving members 
of the public without a "voice".   
 
Administrative obstacles may include the mind-sets and attitudes of government employees. 
Post-1994 legislation poses a people-centred challenge for particularly local government.  
Davids and Maphunye (2005: 61) points out that it requires changes in the attitudes of 
government staff towards issues of public participation. New legislation by itself is not a 
guarantee that mind-sets and attitudes of government employees will appropriately change. 
The many government initiatives are therefore constrained by what Healey (2004) calls 
"deeply embedded cultural assumptions" (governance culture) which provide the implicit 
norms and values which legitimate (or not) what individual actors do and the way governance 
processes operate in any context.  The control orientated tendency amongst officials to rigidly 
apply policy may often fail to allow room for public input into or control over the process 
(Theron, 2005: 123).  The tendency of officials to focus on their own dimension of interest or 
competency may also pose an obstacle in the way of effective accountability.  
 
Values of democracy, equality, and efficiency often clash in a pluralistic society, where people 
have diverse attitudes, values and often conflicting preferences. Social obstacles may also 
relate to the social capacity required for effective public participation. Social capacity may be 
lacking for a number of reasons, such as insufficient information and knowledge and lack of 
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critical ability. Cheibub and Przerworski (1999: 238) confirm that even if “complete 
information” was available members of the public might still not know enough to be able to 
evaluate the performance of an elected representative or government official. Evans (2002: 
231) points out that the relationship brought about by the role of party politicians to act as 
intermediary between communities and government can bring with it “divisive and 
demobilizing side effects”. 
 
Insufficient or excessive levels of participation may also be encountered. Muller (2006:14) and 
Adejumobi (2000:10) list a number of reasons for this phenomenon. It includes that such 
measures of participation may be caused by hopelessness or the belief by people that they 
are unable to influence government decision making,  a culture of dependency, poverty, 
marginalisation, insufficient funds, the low level of trust communities have in government as 
well as time and literacy problems. Hillier (2003: 157) shows that populist mobilization of 
public opinion may distort signals to the elected representatives and may "favour networks of 
articulate, middle-class property owners to the exclusion of the voices of the marginalized". 
Goudsmit and Blackburn (2001: 589) argue that excessive ‘participationism’ also hold 
dangers for the public interest and that blind adherence to whatever the local population 
proposes may endanger the sustainability of local development processes. This is especially 
so when the local population lacks applicable knowledge and views expressed by its 
members are based on ignorance. Cullingworth (1997: 134) points out that as the “defence of 
privilege”, public participation may become a major hurdle in the way of planning and 
development if not managed properly. Frivolous challenges to applications or decisions of the 
authorities should be appropriately discouraged. An example of an arrangement used in 
classical times is a graphe, which roughly speaking was a lawsuit in Athenian public matters. 
"If the accuser failed to obtain a fifth of the vote, he was fined and lost the right to bring similar 
accusations in the future, a practice deemed necessary to prevent frivolous action" (Elster, 
1999: 263).   
 
Pieterse (2006: 285) makes a number of proposals for realising integrated urban development 
in South Africa. According to him “vibrant city politics” and a substantial “epistemic 
community” that “generate imaginative ideas about alternative futures” are amongst the key 
conditions for addressing the structural crises or urban fragmentation. He argues that the 
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function of an epistemic community is “potentially to influence the on-going deliberations” of 
democratically elected bodies, not to replace it. The “purpose of the epistemic community is to 
challenge fundamentally the conventional orthodoxy (the mainstream) about what is possible 
and impossible in terms of transformative urban development agendas” (Pieterse, 2006: 290).  
Pieterse (2006: 294) refers with approval to the case which Ayyub Malik makes for the 
establishment of “deliberative forums to imagine and plot alternative approaches to urban 
development”. Such forums are intended to foster local spaces of deliberation where citizens 
will have opportunity to actively participate in shaping their city. This thesis argues that the 
establishment of deliberative forums as suggested by Malik may make a substantial 
contribution to the potential influence which the public may exert on government deliberations 
in planning and development context. These views are based on the work of Jurgen 
Habermas on the role of debate in the public sphere and on communicative action, which also 
heavily influenced planning theory.  
 
2.5 LIMITATIONS TO ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
Maraval (1999: 157) suggests that democratic accountability depends on “whether voters can 
discern whether” the agent “is acting in their best interest”, assign responsibility and reward or 
punish them appropriately. Voter capacity to discern agent performance, to sanction it when 
necessary and thereby induce agents to render accountable performance, depends on two 
factors. Firstly, it depends on the institutional mechanism available to voters to select good 
representatives and punish those that do not perform well (e.g. elections). Secondly, it also 
depends on the discretion agents have once in office (Laver and Shepsle, 1999: 285). 
 
There are serious limitations to accountability within democratic institutions. Both the selection 
and sanction models of elections are problematic and to some extent also crucially deficient. 
Fearon (1999:68) has been found that repeated elections on their own do not work well as 
mechanisms of accountability, due to formidable problems involved. Institutional factors that 
impact on voters' control over elected office-bearers, may weaken the threat of electoral 
sanctions and may serve to reduce the measure of effective accountability that may be 
achieved and merit special attention.  Those factors can roughly be divided into the 
abovementioned three categories that somewhat overlap (i.e. capacity of voters to discern, 
monitor and evaluate agent performance, voter ability to assign responsibility and voter 
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capacity to sanction deviants and to reward those that satisfy). Those factors are inter alia a 
consequence of the complexity of modern government and operate together to limit the 
effectiveness of government accountability. The researcher has selected the following twelve 
examples for illustration and analysis. 
 
1. Capacity to monitor and evaluate 
Voters do not have a mechanism to oblige government to follow mandates, yet they 
may exercise a measure of control “if they can induce the incumbents to anticipate that 
they will have to render accounts for their past actions” (Manin et al, 1999: 40).  Their 
measure of success in this regard will depend on their ability to judge government's 
record retrospectively at election time. In a pure accountability model, the performance 
of the incumbent potentially represents the entire information available to voters. If they 
“do not have sufficient information to evaluate” the government's performance, “the 
threat of not being” re-elected “is insufficient to induce” government “to act in” their 
“best interest” (Manin et al, 1999: 30).  
 
Voters suffer from an informational disadvantage. It presents a major obstacle to 
democratic accountability. Overall voter ability to control agent behaviour is extremely 
limited (Ferejohn, 1999: 134). The elected typically enjoy an immense informational 
advantage over the voters.  Dunn (1999b:335) argues that most voters most of the 
time cannot and do not know what is going on in the political realm. Manin et al (1999: 
43) and Fearon (1999: 68) points out that the calculated manner in which voters are 
supposed to consider their options is an artifice and that the problems involved in 
making informed judgements about whether to re-elect are formidable.  Government's 
behaviour can usually only be imperfectly observed. Voters generally lack detailed 
empirical and theoretical understanding of legislative procedure and politics.  Cheibub 
and Przerworski(1999: 238) argues that even if complete information (i.e. all the 
relevant facts) was available voters might still not know enough to be able to evaluate 
the incumbent's performance.  
 
Numerous factors impact directly and indirectly on the ability of voters to know or 
observe and evaluate the performance of the elected office-bearers. The ability of 
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voters to do so depends on how open and observable governmental processes are 
and how well elected office-bearers can shield their actions from outside observation.   
Elected office-bearers may seek to influence public opinion and hide their actions from 
public scrutiny. The elected enjoy an informational advantage over voters and can use 
it to hide their actions and avoid answerability. Poor monitoring implies that shirking of 
responsibilities has less effect on the incumbent's probability of re-election.  
 
2. Capacity to sanction deviants 
 Elections only work as an instrument for accountability in the hands of the voters for 
those in government that must be elected (i.e. the party political candidates).  
However, appointed government officials are not elected to office by the voting public 
and do not represent the public, yet they take the bulk of government decisions. The 
electoral mechanism therefore does not empower the voting public to hold the 
appointed government officials accountable.  
 
3. Multiple and heterogeneous principals 
 The theoretical models portray the electorate as a unitary actor (Stimson, 1999: 209) or 
a like-minded group of individuals. In real life the electorate is part of a pluralistic 
society, people with diverse attitudes and values that do not act as one, but very 
differently. It may be inherently difficult for multiple and heterogeneous principals to 
effectively control the elected agents via the mechanism of elections due to their often 
diverse and conflicting preferences (Fearon, 1999: 56).  Diversity and conflict amongst 
principals open the opportunity for exploitation to the elected agent.  The principals 
may find it difficulty or may even be unable to commit to a coordination scheme that 
would effectively limit such exploitation opportunities to the elected agents (Ferejohn, 
1999: 149). Individuals may appear anywhere in the distribution of possible 
preferences.  The sanction and reward functions of elections are only available to the 
majority of voters.  Minorities also have rights. Elections are not an effective 
mechanism for individuals to enforce accountability.  
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4. Clarity of mandates 
During elections parties compete more with images, symbols, and personalities, than 
with specific policy positions (Maraval, 1999: 167). Suffice it to say that it cannot be 
seriously suggested that an elected candidate has in one way or the other deviated 
from the mandate, if nobody seems to know what exactly the mandate is. The 
suggested mandates are usually void for vagueness and at best notional. 
 
5. Multidimensional activity 
Governmental action is multidimensional. Government may for example have policies 
that relate to the environment, housing, health care and property. Voters may want to 
reject some policies but retain others that they value. Cheibub and Prezerworski (1999: 
237) highlights that voters have only one instrument - the vote - to sanction 
government. Social policies tend to trump economic policies. Even if voters disliked 
economic policies, they may support the government if they approved of social 
policies. Maraval (1999: 187) argues that if government knew that voters sympathized 
more with social policies, the ruling party would probably give more prominence to this 
dimension of accountability Each and every day many thousands of decisions are 
made by those in government that affect individual welfare. One cannot control a 
thousand targets with one instrument - the vote (Manin et al, 1999: 50). 
 
6. Clarity of responsibility 
Mismanagement may be clear for everyone to see, yet one may be unable to 
pronounce to whom is to be held to account.  "Clarity of responsibility" is a particular 
concern to enforce accountability as voters must be able to assign clearly the 
responsibility for government performance and to discern whom to punish. Individual 
ministers sometimes perform as members of a governmental team in which there may 
be a sequence of accountability relationships.  Generally accountability is obscured 
under a plural or cabinet executive. Maraval (1999: 47) argues that it tends to conceal 
faults and destroy responsibility.   Dunn (1999b: 336) argues that the relation of 
accountability holds fully where the elected representatives are liable for their actions 
in exercising public powers; are predictably identifiable by the voters as agents and are 
knowably and effectively sanctionable for their public acts. 
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7. Proportional representation 
Our national legislation provides for the election of municipal councillors in accordance 
with a system of proportional representation.35 It intends to ensure that the total 
number of members elected from every party reflect the relationship between the votes 
cast for the respective parties. Basically this system works on the basis that political 
parties each submit a list of the names of their candidates in order of the party's 
preference. The final decision in such a system rests with the chief electoral officer. 
She determines “which party candidates are elected by selecting from the party's list, in 
accordance with that order of preference, the number of candidates that is equal to the 
number of seats to which the party is entitled”.36  Differences of political candidates in 
terms of general competence, skill, integrity, and so forth becomes irrelevant in a such 
a system, as voters have little say over candidates. The choice of future municipal 
councillors, provincial and national representatives is effectively left to party 
bureaucrats.  
 
8. Performance criteria 
Consensus amongst principals that the performance of the elected agents should be 
evaluated does not automatically translate into agreement on performance criteria.  
Although principals may share an interest in evaluating agent performance, they may 
and are likely to have conflicting interests over the exact criteria to be employed to 
evaluate same. In order to be credible, the chosen performance criteria should 
motivate incumbents optimally to act in a representative manner and to choose a policy 
as close as possible to the electorate's preferences (Fearon, 1999: 75).   
 
9. Temporary nature of preferences 
There can be no fixed and final definition of preferences. Even if the electorate was a 
unitary actor, preferences would not be static due to human nature and changing 
circumstances. The public may and do have moving ideal points.  In the literature 
reviewed by the researcher the writers generally seemed to ignore this fact in their 
theoretical models. They proceed on an illusory path of fixed preferences in developing 
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  Section 157(3) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996).  
36
  Item 13(5) of Schedule 1 of the Municipal Structures Act.  
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their arguments regarding measurement of performance against criteria set by the 
electorate.  
 
10. Term limitations 
Term limitations are intended to create turnover of representatives. The enforcement 
problem has to do with the capacity of voters to sanction or reward politicians 
effectively. If they are to bear the full impact of their actions, politicians must, first of all, 
want to be re-elected and know that they may be re-elected (Maraval, 1999: 160). 
Fearon (1999: 57) argues that if the candidate will be required to vacate office, once 
elected, at the end of the term due to term limitations or if the elected representative 
does not intend to stand for re-election, it can be viewed as an election with no 
expectation of accountability. 
 
11. Discretion  
The capacity of principals to sanction agents, if necessary, depends amongst other 
things on the institutional discretion agents have to formulate policies once in office 
(Laver and Shepsle, 1999: 285).  Democratic mandates are never imperative because 
new contingencies, which can never be fully anticipated at the time of election, will 
arise once the politician has taken up office (Maraval, 1999: 159).  Elected office-
bearers are not legally compelled to abide by their electoral platforms in any 
democratic system. The historical reason for this absence of institutional mechanisms 
to force compliance was that the legislature should be allowed to deliberate and to 
have flexibility to cope with changed circumstances. To be able to govern properly, 
elected office-bearers must be able to act boldly and need a considerable degree of 
freedom. Their ability to act boldly and effectively in the public interest depends to a 
large degree on the measure of freedom they have in terms of decision-making (Dunn, 
1999b: 340). The available procedures for withdrawing confidence37 are never targeted 
at the betrayal of promises (Manin et al, 1999: 39).   
 
12. Real time operation. Institutions of democratic accountability operate in real time. 
Elections are not a regular short-term occurrence. This provides opportunities to avoid 
                                                 
37
  See the "no confidence" mechanism of accountability in 3.3.2 below. 
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electoral responsibility for particular actions for extended periods of time or even 
indefinitely.  
 
Given all the limitations to accountability within democratic institutions, some of which have 
been briefly analysed above, it would be futile to expect that elections alone would serve 
effectively as an instrument of enforcing accountable government.  The opinion of the authors 
mentioned above appears to be that electoral means to control political agents are fairly weak 
and that repeated elections do not work well as mechanisms of accountability (Fearon, 1999:  
68).  They recognise and acknowledge that the assertion that democracy induces 
accountability is at least far too broad (e.g. Cheibub & Przerworski, 1999: 230); that to date 
the ballot box has regularly failed to reflect the will of the people (e.g. Adejumobi, 2000: 6), 
and that the control of voters over politicians is at best highly imperfect in most democracies. 
Elections are not regarded as a sufficient mechanism to insure that governments will perform 
adequately to maximise citizens' welfare (Manin et al, 1999: 50). The formal electoral 
apparatus is an impotent instrument of government accountability.  It is generally realised that 
contested elections might still be a necessary condition for accountability, at the same time 
they are certain to fall some way short of being a sufficient condition (Dunn, 1999b: 334). 
Adejumobi (2000: 7) and Dunn (1999b: 336) argue convincingly that engendering 
accountable governance in any democratic country incorporates but transcends the issue of 
elections.  
 
Manin et al(1999: 50) argues that institutional reform and innovation are needed for improved 
representation and government accountability. Healey (1992: 143) emphasis that the 
“technical and administrative machineries created in the past to achieve planning goals have 
… compromised the development of a democratic attitude”. According to Manin et al (1999: 
51) proportional representation in the 1860s was the last major institutional invention and that, 
other than that, there has been “almost no institutional creativity” during “the past two hundred 
years”.  He suggests, for example, “accountability agencies” as institutions that would provide 
citizens with independent information about government. Haggard (quoted with approval by 
Przeworski, 2009: 8) argues, “[T]he ultimate check on government must come through 
institutionalized forms of participation”. Gilbert (2009: 2) suggests that the gap between 
parliaments and citizens could potentially be bridged by the use of constituency offices. 
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Woltjer (2002: 447) regards the challenge to institutionalise a comprehensive process of 
participatory planning “which goes beyond representative community action and sporadic 
participation” as “formidable”. 
 
This thesis considers the proposition that elections are the main mechanism for enforcing 
accountability as more ideological fiction than palpable political fact. The control of voters over 
politicians remains highly imperfect and elections alone are not a sufficient mechanism to 
insure that government will perform in terms of voter preferences (Gilbert, 2009: 1).  An 
assertion that democracy induces accountability would be far too broad.  On the contrary, in 
South Africa legislation permitted floor crossings,38 in terms of which it was legally permissible 
for elected office-bearers to join forces with opponents whilst in office. The Legislature's 
condonation of this form of betrayal of the electorate's trust remains unacceptable and may 
serve as an acknowledgement that the electoral sanction is not regarded as a serious threat 
by politicians.  
 
2.6 ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
Administrative courts that specialise in disputes between private persons and the authorities 
concerning the exercise of public power have been established in a large number of countries 
around the world. Amongst the countries that have established such courts are England and 
Wales, Finland, the Republic of Lithuania, Sweden, Indonesia, Morocco, Estonia, Taiwan, the 
Netherlands, The United States of America and Australia.39 South Africa has not established 
administrative courts. Its ordinary superior courts are required to adjudicate disputes between 
private persons and the authorities concerning the exercise of public power. Judicial review of 
administrative action in terms of PAJA is often employed to have government decisions set 
aside. The doctrine of separation of powers and other factors, however, restrict the powers of 
the South African courts to play a meaningful role in government accountability in South 
Africa (see par 3.4 further on). 
                                                 
38
  Apparently new legislation will be introduced to reverse this situation. At the time of writing this thesis 
 such legislation has not yet been adopted. 
39
  See respectively www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/admin.htm, www.oikeus.fi/17598.htm, 
 www.lvat.lt/?item=teismas&lang=3, www.domstol.se/templates/DV_InfoPage____2321.aspx, 
 www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=210&pid=20632, www.wipo.int/clea/en/details.jsp?id=2968, 
 www.nc.ee/?id=191, tcb.judicial.gov.tw/en/intro2.asp, doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1467-9930.00102, 
 www.dmvnv.com/admlaw.htm and www.courts.sa.gov.au/courts/district/index.html.   
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A comprehensive overview of the emergent history and functions of administrative courts in 
the countries referred to above is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that the 
administrative courts, being administrative in nature and often not subject to the restrictions 
that apply to ordinary courts of law, may potentially be more effective to achieve government 
accountability than ordinary courts. Principles that appear from the examples referred to in the 
literature (see footnote 39) include that the public body concerned should be able to first seek 
self-rectification before the matter be heard by the administrative court, that those courts 
should provide a neutral forum for fair, prompt and objective hearings and should be within 
the executive branch of government. Examples of measures against which an action may be 
filed in an administrative court include activities, omissions or delays by the authority to 
perform actions.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the vast literature on the use of appeal 
tribunals. Suffice it to say that the tribunals may potentially function very much in the same 
manner as administrative courts in authoritatively resolving disputes between private persons 
and the authorities concerning the exercise of public power.40 Appeal tribunals differ from 
tribunals appointed to make decisions in the place of government, such as the tribunals 
appointed in terms of the DFA. In the Western Cape a tribunal as contemplated in the DFA 
was never appointed. The DFA tribunals that have to date functioned in the other provinces of 
South Africa  will in future probably have an insignificant impact in the field of study in view of 
the September 2009 judgment of the SCA in the City of Johannesburg v Gauteng 
Development Tribunal (335/08) discussed in 1.1 above. 
2.7 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Accountability is both an important philosophical and practical issue of our day, yet it has not 
received any noteworthy attention in the South African literature. This in itself is regarded as a 
gap in the literature. It would appear from a database search that administrative courts, as a 
mechanism to enforce government accountability, has not received any noteworthy attention 
in the South African literature. 
 
                                                 
40
  See for example www.tribunals.gov.uk for the tribunals service in the United Kingdom and  
 www.aat.gov.au for administrative appeals in Australia. 
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Whilst some of the notions, claims and objectives (e.g. ‘accountability’ and the promotion of 
socio-economic development) encountered in the legislation, government documents and 
political speeches may be viewed as political aspirations, posturing or just plain propaganda, 
the strong rhetoric has not managed to accomplish significant change in real terms.41 Key 
words such as accountable government and the promotion of socio-economic development42 
can be regarded as intending to act like tranquilisers or magic mushrooms, to create 
expectation and to keep everyone relatively happy or at least hopeful. One would have 
expected the South African writers to comment on the failure of the legislation and those 
documents to give any sense of how the objective of accountable government is to be 
accomplished.   
 
The ‘underdeveloped’ meaning of words and concepts such as accountability and the 
promotion of socio-economic development are rarely discussed in government documents. It 
is left to the readers to interpret government documents in manners that suit their individual 
agendas. These documents are often written in a manner intended to find the broadest 
possible acceptance, using emotive language (e.g. ‘sweet bits’ such as pro-poor) to capture 
the imagination of the Alliance partners and the poor voters, whilst the script-writers 
intentionally avoid unpacking the meaning thereof. The manner in which South African 
government documents are written can be regarded as intentional misrepresentations, yet 
only rarely criticised in the literature.43  
 
The main focus of the literature from abroad is on elections as a mechanism for achieving 
government accountability, to the exclusion of other issues and with a distinct disregard for 
legal questions. The authors referred to above have generally adopted a historical and 
academically polite approach, failing to engage critically with the issues, with resultant 
repetitive and monotonous renditions that fail to contribute anything noteworthy to the 
accountability debate.  Fearon (1999: 82) remarks that there is surprisingly little to be found in 
the tradition of democratic theory on exactly how elections are supposed to produce 
accountable government or on how effective elections may be expected to perform in this 
regard.  Practical suggestions as to how accountability problems could be tackled are rare in 
                                                 
41
  Notably the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1997). 
42
  One of the objectives of local government mentioned in section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
43
  See for example Du Toit & Neves, 2007 on "integration". 
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the literature, hence its sterile nature. The flawed assumptions on which theories rely, 
generally goes unchallenged in the academic literature reviewed. Symbolic value still appears 
to be more important than reality (e.g. arguments put forward relating to elections as 
mechanisms for sanctions).  As such the literature from abroad is of little or no significance to 
those who have to face the daily challenges in the development industry in the Western Cape.   
 
South Africa has some unique legal requirements, which are not dealt with in the literature 
from abroad. Section 195 of the South African Constitution inter alia requires that the public 
administration shall be governed by democratic principles and shall be accountable.  What is 
meant by this legal requirement? Government employees are not elected but appointed. 
Clearly elections are not the mechanism by which their accountability would be achieved.  
The available literature fails to unpack this requirement. Could it be that the Legislature 
intended a more direct form of accountability to the public?   
 
The success of BBBEE has been questioned and its criticisms are growing.44 Suggestions 
have also been made as to what could be done to improve BBBEE.45 A topic apparently not 
yet researched is whether and, if so, how and to what extent the governing party employs 
BBBEE to avoid government accountability in economic transactions which benefits the 
governing party or individual politicians. 
 
Overall one of the most difficult questions remaining is how government accountability can be 
engendered in South Africa. The available literature, with a few noteworthy exceptions (e.g. 
Adejumobi, 2000 and Pieterse, 2006), is not helpful in this regard. If the academic writers 
have in mind to bring about improvement and meaningful change in government 
accountability, future literature should be more pragmatic.  
 
2.8 SUMMARY  
This chapter illuminated the idea of government accountability on the basis of a literature 
review, exposed the substance of government accountability, and examined elections as a 
dominant accountability process. Limitations to accountability within democratic institutions 
were explored and certain gaps in the literature were identified.  
                                                 
44
  See for example Sartorius & Botha (2008) and the sources to which they refer. 
45
  See for example Andrews (2008). 
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This thesis argued that in its most basic sense accountability means to be answerable for 
one's actions or behaviour. It was illustrated that accountability seeks to assure that 
government acts within the legal framework of its empowerment, that accountability must be 
perceived as a process and that government decisions have an ethical nature which means 
responsible decision-making.  It was argued that democratic accountability, to be 
accomplished via the electoral process, is always mediated and never direct. It was argued 
that more direct (as opposed to mediated) vertical accountability between administrators and 
members of the public is essential if effective government accountability is to be achieved and 
that, if one were to depend on elections to achieve a reasonable measure of effective 
government accountability, it is unlikely to materialise. The pivotal continuing role of public 
participation in government accountability was highlighted. 
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CHAPTER 3: LAW REVIEW, JUDICIAL & ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESSES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Accountability, an essential ingredient of democracy, must be accomplished within the 
democratic framework provided by the legislation of the Republic. This chapter provides an 
overview of that legal framework. The aim of the law review is to increase knowledge on the 
subject and to facilitate the interpretation of the data collected in the course of the study. 
Some of the methods, statutory devices and available mechanisms employed in legislation to 
promote and enforce accountability are examined. The essential role of public participation in 
the processes of government was explored.  Planning law is used as a backdrop to highlight 
some of the shortcomings in the legislative endeavour to accomplish vertical government 
accountability towards the public in land use planning and development context.  
 
3.2 ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM 
The South African Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic46 is the logical point of 
departure for any exploration of the maze of statutory provisions that apply within this field.   It 
claims that the Republic is a democratic state founded on stipulated values. Those values 
include the supremacy of the South African Constitution and the rule of law47. It also includes 
"universal adult suffrage, a national common voters' roll, regular elections and a multi-party 
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness".48  
The Constitution establishes a common South African citizenship and provides for equal 
entitlement of all such citizens to rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship49.  
 
Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution provides a Bill of Rights as the cornerstone of 
democracy and requires the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil those rights.50  
Fundamental constitutional rights considered particularly important for purposes of the 
research include rights to equality before the law and to demonstrate, to an environment that 
                                                 
46
  Section 1 of the National Constitution. 
47
  The rule of law basically requires the state to act in accordance with the law (i.e. that the state can only 
 exercise power to the extent permitted by law and must obey the law like everyone else in the country).   
48
  Section 1 of the Constitution. 
49
  Section 3 of the Constitution. 
50
  See section 7(2) of the Constitution and Meyer (1999 par. 354 on p 223 and p 237).  
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is not harmful to the health of well-being of people in this country, against unlawful or arbitrary 
deprivation of property, to have access to adequate housing and to information held by the 
state, and the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.51 
 
Government functions are classified into legislative, executive and judicial categories and 
government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres. All spheres of 
government and all organs of state within each sphere are required to provide effective, 
transparent and accountable government.52 The legislative authority of the national, provincial 
and local spheres of government respectively is vested in Parliament, the provincial 
legislatures and municipal councils.53  The members of the National Assembly (a component 
of Parliament), the provincial legislatures, and municipal councils have to be elected in terms 
of an electoral system that is prescribed by national legislation.54  The legislative authority of 
each of those bodies is limited to matters within their respective functional areas.55 "Provincial 
planning" is a functional area of exclusive provincial legislative competence. Both "regional 
planning and development" and "municipal planning" are concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competences. Each legislative authority may make and administer laws for the 
effective administration of matters which they have the right to administer in terms of the 
South African Constitution.56 Those authorities are required to exercise their respective 
legislative competences and perform their supervisory functions.  
 
The executive authority of the Republic is vested in the President, of provinces in the 
Premiers and of municipalities in the municipal councils.57 The Constitution sets out what the 
exercise of executive authority involves. The executive is required to implement and 
administer legislation and to adopt policy guidelines which serve to assist decision-makers in 
the exercise of their discretionary powers.  Each municipality has executive authority in 
respect of and the right to administer inter alia municipal planning and building regulations.58 
                                                 
51
  Sections 9(1), 17, 24, 25, 26, 27(1)(b), 32(1)(a) and 33 respectively. 
52
  Sections 40(1) and 41(1)(c) of the Constitution respectively. 
53
  Sections 44, 104 and 156  respectively.  
54
  Section 46(1), 105 and  157 of the South African Constitution, to be read with the provisions of the 
 Electoral Act, No. 73 of 1998 and section 14 of the Constitution of the Western Cape, No. 1 of 1998.  
55
  Schedules 4 and 5 to the Constitution for the functional areas of legislative competences. 
56
  See for example section 156(2) of the South African Constitution which empowers municipalities to 
 administer the matters listed in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 to the Constitution. 
57
  Sections 85(1), 125 and 151(2) of the Constitution respectively. 
58
  Section 156(1) ibid. 
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The Legislature targeted the local sphere of government to promote social and economic 
development. Constitutional objects of local government include that it should "provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities" and "promote social and 
economic development".59 The developmental duties of municipalities include that each 
municipality must "structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and 
economic development of the community".60  Local government is required to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner, promote a safe and healthy 
environment, and encourage the involvement of "communities and community organisations" 
in the matters of local government.61   The MSA echoes the requirement that the provision of 
services to the local community should be undertaken in a "financially and environmentally" 
sustainable manner62 and requires that municipalities promote and undertake development in 
the municipality.63  
 
The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in our courts. The South African Constitution 
provides for the institution of a constitutional court charged with over-seeing inter alia matters 
relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution.64 
Below the Constitutional Court is a structure of superior or high courts.  The appellate court 
exercises appellate jurisdiction and only hears and determines matters brought before it on 
appeal from other divisions of the supreme or superior courts. Provincial and local divisions of 
the Supreme Court with inherent jurisdiction were also created. Basically, it means that they may 
hear and determine any matter brought before them and make orders unlimited as to amount in 
respect thereof, subject only to statutory and certain common law restrictions. Magistrates' 
courts, the lowest level of the hierarchy, cannot claim any authority which cannot be found within 
the four corners of the enabling legislation.  They inter alia adjudicate on offences brought 
before them by local authorities in the course of municipal law enforcement.65 They have 
limited criminal and civil jurisdiction and may not undertake the judicial review of a decision 
taken by an administrator. Such a matter will have to be brought before the High Court. 
                                                 
59
  Section 152(1)(a) and (c) of the South African Constitution. 
60
  Section 153 of the South African Constitution. 
61
  Section 152(1)(b) - (e) ibid. Note the emphasis on the collective (the community).  
62
  Section 4(2)(d) ibid. 
63
  Section 4(2)(g) ibid. 
64
  Ibid sections 166(a) and 167. 
65
 Meyer (1999: 174). 
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A number of state institutions were established to strengthen constitutional democracy in the 
Republic, such as the Public Protector and the Electoral Commission.  The Public Protector is 
potentially the most significant of those institutions for purposes of vertical government 
accountability within land use planning and development context.  National66 and provincial67 
legislation were passed to provide for additional powers and functions of a national and a 
provincial public protector.  The national public protector may investigate any conduct in state 
affairs or in the public administration in any sphere of government,68 whilst the activities of the 
provincial public protector are restricted to affairs of government at provincial level and local 
authority level.69  Both the national and provincial public protector may on own initiative or on 
receipt specified complaints conduct such investigations. Complaints may relate to any 
alleged maladministration in connection with government affairs and the public administration, 
abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair or undue delay by a person performing a 
public function, which results in unlawful or improper prejudice to any other person.70  Section 
182(1)(c) of the South African Constitution empowers the national public protector to take 
appropriate remedial action. The provincial public protector may only make appropriate 
recommendations to the relevant public authority.71   
 
The public administration supports the three spheres of government and is enjoined to be 
governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.72 Included 
are that the public administration must be development-orientated and accountable. The 
public administration fulfils an influential role in daily government practice relating to land use 
planning and development management as officials take by far the bulk of the decisions 
within the field of study. Elected representatives only deal with a relatively limited number of 
land use and development applications in daily practice.   
 
3.3 STATUTORY DEVICES TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Legislation is the sole instrument with which the Legislature can promote accountable and 
effective government performance. Examples of mechanisms and methods used by the 
                                                 
66
  The Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994 (the "Public Protector Act"). 
67
  The Western Cape Provincial Public Protector Law, No. 6 of 1994. 
68
  Section 6(4)(a) of the Public Protector Act. 
69
  Section 4(1)(a)(i) of the Western Cape Provincial Public Protector Law, 1994. 
70
  See section 4 of the Provincial Law and section 6(4) of the Public Protector Act. 
71
  Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Provincial Law. 
72
  Section 195(1) of the Constitution, echoed in section 19(1) of the MSA. 
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Legislature to engineer accountability in the three spheres of government include statutory 
requirements relating to the compulsory establishment of state institutions to strengthen 
constitutional democracy and elections to promote accountability. The following nine further 
examples are considered to be of particular significance for achieving government 
accountability within the planning and development context and have been selected by the 
researcher for illustration and analysis. Examples of statutory requirements are provided for 
each of them. 
  
 3.3.1 Providing for sanctions:  The presence of authority able to back up legal imperatives by 
sanctions which a court will enforce, is required for the regulation of a community and for 
sustained responsiveness.  Sanctions are provided for in all the laws dealing with 
planning and development and may be imposed via the formal judicial route or in 
quasi-judicial or purely administrative processes. Sanctions in relation to government 
accountability may serve to punish, incapacitate, deter, reform or correct, and to 
redress or provide retribution.73  Civil liability usually involves the payment of a sum of 
money by the offender to the victim (e.g. for damages suffered). Criminal liability often 
requires the payment of a fine by the offender to the authorities or imprisonment. 
 
3.3.2 Providing a "no confidence" mechanism of accountability:74  This procedure in 
parliamentary democracies permits the principals in the legislature to observe and ex 
ante sanction the members of the cabinet who have sufficiently violated expectations 
so as to make them vulnerable to replacement (Laver & Shepsle, 1999: 295). If such a 
motion is passed with the required support or if the agent resigns in anticipation of it, 
the Cabinet or Executive Council (as the case may be) must be reconstituted 
 
3.3.3 Stipulation of values, principles and criteria:  Section 195 of the Constitution stipulates 
basic values and principles that govern the public administration. Sections 2 and 3 of 
the DFA enjoins local authorities to promote efficient development in decision-making, 
to optimise existing resources, to discourage the phenomenon of urban sprawl and 
(through decision-making) to contribute to the development of more compact towns 
                                                 
73
  Compare Elster (1999: 276), Neill (1971) quoted by Solomons (1990. 272) and Solomons (1990. 128).  
74
  Sections 102(1) and 141(1) of the Constitution respectively provide for a vote of no confidence in the 
 Cabinet and a province's Executive Council. 
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and cities. Section 36(1) of LUPO states that an application for the subdivision and 
rezoning of land may only be refused on the grounds of "lack of desirability".  
 
3.3.4 Stipulation of obligations:  All three spheres of government (including the public 
administration) must obey, observe, uphold and maintain the Constitution and all other 
law of the Republic. Municipalities must comply with the developmental duties 
discussed above and must determine appropriate lines of internal accountability and 
reporting for the municipal structures and office bearers.75 They must comply with and 
enforce compliance with their zoning scheme provisions and with conditions of 
approval imposed under LUPO and must undertake integrated development planning. 
 
3.3.5 Stipulation of performance and behavioural standards: Specific time periods are 
stipulated within which certain acts must be performed.76 Section 5(1)(b) of the MSA 
provides that the community is entitled to "prompt" replies to their written enquiries. 
Performance reporting requirements are stipulated.77 Section 237 of the Constitution 
requires that all constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without 
delay.  Municipal officials and councillors must comply with their respective codes of 
conduct.78 They may be suspended or removed from office, after investigation, if the 
provisions of their codes of conduct have been breached.  National legislation was 
enacted to give effect to the constitutional right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 6(2) of the PAJA empowers competent 
courts to judicially review administrative action if it was procedurally unfair, not 
authorised or if the administrator acted unreasonably. 
 
3.3.6 Stipulation of transparency requirements:  Open meetings,79 mandatory publications,80 
opportunities for public participation in policy formulation,81 "notice and comment" 
                                                 
75
  Section 39(1) of LUPO, section 6(2), 50 and 53(5)(b) of the MSA. 
76
  An administrator must within 90 days after receiving the request, give the person making the request 
 adequate reasons in writing for the action (Section 5(2) of the PAJA). A building plan application must be 
 decided within 30 or 60 days (Section 7(1) of the Building Act). 
77
  E.g. Chapter 12 of the MFMA and the councillors' Code of Conduct that require quarterly reports. 
78
  Sections 69 and 54 read with Schedules 1 and 2 to the MSA respectively. 
79
  Section 14(2) of the MFMA requires decisions relating to the sale of municipal capital assets to be 
 taken in meetings open to the public. Section 160(7) of the Constitution requires municipal councils to 
 conduct its business in an open manner. It may close its sittings only when it is "reasonable" do so. 
80
  E.g. section 16 of LUPO (i.r.o. advertisement of rezonings) and regulation 18 of the PAJA regulations. 
  
68 
 
 
procedures and public inquiries and hearings are required.82 The South African 
Constitution requires the public administration to be accountable.83  The idea of 
accountability has moved the emphasis from power to decisions that are justifiable and 
this shift may result in legal precedent playing a bigger role in future decision-making.  
Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons.  The public administration must foster transparency 
by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.84  PAIA was 
enacted to give effect to the fundamental right to information.   
 
3.3.7 Providing for oversight:  In addition to the Public Protector and other state institutions 
referred to above, provisions exist for other forms of judicial and legislative oversight of 
government action or inaction.  Despite the apparent autonomy of municipalities, they 
remain subject to the supervision of the other two spheres of government. The national 
and provincial spheres of government have the legislative and executive authority to 
ensure the effective performance by municipalities of their local government functions. 
This is to be achieved by regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive 
authority.85  Provincial governments are required, through legislative and other 
measures, to provide for the monitoring and support of local government in their 
provinces.86  The provincial executive may intervene when a municipality cannot or 
does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of legislation.87  National and provincial 
government may not, in the exercise of their powers, compromise or impede a 
municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.88 
 
3.3.8 Administrative appeals: The protection of fundamental rights is not solely the domain of 
our courts.  An array of office-bearers and bodies may perform quasi-judicial functions 
to cope with the problem of deciding about the appropriate application of laws in the 
planning and development field. This is necessary as our courts have consistently 
                                                                                                                                                                       
81
  E.g. Chapter 4 of the MSA requires public participation in the content and process of drafting an IDP.  
82
  E.g. section 4(1) and (3) of the PAJA and the PAJA regulations. 
83
  Section 195 of the Constitution. 
84
  Section 33(2) and 195(1)(g) of the Constitution respectively. 
85
  Section 155(7) ibid. 
86
  Section 155(6)(a) ibid. 
87
  Section 139 ibid. Also see, for example, sections 137 and 139 of the MFMA which deals with 
 discretionary and mandatory provincial interventions in municipal financial problems.  
88
  Section 151(4) ibid. 
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refused to consider the merits of a case involving the exercise of public power, even in 
the face of the foolish exercise of discretion.89 Applicants and persons whose rights are 
affected by government decisions have rights of appeal, all aimed at reconsideration of 
the merits of government decisions. The main purpose of such appeals is often to set 
aside, correct, prevent or remedy action or failure to act on the part of an administrator.  
The Legislatures provided an arsenal of appeals such as appeals for decisions taken 
under delegated authority within the municipal sphere, taken in terms of LUPO, 
concerning the environment, regarding requests for access to information, relating to 
heritage resources, and decisions relating to applications for building plan approval.90  
 
3.3.8 Providing for deliberation:  The Guidelines issued by the Minister for Provincial and 
Local Government (2005) concerning ward committees serve as an example. Section 
7(1) restricts membership of a ward committee to a maximum of eleven persons, of 
which a councillor representing the ward must be a member and the chairperson. 
Section 11(1) stipulates that ward committee meetings are convened by the 
chairperson. Section 11(2) stipulates the minimum required frequency of such 
meetings, i.e. at least quarterly (unless the municipality has made rules requiring 
meetings more often). Those guidelines however do not provide for sufficient control by 
members of the public and do not create a deliberative platform for matters concerning 
the national and provincial  spheres of government.   
 
3.4 JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
The judiciary has acquired a major role in the mechanisms of government accountability.91 
Judicial review of administrative action is a popular judicial instrument that may assist in 
achieving government accountability. A court performs two separate functions with judicial 
reviews. It reviews the legality of the action on the part of the authority and grants an 
appropriate order if it finds in favour of the applicant.  Currently a court's power to review 
administrative action flows directly from the PAJA and the Constitution itself.92   Section 6 of 
the PAJA provides that any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the 
                                                 
89
  E.g. Sinovitch v Hercules Municipality 1946 AD 783.  
90
  Section 44 of LUPO, section 62 of the MSA, section 74 of the Information Act, section 43  of NEMA, 
 section 49 of the Heritage Act and section 9 of the Building Act. 
91
  Maraval (1999: 162). 
92
  Pharmaceutical judgment paras 33 and 34. 
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judicial review of administrative action. It sets out a number of grounds on which judicial 
review may be based. Those grounds include that the action was procedurally unfair, was 
taken for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision, was not rationally connected 
to the reasons given for it or that the exercise of the power was so unreasonable that no 
reasonable person could have so exercised the power or performed the function.  
 
The court may judicially review administrative action if the action consists of a failure to take a 
decision.  It was confirmed in the case of The Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Another v 
Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd and Another 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) (at 152A-D) that, if it is alleged that 
the administrator failed to apply his mind to the relevant issues as required by law, proof is 
required that the decision was arrived at arbitrarily, as a result of unwarranted adherence to a 
fixed principle or in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose and so forth in order to 
establish review grounds.  Proceedings for judicial review must be instituted without 
reasonable delay and within the time period stipulated by law. 
 
The main purpose of an application for judicial review is often to set aside, correct, prevent or 
remedy action or failure to act on the part of the authorities. De Waal (2001: 173) argues that 
the object of awarding a remedy should include vindication of the Constitution and deterrence 
of future infringements. Competent courts are empowered to grant appropriate relief, such as 
an interdict, a mandamus (an order to compel) or a declaration of rights. It may declare any 
law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution as invalid93 and may make an order 
that is just and equitable.94  An appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy.  
 
The court has discretion, when setting aside administrative action, to remit the matter for 
reconsideration by the administrator (with or without directions). Section 8(1)(c) of the 
Constitution provides that a court may in exceptional cases correct a defect resulting from the 
administrative action, substitute or vary the administrative action or direct the administrator to 
pay compensation.95  De Waal (2001: 188) argues that good reason exists for the 
development of damages as a remedy for certain violations of fundamental rights.  
                                                 
93
  Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
94
  Ibid section 172(1)(b). In the Fose judgment it is stated that appropriate relief will in essence be relief 
 that is required to protect and enforce the Constitution.  
95
  Section 8(1)(1)(c) of the PAJA. 
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A number of factors directly or indirectly restrict the powers of the courts to play a meaningful 
role in enforcing government accountability and the ability of members of the public to enforce 
government accountability via our courts (e.g. the limited jurisdiction of Magistrates Courts).  
Practical constraints only permit a brief examination below of the restrictions flowing from the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the rules governing the interpretation of laws and justiciability 
requirements. The affordability problems of litigation which prevent most citizens access to the 
courts to enforce government accountability is briefly discussed in par 3.7.1. 
 
3.4.1 The doctrine of separation of powers serves to prevent the excessive concentration of 
power in a single person or body. It requires the classification of government functions 
into three categories (i.e. legislative, executive and judicial) and that each separate 
function be performed by separate branches of government.  It is necessary to briefly 
refer to the legacy of the previous regime. Dugard et al (1992) have shown how 
discriminatory, repressive and emergency laws have damaged and undermined the 
reputation of the judiciary and destroyed respect for the law among the majority of the 
population.  Dugard (1992: 28) describes how by 1959 the government had brought 
the judiciary into line and that "restraint and abstention were to characterise judicial 
decisions on race and security", whilst the unequal application of certain legislation 
was made still harsher by judicial interpretations in favour of the executive. The 
previous government created an environment where officials could undertake any 
action in the name of law and order and the maintenance of stability.  "Given the 
reluctance of the courts to place effective controls on those responsible for executing 
the emergency, the abuse of power was rampant and inevitable. Not surprisingly, an 
already fragile legal system came to be perceived by many South Africans as both 
impotent and partial".  The ‘hands-off’ approach to government activity by our courts in 
the pre-Constitution phase96  and their failure to use their powers of interpretation and 
review to support human rights in the previous dispensation provoked severe criticism 
in academic legal circles.97    
 
                                                 
96
  See the Sinovitch judgment at 802-803: "The law does not protect the subject against the merely foolish 
 exercise of a discretion by an official, however much such subject suffers thereby".  
97
  E.g. Dugard (1992: 27), Sarkin (1998), Skjelten (2006: 15 and 19)and Forsyth (1985: 144) 
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 Currently a separation of government functions is recognised by vesting the legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in different bodies98, although the separation is not clear 
at the municipal sphere of government.99  Our courts are keenly aware of the need to 
respect the separation of powers doctrine and to exercise judicial restraint.100  They 
have developed mechanisms of self-restraint aimed at preventing them from interfering 
with the legislative and executive branches of government.  Their treatment of 
administrative decisions with appropriate judicial deference is best understood as 
appropriate respect for the findings of fact by administrators. It is a conscious 
determination not to usurp the functions of the administrative agencies and a 
willingness on the part of our courts to recognise the proper role of the executive within 
the Constitution.101  
 
3.4.2 Rules of statutory interpretation:  In statutory law, the legislature's intention is not always 
proclaimed in clear terms, no matter how carefully words are chosen. Our courts have 
therefore formulated rules of interpretation to assist whenever it is necessary to ascertain 
and establish what intention the legislature conveyed by the language used.102   In the 
pre-Constitution dispensation it was a golden rule of interpretation that words had to be 
given their ordinary literal grammatical meaning unless, when so applied, they produced 
an inconsistency so as to justify the Court in placing upon them some other signification 
which the court thinks the words will bear.103  The Constitution introduced a fresh 
approach to legal interpretation and requires our courts and tribunals, when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights and legislation, to promote the values that underlie an open 
and democratic society and to promote the spirit, purports and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.104  On the other hand, this value-based approach to interpretation often means 
that litigants are in practical reality at risk. They may discover after an expensive court 
case that their understanding of statutory provisions have been wrong. Such 
uncertainty discourages litigation. 
                                                 
98
  Sections 43, 85, 125 and 165 of the South African Constitution. 
99
  Section 151(2) of the Constitution vests municipal councils with both executive and legislative authority.  
100
  See for example comments made by Madala J in the Nyathi judgment at par 88 
101
  See footnote 32 of Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA (CC) and 
 par 88 of Nyathi v MEC for the Department of Health, Gauteng and Others: Constitutional Court Case 
 Number CCT 17/07 [2008] ZACC 8. 
102
  See generally Steyn (1981). 
103
  Union Government v Mack 1917 AD 731 serve as an example.  
104
  Ibid sub-sections 39(1) and (2).  
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3.4.3 Justiciability requirements relate to legal standing, ripeness and mootness.  The 
applicant in a legal matter must be able to satisfy the court that she has legal 
standing.105  The doctrine of ripeness deals with the timing of a challenge. The 
business of a court is generally retrospective. It deals with situations that have already 
ripened. Applicants that approach the court prematurely or with hypothetical concerns 
will be denied the required remedies. Usually those who seek judicial review must first 
exhaust the domestic remedies (Baxter, 1984: 720).106  The doctrine of mootness 
prevents a court from deciding an issue when it is too late.107 Even if one were able to 
overcome the many technical and financial hurdles that stand in the way of litigation, 
one may find that state liability has been limited or excluded by legislation.108  
 
This thesis argues that, in addition to law and institutional reform (discussed earlier), a certain 
measure of judicial liberalism (i.e. the use by the courts of their powers of interpretation and 
review to support the promotion of socio-economic development and so forth) is required for 
the improvement of government accountability. 
 
3.5 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ACHIEVE ACCOUNTABILITY 
If the state appears to be beyond legal limits and recourse to law is regarded as futile or is not 
possible, members of the public may have to employ alternative approaches in an attempt to 
remedy the situation. Budlender (1988: 152) claims that in those circumstances those who 
are alienated from the processes of social control tend to exercise their own control and that it 
is likely to be "at least as arbitrary and brutal as anything they have experienced". This is 
confirmed by recorded facts in The Culture of Power in Southern Africa, where Craig (2003: 
27) records the most gruesome of the narratives in which a resident magistrate, an arrogant 
official, was ritually murdered at a ceremony of authority and fertility in 1880. Other examples 
of alternative approaches mentioned in the literature include defiance campaigns, mass 
resistance, boycotts, labour strikes and protests, civil disobedience, political violence, 
                                                 
105
  E.g. a person acting in the "public interest" as contemplated in section 38 of the Constitution.  
106
  Section 7(2)(c) of PAJA empowers a court, in exceptional circumstances and on  application, to exempt 
 a person from the obligation to exhaust internal remedies before instituting proceedings for judicial 
 review, if deemed in the interest of justice.  
107
  In the JT Publishing judgment the court confirmed the principle that courts should not decide points 
 which are merely abstract, academic or hypothetical. 
108
  See the Institution of Legal Proceeding Against Organs of State Act and the State Liability Act. 
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witchcraft, pickets and demonstrations.  Our Bill of Rights contains a right to assemble, 
demonstrate and picket, peacefully and unarmed and to present petitions.109  Such counter-
actions may disrupt peace, stability and orderly government processes.  Adejumobi (2000: 
11) argues that accountable governance involves a stable, inclusive and popular decision 
process, that war and conflicts are antithetical to accountable governance and that 
"accountable governance is possible only in an environment of peace and stability".  
 
3.6 PLANNING LAW AS BACKDROP TO ACCOUNTABILITY 
This section provides a brief overview of some of the statutory requirements employed by the 
Legislatures to manage and regulate planning and development.  Various acts, ordinances, 
regulations and by-laws relating to land use planning and development were in force when 
the Constitution took effect and continue to be in force.110 Those laws inter alia require local 
government to undertake land use planning, to apply the DFA principles in relation to 
decisions concerning land use development and to approve or refuse applications for the 
rezoning or subdivision of land, consent uses and of building plans.111 When granting 
approvals, the authorities may also impose appropriate conditions. Such conditions may inter 
alia include requirements relating to the cession of land or payment of money which is directly 
related to the needs arising from the approval.112 In addition new laws have been passed as 
part of the post-democratic legislative endeavour. New activities that require prior approval or 
authorisation from the competent authorities include those that may potentially impact on 
cultural heritage resources113 and the commencement of listed environmental activities.114 
The list of legislation referred to is not intended to be exhaustive and merely serves to 
indicate the variety of applications and approvals required before a single development 
proposal may commence.   
                                                 
109
  Section 17 of the South African Constitution. 
110
  Section 2 of Schedule 6 to the Constitution. 
111
  See the structure plan and application requirements in LUPO, the Subdivision of  Agricultural Land Act, 
 No. 70 of 1970, the National Building Regulations and Buildings Standard Act, No. 103 of 1977.  The 
 DFA principles have been referred to above. 
112
  E.g. section 42 of LUPO.  The "cession of land" as used in that section means "without compensation". 
 The municipality may therefore obtain ownership of portions of an applicant's land required for purposes 
 of public roads without payment of compensation in the stated circumstances.  
113
  Section 38 of the National Heritage Resources Act, No 25 of 1999. 
114
  E.g. excavation within 100m from the high water mark is a listed activity in terms of the 2006 regulations 
 made under NEMA and requires environmental authorisation.  
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3.7 PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES OF LEGISLATIVE MEASURES 
In the elaborate legislative scheme described above the elected legislatures are required to 
make laws that grant rights, impose obligations and set standards and norms. The executive 
government bodies are required to implement those laws and comply with their legal 
obligations. A system of sanctions and awards has been created, the courts are empowered 
to enforce the laws and provision exists for administrative measures to accomplish 
accountability. Even if everything else fails, provision exists for alternative measures to 
promote government accountability (e.g. the rights to assemble and demonstrate).  
 
Notwithstanding the impressive efforts on the part of the Legislatures to provide an effective 
system of democracy and accountability, this thesis argues that  many factors exist that limits 
the effectiveness of those measures within the land use planning and development context. 
Three recent examples encountered by the researcher will be used to illustrate some of the 
many shortcomings in the legislation and the ineffectiveness of the current system of 
government accountability within the field of research.  
 
3.7.1 Example number 1. The first case concerns an attempt by someone who wished to 
exercise his fundamental right to have access to adequate housing. Municipal policy 
applies in the area in which he intended erecting his house, in terms of which buildings 
on farms which may be visible from the village should be discouraged.  His application 
for building plan approval was refused as a result of the rigid application of the 
municipal policy. A long line of court cases over the years have made it clear that 
policy may not be treated as a hard and fast rule to be applied invariably in every case 
and that every case that is presented to the public body for its decision must be 
considered on its merits. It inter alia means that the administrator must take relevant 
considerations into account115 and should exercise her discretion by making a choice 
from amongst alternative courses of action. Such choice is expected to be made in a 
judicious manner.116 If policy guidelines are applied in a manner which excludes the 
conscientious exercise of the relevant discretion, the court will set those decisions 
aside on judicial review.117  On the other hand, if the court is satisfied that applications 
                                                 
115
  E.g. the Pharmaceutical judgment at par 85. 
116
  See Baxter (1984: 80) and section 6(2)(f)(ii) of the PAJA. 
117
  E.g. the Britten v Pope 1916 AD. 
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have been carefully considered and involved the conscientious exercise of the relevant 
discretion it will not intervene.118 
 
 The refusal was challenged by way of appeal in terms of the MSA. The municipality 
was informed that blind adherence to policy does not amount to the exercise of a 
discretion in law. When, after more than a year, no steps have yet been taken to 
process the appeal a formal complaint was lodged with the Staff Department of the 
municipality and it was alleged that the responsible official was in breach of the 
applicable code of conduct. The request for an investigation and disciplinary action 
against the official was ignored. The subsequent persistent pestering of the municipal 
officials and letters to the municipal manager and mayor did not solicit prompt replies 
as required in terms of the MSA. Those letters were met with utter silence.  
 
Part of the problem was that the legislature had failed to clearly specify performance 
standards (e.g. that the appeal decision should be taken or that enquiries should  
be answered within a fixed period). It also failed to provide an affordable mechanism to 
achieve government accountability if the municipality or official would have failed to 
comply with the stipulated norms and statutory requirements. Judicial review was an 
option. In terms of section 6 of the PAJA the remedy is available if an authority fails to 
take a decision within 180 days in circumstances as described above. As the 
Magistrates Court did not have jurisdiction in the matter, it meant that a High Court 
application was necessary. If the applicant was required to first exhaust internal 
remedies, it effectively would have meant a waiting period of at least 180 days before 
court papers could be issued. The current waiting period in the Cape High Court from 
date that court papers for judicial review are issued until the matter is finally heard and 
decided, is two or more years.  Effectively therefore it could easily take three or more 
years only to obtain a decision relating to one's fundamental right to have access to 
adequate housing.  This thesis argues that accountability delayed is accountability 
denied. 
 
                                                 
118
  See the approach adopted by O'Regan J at par 56 of the Bato Star judgment. 
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The risks and costs involved in High Court litigation are considerable. Reference was 
made above to the uncertainty associated with the interpretation of legislation. The 
manner in which a court will exercise its discretion will impact on the outcome of the 
court case concerned and generally that will only be known when judgment is handed 
down.  In the researcher's experience the legal costs of a successful litigant in an 
application for judicial review may amount from R60 000,00 upwards and, if opposed, 
may amount to more than double that figure. The unsuccessful applicant must usually 
pay the opponent's taxed legal costs. Effectively therefore affordability problems 
prevent most citizens access to the courts to enforce government accountability. The 
applicant in the example given was one of the fortunate few that could afford High 
Court litigation. If the applicant was prepared to accept the extensive delays involved in 
litigation and managed to achieve "success" in court, it could have amounted to an 
empty victory. The setting aside of the municipal decision to refuse the building plan 
coupled with the normal exercise of judicial restraint and deference, would have meant 
reconsideration of the application by the municipality and potentially again a refusal.  
 
The public protector was a further possible avenue that the applicant could have 
pursued. The applicant perceived the role played by the public protectors to be political 
rather than robust. Joubert (2005:140) confirms that this type of perception is based on 
the issues covered in the reports of the public protector to date. The applicant elected 
to wait for the municipal appeal authority's decision, rather than to approach the public 
protector or a court.  
 
 The appeal was dismissed by the municipal appeal authority almost two years after 
date of lodgement and the reason given for dismissal was that the proposed building 
would probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining property. If the statement 
was factually correct, it would have been a valid reason for refusal of the building plan 
in terms of section 7 of the Building Act. In the given set of facts the dwelling would not 
have been visible from adjoining property and could therefore not have detracted from 
the value of adjoining property. As stated before, the authority is required by law to 
provide adequate reasons for decisions. The legislation, however, failed to clearly 
require that the decision-maker should also provide the reasoning to support the 
  
78 
 
 
conclusion reached. Without knowing what the reasoning was for the conclusion 
reached, the applicant was unable to establish whether the decision-maker made an 
error of law or fact. When asked to judicially review such a decision, a court generally 
will not enquire into the merits of a case. Even though the reason given was not 
supported by the facts, the municipality managed to camouflage the real reasons for its 
refusal of the building plan application by employing words used in the applicable 
legislation. The person approaching the court for appropriate relief bears the burden of 
proof. The reasons provided for refusal seemed, at face value, to indicate that the 
exercise of public power was rationally related to the purpose for which those powers 
were given. A court probably would have refused to intervene in those circumstances. 
Effectively, therefore, the applicant was without a remedy. The applicant stated that he 
has shelved the idea of a residence or further investment in South Africa and that he 
would arther live and invest in Austria. 
 
3.7.2 Example number 2. The second case involved an application for township 
establishment. The proposal triggered so-called ‘listed activities’ (in terms of the 
environmental regulations), had a potential impact on an historical furrow, and required 
approval of rezoning and subdivision applications. The local authority refused to 
process the LUPO applications before the outcome was known of the environmental 
process required under the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA). A full 
environmental assessment was required before the application for environmental 
authorisation could be decided. The applicant also had to comply with the 
requirements of the National Heritage Resources Act. In terms of section 38(8) of that 
Act the authority empowered to grant authorisation under the environmental legislation 
is required to take into consideration comments made on behalf of the heritage 
authority before deciding an application for environmental authorisation. In the given 
set of facts the heritage authority failed to properly deal with the matter and eventually 
the frustrated applicant lodged an appeal with the responsible heritage minister. The 
minister upheld the appeal after many months of delay and provided favourable 
comment to the environmental authority. After yet further delays, an official acting 
under delegated authority granted environmental authorisation approximately eighteen 
months from date of receipt of the application. Objectors then lodged an appeal against 
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the decision, causing a further delay of almost two years before that appeal was 
dismissed by the responsible minister.  That minister simultaneously approved the 
rezoning of the property for "subdivisional purposes" as contemplated in section 22 of 
LUPO. She imposed as a condition of approval that the competent heritage authority 
should approve of the wording of a servitude to be registered to regulate access to the 
historic furrow.  
 
 The competent heritage authority was requested to approve the wording of the 
proposed servitude, but failed to properly do so and subsequently also failed to 
process an appeal which the applicant lodged as a result. The applicant's concerted 
efforts over approximately two years to obtain the required heritage approval were 
unsuccessful. The matter was once again submitted to the environmental authority with 
the request that the condition requiring the approval of the heritage authority be 
waived. Indications are that, if the request for amendment should eventually be 
successful, the eventual decision to approve or refuse the application for subdivision 
will be met by an appeal in terms of LUPO. Such an appeal could add another 
eighteen months or more to the process.  
 
3.7.3 Example number 3. The judgment handed down in Hayes and Another v Minister of 
Finance and Development Planning (Western Cape) and Others 2003 (4) SA 598 (C) 
serves as a practical example of how judicial restraint may impact on potential 
development. In the Hayes-matter a provincial minister on appeal approved a land use 
application against the wishes of the municipality concerned. The approval was set 
aside by the High Court because the objectors were not informed that the applicant 
lodged a LUPO appeal with the provincial authority against the municipality's refusal of 
the application. The matter was referred back to the provincial authority for 
reconsideration. The provincial authority then duly ensured that the objectors were 
given proper notice and an opportunity to make further comment before reconsidering 
the appeal. It subsequently again approved the application. The objectors approached 
the court for a second time and managed to again obtain an order setting aside the 
minister's second approval on technical grounds.  The applicant for development 
approval, after several years of effort trying to obtain approval and after having 
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incurred considerable town planning and legal expenses, decided to shelve the idea of 
developing the property. 
 
The three examples described above convincingly illustrates that the manner in which the 
legislation has been written (and the lack of integration of legislation) makes it nigh impossible 
for local government to effectively promote social and economic development within land use 
context. Part of the problem is that National and Provincial Legislatures have not provided 
only one right of appeal on the same set of facts, but several rights of appeal. Any person 
who intends to obstruct development is therefore able, on the same set of facts, to 
successively frustrate the process by lodging successive appeals. Even if more than one right 
of appeal was warranted, a statutory provision that all appeals should be dealt with 
concurrently and not successively would have contributed to more speedy resolution of 
disputes.  If the Legislature required decisions relating to land use planning and development 
to be taken by one body representing all the various interests119 it could have expedited 
finalisation of applications and would have contributed to a more holistic approach to 
consideration of such applications. This in turn would have positively contributed to the 
progressive realisation of the fundamental right to have access to adequate housing. 
 
The legislative picture is not entirely bleak. In addition to legislation regarded as making a 
positive contribution to the promotion of accountability (such as the PAJA and the PAIA), the 
Legislatures have in recent times also managed to introduce measures that contribute 
positively to the more effective processing of applications within the field of study. One such a 
provision is section 38 of the NHRA. It basically provides that the competent heritage 
authority (which would have been a decision-making authority in ordinary circumstances) 
becomes a commenting authority if the proposal to which the application relates also requires 
authorisation under the environmental legislation. In other words, the heritage authority will 
still be required to comment on the proposal, but only one decision will be taken, namely by 
the environmental authority.    
 
Certain minimum requirements will have to be complied with to overcome the perceived 
weaknesses of legislative measures aimed at accomplishing government accountability. This 
                                                 
119
  The tribunal contemplated in the DFA partially fulfils such a function. However, no such tribunal has 
 been appointed for the Western Cape. 
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should be evident from the practical problems experienced by ordinary citizens in land use 
planning and development context as highlighted in the examples provided in 1.3 and 3.7. 
This thesis argues that legislative reform is urgently required. It should provide for compulsory 
co-ordination of the legislative activities of the three spheres of government, oblige the 
provincial and national spheres of government to undertake land use planning and stipulate 
specific time periods for the performance of activities. In all instances where statutory 
obligations are placed on government bodies, effective and affordable mechanisms should be 
provided for members of the public to enforce prompt compliance. Provision should be made 
for informal, relatively cheap and fair procedures for challenging the manner in which public 
power has been exercised, for prompt and objective hearings, and for supervisory bodies that 
would not be required to remit matters to the relevant authority for reconsideration. Such 
supervisory bodies should be empowered to enquire into the merits of decision, to annul 
administrative acts, to substitute the decision of the authority under review, to impose 
coercive fines and take disciplinary action against offending authorities and their officials.120   
 
3.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the legal framework within which government 
accountability is to be achieved in our democracy. It explored the statutory devices employed 
to promote accountability, with special emphasis on the role of the judiciary in the process, 
and included a brief analysis of the alternative approaches that may be employed to achieve 
government accountability. Planning law was used as a backdrop for purposes of exposing 
the practical difficulties encountered by applicants in land use planning and development 
context. Three examples were provided that illuminated the high risks, costs and time delays 
involved in the application of the available formal remedies.  
 
                                                 
120
  See discussion in Part II “Powers of Administrative Courts to Enforce their Decisions” in the General 
 Reports of Congresses of the International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions (Madrid, 
 2004) available at www.iasaj.org/publi/doc/congres%20VIII%20va.pdf.  
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CHAPTER 4: APPROACH TO RESEARCH 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it aims to show in more detail how the researcher 
approached the supplementary study that was undertaken to establish whether others active 
in the field of study also viewed government as unaccountable within the land use and 
planning context. Secondly, it aims to describe the actual process of fact-finding involving a 
target group, to analyse the data obtained, and to describe and discuss the research findings. 
 
Particulars provided in earlier chapters regarding the approach which the researcher adopted 
to the research, are not repeated here in any detail. For ease of reference the reader is 
referred to the following sub-paragraphs above: 
 
4.1.1 The problem definition (i.e. whether the current mechanisms for achieving effective 
government accountability are adequate) - par 1.4. 
 
4.1.2 The main research objectives (to establish what exactly is meant by the constitutional 
requirement that government and the public administration must be accountable and to 
assess the effectiveness and adequacy of the available mechanisms to achieve such 
accountability) – par 1.5. 
 
4.1.3 The theoretical framework and research questions (e.g. what are the available legal 
requirements and key mechanisms to promote government accountability and whether 
they are adequate to ensure a reasonable measure of accountability) – par 1.6. 
 
4.1.4 The research methodology (i.e. first undertaking literature and laws reviews, followed 
by supplementary research to obtain the views of others active in the field of study on 
whether they perceive government as unaccountable and whether they regard the 
available mechanisms for accountability as effective within land use and planning 
context) – par 1.7.  
 
  
83 
 
 
4.1.5 The target group (e.g. the selection criteria employed to ensure that members of the 
group would be representative of provincial and local government, professional 
consultants and developers and would be actively involved and experienced in land 
use planning and development context) – par 1.2. 
 
A qualitative approach was used in this study to test the level of acceptance of government 
accountability and the perceived effectiveness of the existing mechanisms within a chosen 
target group. The unit of analysis for this research involved all three spheres of government 
(including the public administration) within the land use planning and development context 
within the Western Cape.  
 
This research concerned the exercise of public power by government within the stated 
context and more particularly whether government can effectively be held accountable for the 
manner in which public power is exercised. Three basic questions were raised in this regard. 
Firstly, whether government could effectively be compelled to answer (i.e. provide an 
explanation, reason or justification) to members of the public for it's the acts or omissions. 
Secondly, in the event of unsatisfactory account-giving, whether an acceptable degree of 
remedy (e.g. redress and correction) was available. Thirdly, whether government 
accountability involved a process of social empowerment for the people by incorporation of 
those for whom decisions are made into the decision making mill. 
 
Based on the researcher's own observations as described earlier he has adopted as an 
existential hypothesis121 that government is mostly not accountable within land use planning 
and development context within the Western Cape and that the available mechanisms for 
achieving government accountability are ineffective. In doing so, the researcher’s bias was 
placed in the open. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Various research assumptions and limitations may potentially detract from the validity and 
reliability of the data obtained. For example, Delport and Fouché point out (2005: 262) all 
"qualitative researchers approach their studies with a certain paradigm or world-view, a basic 
                                                 
121
  I.e. "a provisional statement about a certain state of affairs" (Mouton, 1996: 122). 
  
84 
 
 
set of beliefs or assumptions that guides their inquiries".  Du Toit (2005: 426) argues that the 
researcher should bring the hidden assumptions and implications that research questions 
may contain, to light before attempting to provide answers to the questions posed.  Through 
the law review it was shown that the assumptions in the research questions that legal 
requirements do exist relating to government accountability and that there are mechanisms in 
place to promote government accountability, were correct.   
 
A comprehensive overview of the assumptions and limitations that could potentially detract 
from the validity and reliability of the data obtained in the course of the research is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Some of those do merit special attention and are briefly examined below.  
 
4.2.1 Research assumptions 
This study assumed that respondents are answering the questionnaire truthfully and honestly. 
To improve the likelihood of this being so, the anonymity of respondents have been assured. 
In addition reliance was placed, amongst other things, on direct observation of the researcher 
supplemented with less reactive methods (e.g. the use of case law) with which to compare 
the answers obtained from respondents. The questionnaire was set in a way that would 
contribute to a reduction of the likelihood of dishonesty or untruthfulness.  Most statements to 
which informants were required to respond were positively worded (e.g. "adequate land use 
planning exists") or required confirmation of the factual situation (e.g. "requests for reasons 
are promptly complied with").The researcher realised that respondents are more likely to 
agree with a statement than to disagree with the inverse (see Mouton, 1996: 155).  
 
4.2.2 Potential sources of error 
Mouton (2001: 100 - 110) provides a useful summary of the main errors one may encounter in 
research. A comprehensive overview of potential sources of error that may lead to invalid or 
unreliable information is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that the attempts of 
the researcher to overcome or limit problems in this regard included the following: 
 
(a) The researcher clearly defined what was meant by accountability within the context of 
the research122 and used short and simple specific questions rather than general ones 
                                                 
122
  See Annexure 1: Pro forma questionnaire.  
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to avoid problems of ambiguity and abstract concepts.  The questions were aimed at 
establishing facts rather than opinion through formulation that was likely to render such 
a result.  
 
(b) Leading questions were avoided.  The target group included persons representing 
government, the private sector and professional consultants who are required to work 
on both sides of the proverbial fence.  
 
(c) The researcher discussed the measuring instrument with his supervisor, improved it 
afterwards before testing it with two town planners who did not form part of the target 
group, and only then used it in the actual study.  
 
(d) The researcher placed substantial reliance on relevant case law which by its very 
nature is non-reactive.123 The researcher employed a questionnaire to create distance 
between him and the participants to provide less opportunity for his own prejudices, 
attitudes and beliefs to influence the final data.  
 
4.2.3 Research limitations 
This study was subject to a number of limitations. Included amongst those limitations were 
that the findings were analytic generalizations (as opposed to statistical generalization), that 
the study was a cross sectional study and all findings were limited to the period of time which 
is covered by the study analysis and the researcher's inability to find strong supporting 
literature on all dimensions of government accountability. Further potential limitations included 
the issue of honesty and truly detailed answers from participants and sociological, ontological 
and methodological constraints.124 Examples of such constraints would be that the 
researcher, whilst interacting with the social world in the research process, made a number of 
decisions in the pursuit of valid conclusions that could impact on the validity of the results,125 
the complexity of human behaviour coupled with the fact that most social actions take place in 
an open system, and the use of potentially inappropriate methods and techniques. Overall the 
                                                 
123
  This is “modification to create a better impression” - per Mouton (1996: 143). 
124
  See Mouton’s discussion of these types of constraints (2001: 123). 
125
  See Mouton (1996: 41), Fouche & De Vos (2005:102) and Strydom (2005: 249). 
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qualitative style of the supplementary research was “situationally constrained” (Fouche & De 
Vos, 2005:102). 
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
The aim with this section is to explain how the researcher reached his research questions, 
why those questions were asked, in what sense they were linked to the research objective 
and how the research project was executed in order to maximise the validity of the findings. 
The purpose of undertaking a research design was to enable the researcher to anticipate 
what the appropriate research decisions should be, aimed at maximising the validity of the 
eventual results. 
 
Steps taken and tactics employed by the researcher in an attempt to avoid problems relating 
to the validity and reliability of information included conceptualisation and operationalisation. 
"Accountability", as a key concept, was clarified by way of definition in the questionnaire. The 
process of operationalisation included compiling a list of characteristics denoted by the 
concept "accountability" for purposes of measurement. For construct validity, reliance was 
inter alia placed on knowledge gained in the process of the literature and law reviews.  This 
was followed by compilation of a list of questions that were assumed to be elements of the 
phenomenon called accountability and presenting them to a sample of individuals in a 
questionnaire, from which the researcher could gain an overall impression. 
 
A questionnaire was used to obtain standardised data, allowing easy comparison and giving 
more control over the research process. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix 
1. Part I of the questionnaire required respondents to provide some personal information 
relating to them. In order to encourage the target group to complete the questionnaire and 
hopefully generate a high response rate, the researcher assured respondents by letter that 
their responses would be treated as confidential and that they would not be identified in the 
thesis. 
 
Part II of the questionnaire contains the survey questions.  It was designed by grouping all the 
questions and issues which resulted from the detailed literature review and statutory 
requirements together. The questions used in the questionnaire were mainly structured, 
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asking the respondents to make choices among a number of options given by the researcher 
and were considered to be relatively easier to answer than open-ended questions. The item 
format was such that each item had to be rated on a six-point-scale.  In the second section of 
Part II eighteen factors were listed that could potentially contribute to the erosion of 
government accountability. Respondents were required to use a given scale of ratings to 
indicate what contribution those factors make (if any) to the erosion of government 
accountability. The item format was such that each item had to be rated on a three-point-
scale. In order to give respondents the opportunity for additional comment they were also 
asked to indicate whether in their opinion there were factors not listed by the researcher that 
contributed to the erosion of accountability in government and for this purpose a blank lined 
space was provided. 
 
The third section of Part II was concerned with the time taken by the authorities to finalise 
processing of listed types of applications and appeals. The aim was inter alia to establish 
whether the authorities complied with the rule of law.126  Respondents were asked in the 
fourth section of Part II to rate the current measure of accountability in the three spheres of 
government in the specified context, expressed as a percentage. Respondents were also 
required to motivate their choices made and were invited to make suggestions as to what is 
required to improve the accountability of the three spheres of government in the field of study 
generally.  
 
Having compiled a questionnaire, the researcher was faced with the problem of getting a 
sample that was as representative as possible of the research population (i.e. a collection of 
individuals all involved in the land use planning and development industry in the Western 
Cape). The selection criteria as described in par 1.2 (e.g. on-going experience in the field of 
study over many years) narrowed the potential research population to an estimated 150 
persons, of which the researcher managed to identify a core group of 47 persons as members 
of the target group.  The chosen sampling frame included government employees, town 
planners in private practice and developers. The target group comprised 12 town planners 
and 1 environmental practitioner in private practice, 8 municipal town planners from various 
local authorities, 3 senior provincial officials, and 23 developers.  All those identified that met 
                                                 
126
  Discussed in 3.7.1.  Statutory time periods apply in some instances within which the authorities are 
 required to perform and failure to comply, would serve to indicate non-compliance with the rule of law.  
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the criteria described above, were selected to remove the possibility that the researcher's bias 
would enter into the selection of potential respondents. The inclusion of government officials, 
private practitioners and developers into the target group was aimed at reaching accurate 
results covering all sectors. Overall the aim was to obtain a balanced set of data that would 
enable the researcher to form a more reliable picture of the actual state of affairs regarding 
government accountability. 
 
Methods employed to increase the likelihood of reliability of data included multiple sources of 
data collection and direct observation supplemented with less reactive methods (e.g. use of 
case law).  The strategy employed to ensure inferential validity was firstly to obtain a thorough 
understanding of the relevant theories and their philosophical underpinnings as well the 
statutory requirements and applicable legal principles; secondly, to use an appropriate 
technique of analysis for rival findings or explanations.   
 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION  
The questionnaire was forwarded by e-mail to the 47 members of the target group. The 
researcher wished to create a sense of urgency to improve the response rate and as the time 
required to complete the questionnaire was only approximately 20 minutes, they were 
afforded a limited period within which to respond.  Only a disappointing fifteen completed 
questionnaires were returned within the time period stipulated (i.e. 31,9%) of which 3 were 
from municipal planners, 3 from town planners in private practice, 2 from senior provincial 
officials and 7 from developers.  
 
The researcher contacted those who have failed to respond within the stated time period to 
ascertain the reasons for the non-completion of their questionnaires. He was given reasons 
ranging from point blank refusal to participate in research to explanations relating to perceived 
lack of sufficient knowledge and experience regarding the subject matter. Even through the 
sample may not be regarded as representative, it provides insight based on the many years 
of experience of the respondents, and supplements the supporting evidence obtained in the 
literature and law reviews and the findings of our courts in the case law. 
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4.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The results obtained from the questionnaires returned are summarised below. For purposes 
of the summary the respondents have been classified into three groups, to wit 
"administrators" (i.e. the 4 provincial and municipal respondents indicated with a *), 
"practitioners" (i.e. the 4 town planners in private practice indicated with a *) and "developers" 
(the 7 developers that responded indicated with a *). 
 
4.5.1 Part II of questionnaire - section 1  
The respondents were asked to make choices among a number of options given by the 
researcher.  The item format was such that each item had to be rated on a six-point-scale, 
namely 1 - strongly disagree; 2 - moderately disagree; 3 - mildly disagree; 4 - mildly agrees; 
5 - moderately agrees; and 6 - strongly agrees. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Adequate land use planning exits that may serve as a basis 
* * * * * 
    for decision-making in the national sphere of government 
* * * *  
  
* * * *  
     
 *  *  
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Adequate land use planning exits that may serve as a basis 
* * * * *     for decision-making in the provincial sphere of government 
* *  * *   
* *  * *      
    *   
    *   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Adequate land use planning exits that may serve as a basis 
* * * * *     for decision-making in the municipal sphere of government 
* *  * *   
* *  * *      
    *   
    *   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The authorities are generally responsive to external 
* * * * * * 
   Stakeholders 
* * * *   
 
*  *    
 
  *    
 
  *    
 
  *    
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1 2 3 4 5 6   The authorities generally provide sufficient opportunity for 
* *  * * * 
   citizen participation in the deliberative process of govt. 
* *  * * * 
 
   * * * 
 
    *  
 
    *  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Usually citizens are afforded an effective opportunity 
* * * * * * 
   to confront adverse evidence before a decision is taken 
*  *  * *  
 
   * *  
 
   *   
 
   *   
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The authorities generally provide sufficient opportunity for 
* *  * * * 
   professional consultants' participation in deliberative 
* *  * * * 
   processes of government 
*   * *  
 
    *  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Decisions taken by municipal councillors are usually 
* * * * * 
    after debate of agenda items 
* * * * * 
  
*    * 
  
*    * 
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The authorities usually provide reasons for decisions when 
*   * * 
    informing applicants & objectors of those decisions 
*   * * 
  
*   * * 
  
    * 
  
    * 
  
    * 
  
    * 
  
    * 
  
    * 
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    It is evident from councillor debates & the reasons given 
* * * * * 
    for decisions that the decision-makers are usually fully 
* * *   
    conversant with all the relevant facts 
*  *   
  
*  *   
  
*  *   
  
  *   
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1 2 3 4 5 6    When authorities are requested to provide reasons for 
* *  * * 
    decisions, such requests are promptly complied with 
* *  *  
  
* *  *  
  
* *  *  
  
*   *  
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The reasons for decisions given by the authorities include 
* * * * * 
    adequate substantiation in support of the decisions 
* *  *  
  
* *  *  
  
 *  *  
  
 *  *  
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The reasons for decisions given by the authorities set out 
* * * * * 
    the reasoning that has led to the conclusions reached  
* * * * * 
  
*  * *  
  
*     
  
*     
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The reasons given for decisions are rationally related to 
* * * * * 
    the decisions taken 
* * * * * 
  
* * * *  
  
 *    
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Statutory codes of conduct provide effective means to 
* * * *  * 
  enforce accountability of officials and councillors 
* * *    
 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
*      
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The current methods and existing tools available to 
* * * *  * 
   monitor the conduct of the authorities are adequate 
* * *    
 
* * *    
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
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1 2 3 4 5 6   When authorities are requested to provide access to 
* * * * *  
  information, such requests are promptly complied with 
* * * *   
 
* *  *   
 
 *     
 
 *     
 
 *     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The institutions created by law to oversee the exercise of 
* * * * *  
  statutory powers (e.g. the public protector) are adequate 
*  * *   
 
*  * *   
 
*  * *   
 
   *   
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The current methods and existing tools available for 
* * * * *  
   achieving effective oversight are adequate 
* * * *   
 
 * * *   
 
 * *    
 
 *     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Our system of political accountability (which relies on the  
* *   *  
   theoretical possibility of poor performers not being re- 
* *     
   elected) is effective 
* *     
 
* *     
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The introduction of party politics in the municipal sphere 
* * *  *  
   has resulted in a general improvement of accountability 
* *     
 
* *     
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
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1 2 3 4 5 6    Our system of legal accountability (which relies mainly on 
* * *  *  
   the Courts and audits in holding the authorities accountable) 
*  *    
   Is effective 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Our system of professional accountability (which relies on 
* * * * *  
   professional bodies in holding officials accountable) is 
* * *    
   Effective 
* * *    
 
*  *    
 
*      
 
*      
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The current methods available to restrain the authorities 
* * * * *  
   from abusing their powers are effective 
* * *    
 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
*  *    
 
  *    
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    The current system has adequate corrective mechanisms 
* * * *   
   for citizens to obtain redirection/ correction when govern- 
* * * *   
   ment performance is deemed unacceptable 
* * *    
 
* *     
 
* *     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    Adequate statutory provisions exists generally for citizens to 
* * * *   
   To impose sanctions on the authorities in cases of manifest 
* * *    
   misconduct in office 
* * *    
 
* *     
 
*      
 
*      
 
*      
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6    National and provincial governments ensure the effective 
* * * *   
   performance by municipalities of their municipal planning  
* * *    
   functions through adequate regulation, monitoring & 
* * *    
   Support 
* *     
 
* *     
 
*      
 
  
94 
 
 
 
4.5.2 Part II of questionnaire - section 2  
Respondents were required to use a given scale of ratings to indicate what contribution the 
following factors made (if any) to the erosion of government accountability. The item format 
was such that each item had to be rated on a three-point-scale, namely a low rating ("1") 
would indicate little or no contribution whilst a high rating ("3") would indicate a major 
contribution to the erosion of government accountability. 
 
1 2 3    The formality of proceedings in our Courts, their remoteness and 
* * ***    inaccessibility (high costs of litigation, etc) 
 * *****  
  ****  
 
1 2 3    The restraint practiced by our Courts in examining the substance 
 **** *** 
   of decisions 
 **** *** 
 
 * * 
 
 
1 2 3    The long delays before applications are decided 
 * *** 
 
  ******* 
 
  **** 
 
 
1 2 3    The long delays before appeals are decided 
* * *** 
 
  ****** 
 
  **** 
 
 
1 2 3    The long delay before cases are decided in Court 
* * *** 
 
 * ****** 
 
  *** 
 
 
1 2 3    Duplicative and wasteful procedures in public administration 
* * *** 
 
 ** ***** 
 
  *** 
 
 
1 2 3    Fragmented character of service delivery 
* ***** **** 
 
 ** ** 
 
  * 
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1 2 3    Absence of performance regime & culture 
* * **** 
 
  ***** 
 
  **** 
 
 
1 2 3    The regulatory burden 
* * *** 
 
* * ***** 
 
  *** 
 
 
1 2 3    The complexity of the statutory framework 
** * *** 
 
 ** *** 
 
 *** * 
 
 
1 2 3    Loss of professional capacity (resignations) 
*  **** 
 
  ****** 
 
  **** 
 
 
1 2 3    Understaffing 
* ** **** 
 
 * **** 
 
  *** 
 
 
1 2 3    Lack of visible qualifications 
* * *** 
 
 ** **** 
 
 *** * 
 
 
1 2 3    Lack of experience, skill and knowledge 
* * *** 
 
 **** ** 
 
  **** 
 
 
1 2 3    No demonstrated competence for position to which appointed 
* **** *** 
 
* *** ** 
 
  * 
 
 
1 2 3    Lack of will to enforce requirements 
* ** *** 
 
* *** **** 
 
  * 
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1 2 3    Public official immunity from civil suits 
* * *** 
 
*** ** **** 
 
 *  
 
 
1 2 3    Inadequate time, information & resources on part of citizens 
*** ** ** 
 
 * ** 
 
 *** * 
 
 
The open-ended question requesting respondents to indicate whether in their opinion there 
were other factors (i.e. not listed by the researcher) that contributed to the erosion of 
accountability in government, elicited the following comments:127 
 
• "Officials become personal and have vendettas", they are "racist" and suffer from "lack 
of skills and experience." 
• "Pressure and interference from local civic groups, e.g. … Property Owners' Assoc." 
• "Lack of cooperation between departments" and "coordination gap between local and 
provincial government." 
• "Affirmative action, racial discrimination and nepotism." 
• "Poor attitude/ mindset of officials - they do not realise the importance of their decisions 
with respect to economy, jobs, social benefits." 
• "Lack of professional ethic when it comes to detail. Sloppy grammar and sloppiness on 
technicalities reflect sloppy professionalism."128 
• "The responsibility for decisions taken, or decisions NOT taken, is mostly circumvented 
by 'making' somebody else responsible for the final 'signature'." 
• "Final planning decisions are more influenced by political considerations rather than 
applying good planning practice. The biggest problem is the politicians. They will 
disregard norms and standards in pursuit of their own objectives ('I want to leave a 
legacy') and party political aspirations. It is interesting to note how development 
applications are manipulated when 'heavy-weights' are part of the BEE component. It  
is also interesting to note how 'friends' get the inside fat of the buttock."129 
                                                 
127
  The few responses that were in Afrikaans have been translated by the researcher. 
128
  The actual response was much longer, but the portion quoted reflects the general trend of the response. 
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4.5.3 Part II of questionnaire - section 3  
Respondents were required to use a scale of ratings to indicate the time taken by the 
authorities to finalise processing of listed types of applications and appeals.  The item format 
was such that each item had to be rated on a three-point-scale, indicate the time period taken 
to finalise the listed applications or appeals, to wit "1" less than 6 months; "2" between 6 and 
12 months and "3" more than 12 months. 
 
1 2 3 Rezoning applications 
 ** ** 
 
 * ******* 
 
  *** 
 
 
1 2 3    Subdivision applications 
 
*** * 
 
 
** ***** 
 
 
*** * 
 
 
1 2 3    Departure applications 
 *** * 
 
 *** **** 
 
* ** *  
 
1 2 3    Applications for building plan approvals 
** ** * 
 
* *****  
 
****   
 
 
1 2 3    Applications for removal of restrictive title conditions 
 **** **** 
 
  *** 
 
  **** 
 
   
 
1 2 3 
   Applications for environmental authorisation 
 * *** 
 
 * ****** 
 
 ** * 
 
 
1 2 3    Appeals in terms of the MSA 
* *** **** 
 
* ***  
 
 ** * 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
129
  Only part of the response is quoted, reflecting the gist of a rather lengthy response. 
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1 2 3    Appeals in terms of LUPO 
 * **** 
 
 * ****** 
 
  *** 
 
 
4.5.4 Part II of questionnaire - sections 4 and 5 
Respondents were asked in the fourth section of Part II to rate the current measure of 
accountability in the three spheres of government in the specified context, expressed as a 
percentage. Ten equal categories each were provided for national, provincial and local 
government, the first category being from 0% - 10% and the last being from 91% - 100%.  
The results obtained are summarised below. 
 
National government: 
0 - 10% *****  51 - 60% *** 
11 - 20% ***  61 - 70% * 
21 - 30% *  71 - 100% 
31 - 50% 
 
Provincial government: 
0 - 10% *** 51 - 60% *** 
11 - 20% * 61 - 70% ** 
21 - 30% ** 71 - 80% * 
31 - 40%  81 - 100% 
41 - 50% ** 
 
Municipal government: 
0 - 10% *** 51 - 60% ** 
11 - 20% * 61 - 70% 
21 - 30% ** 71 - 80% *** 
31 - 40%  81 - 90% * 
41 - 50% * 91 - 100% 
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The request that respondents should motivate their rating of the current measure of 
accountability of the three spheres of government elicited the following responses (quoted in 
no particular order). 
 
• "Not one single development that we have undertaken (in the last 5 years) leaves me 
in any doubt that accountability at all levels of government are at an all time low. The 
writer is prepared to evidence/ bulk up this statement with examples which are factual 
& speak for themselves." 
• "Better qualified staff with more experience at National and Provincial level, rather than 
municipal level." 
• (In respect of provincial experience) "Their short-notice cancellation of meetings, long 
waiting period for comment (DWAF) and unwillingness to give feedback on progress of 
applications (DEADP)." 
• (In respect of municipal experience) "Same as above, but only with a better attitude, 
some departments though have sentiments about a project and are not willing to 
discuss matters objectively." 
• "Provincial government - lack of qualified skills." 
• "Municipal government - lack of qualified skills, however, the City of Cape Town is 
trying to get their act together." 
• "Transparency = overboard."  
• "The national government's accountability is low. They will only change their position if 
ordered by court and then the minister is not even reprimanded by cabinet." 
• "National government seldom reacts on queries/ notifications with regard to land use 
applications/ development proposals, if at all." 
• "Provincial government seldom, but to a lesser extent than national government, takes 
responsibility/ accountability for queries/ requests on planning/ development issues/ 
proposals, especially when the 'enquirer' is the developer and/ or private sector." 
• "Municipal government is more accountable/ responsive as the ward councillors are 
more directly responsible and/ or accessible to the ratepayers/ developers for queries 
/action and equally then puts direct pressure on the officials in this regard." 
• "The whole idea of Spatial Development Frameworks controlled by the MSA and the 
method in terms of which they are approved, are absurd. It is nothing more than a 'wish 
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list' where there is no connection between the environment, planning, infrastructure, 
finances, etc." 
 
4.5.5 Part II of questionnaire - section 6 
The following suggestions were put forward by respondents as to what could be done to 
improve the accountability of the three spheres of government in the land use planning and 
development context within the Western Cape. 
 
• "Privatise the process with rigorous checks and balances, audits, etc." 
• "Incentivise government officials for performance which could be measured by 
development turnover." 
• "Set rigorous time lines for ALL applications with procedures for non-performance (e.g. 
right to appear at a committee of external officials to gain approval immediately or 
conversely rejection with specific reasons)." 
• "Clarity on all relevant legislation in the planning process and the implementation 
thereof." 
• "Quicker decision-making - even if some mistakes are made." 
• "If the public has clarity regarding process and practice, challenging would be easier." 
• "Much of the current frustrations with planning and development are linked to 
infrastructure capacity problems. By simply stating the obvious, i.e. 'that bulk capacity 
can not accommodate growth' problems will not be solved." 
• "Officials and politicians in the planning field must take ownership of challenges. This 
can be done by: (1) showing willingness to look for solutions; (2) initiating discussions 
with engineering departments and funding institutions; (3) coordinating initiative on 
macro level rather than 'project' level."  
• "Improve the regulations, ensure that officials have the necessary experience and 
improve productivity." 
• "Officials and politicians are not performance orientated - they are not held accountable 
if their policies/ interventions fail or if they delay development - or if they waste money - 
political accountability is poor at National and Provincial level - better at local level 
(proportional councillors problematic as they are unaccountable)." 
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• "National level - delegate all planning and development related input and decisions to 
Provincial level." 
• "Provincial level - (1) streamline environmental and planning legislation; (2) form a 
development and planning decision-making body that take social welfare, job creation, 
economic growth, poverty alleviation etc into account when making planning decisions, 
and not only environmental impact considerations; (3) formulate achievable practical 
development friendly policies with statutory status to guide development that ensures 
GROWTH; (4) Cultivate a culture of pro-development amongst planning and 
environmental officials." 
• "Local level - (1) Set time limits on processing of applications; (2) Improve level of 
professional experience and skills; (3) Get political agendas and influences out of 
decision-making process; (4) Take party politics out of local government." 
• "We must stop crawling before the altar of political correctness by blaming the current 
situation on everything else except the true cause - statutory anti-white and anti-brown 
discrimination. This statement does not reflect a right-wing view - it comes from 
someone who saw the political and moral light more than 10 years before FW the 
Wonderman has his 'mountain-top experience' (which in fact was no mountain-top 
experience, but simply an attorney changing his plea on behalf of his client from Not 
guilty to Guilty with extenuating circumstances)." 
• "The three major causes of the current service delivery problems in the town planning 
field can be said to be: (1) Affirmative action; (2) Affirmative action: (3) Affirmative 
action." 
• "Political representatives as well as officials in all 3 spheres of government should be 
made more directly accountable for decisions/ actions taken or NOT taken." 
• "Cross cutting inter government grouping with full mandate to dovetail/ integrate 
legislation impacting on development field would be a good step forward. The fact that 
the three spheres of government impacts on a local government field and the 
uncertainty with respect to field of responsibility is a recipe for disaster. Unless the 
spheres effectively talk to each other and work towards a common cause and learn to 
trust each other we are not going to get anywhere. It should be a national vision to 
support any development and anything impacting on this vision should be removed/ 
streamlined." 
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• "The only method to improve accountability would probably be to require that all 
decisions be made in public and must me made public. This would imply that in 
instances where politicians and officials disagree, this should be published in a register 
or the press." 
• "It is important that legislation be made more clear in order that everyone will know 
who is responsible for what. This may require constitutional amendments. Concepts 
such as 'municipal planning', 'urban and rural planning' and 'provincial planning' should 
be clearly defined."  
 
4.5.6 Experience of respondents 
The results obtained from the questionnaires indicate that the administrators, practitioners 
and developers have the following experience in terms of the number of years that they have 
been involved in their respective fields: 
 
Less than 5 years  5 - 10 years  10 - 15 years  15 - 20 years  more than 20 years 
* *** * * ** 
    *** 
    **** 
 
 
4.6 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION130 
The main objective of this thesis was to establish what exactly is meant by the constitutional 
requirements that local government and the public administration should be accountable; 
more particularly, to illuminate the concept of accountability, to explore, describe and explain 
the available mechanisms for achieving government accountability and to assess the 
effectiveness and adequacy of those mechanisms within the land use planning and 
development context in the Western Cape. The available mechanisms for achieving 
government accountability were identified in the course of the literature and law reviews and 
the study then proceeded to establish the effectiveness and adequacy of those mechanisms 
with reference to practical examples encountered in the field of study. 
 
The processes of conceptualisation and operationalisation of the study were described in 
Chapters1 and 4 above and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the researcher 
compiled a list of questions that are assumed to be elements or factors of the phenomenon 
                                                 
130
  The averages referred to in this sub-paragraph were calculated and have been rounded off to the 
 nearest full percentage, e.g. 66% in stead of 66.499%. 
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called accountability and presented those questions to a sample of individuals in the form of a 
questionnaire. The aim was to obtain responses from a representative target group in order 
that the researcher might gain an overall impression from the target group's perspective of the 
current state of government accountability within the specified context. 
 
Al the practitioners regarded the existing land use planning as basis for decision-making in 
the national sphere as inadequate, whilst 5 out of 7 developers thought the same. Surprisingly 
2 developers regarded land use planning in the national sphere as adequate for decision-
making. Not surprisingly 3 out of the 4 administrators regarded national planning as basis for 
decision-making as adequate. The researcher realised, in retrospect, that he should have 
asked the respondents to name the existing national plans, because with the exception of 
"Guide Plans"131 no other national plans existed that he knew of. He did not regard policy 
statements and documents such as the NSDP as planning in the ordinary grammatical 
meaning of the word (see glossary). Be that as it may, a slight majority of respondents (66%) 
regarded the national plans as inadequate for purposes of informing decision-making within 
land use planning and development context. 
 
In the provincial sphere the adequacy of existing land use planning as basis for decision-
making received a better rating than national planning - 3 practitioners and 4 developers 
regarded it as inadequate, whilst 1 practitioner and 3 developers regarded it as adequate. All 
4 administrators regarded it as moderately adequate. The fact of the matter was that 
provincial planning which could have served as guideline for land use planning decisions was 
basically non-existent. Provincial policies and guidelines abounded,132 but not provincial 
planning.  The researcher realised, in retrospect, that he should have asked the respondents 
to name the existing provincial plans, because their answers would have shown the extent to 
which "planning", "policy" and "guidelines" were in practice all regarded to mean the same 
thing, to wit "planning".  
 
A slight majority of the respondents (54%) regarded the provincial plans as adequate for 
purposes of informing decision-making within the land use planning and development context, 
but the majority of practitioners and developers (63%) regarded it as inadequate. Likewise the 
                                                 
131
  Made in terms of the Physical Planning Act and now known as regional or urban structure plans. 
132
  E.g. the PSDF and "Guidelines for Resort Developments in the Western Cape" (DEADP, 2005). 
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majority of respondents regarded the existing municipal planning as an adequate basis for 
decision-making (i.e. 53%), whilst the majority of practitioners and developers (i.e. 63%) 
regarded it as inadequate. 
 
The practitioners were unanimous that the authorities were generally not responsive to 
external stakeholders. The developers were divided on the issue, with 4 indicating that the 
authorities were not responsive and 3 indicating that they were responsive. Surprisingly 3 out 
of the 4 administrators regarded the authorities as being unresponsive to external 
stakeholders.  
 
Only 27% of the respondents did not believe that the authorities provided sufficient 
opportunity for citizen participation in deliberative processes of government. The researcher 
fears that of the 73% of the respondents that believed that the authorities did provide 
sufficient opportunity for citizen participation, many if not most of them may not have fully 
comprehended what was meant by "participation in the deliberative processes".  In the 
industry, the mere opportunity or invitation to lodge an objection was seen as public 
participation. As was pointed out above, public participation implies at least two ways or 
mutual communication and more.  It is something more than an instrumental process to get a 
plan approved, and should involve the empowerment of people to have control over which 
and how things are done. In the researcher's experience this was not the case in practice and 
as a result he was unconvinced by the result.  
 
As one of the developers have not responded to the statement that citizens usually were 
afforded an effective opportunity to confront adverse evidence before a decision was taken, 
the result was a draw in the "practitioners and developers" category (5 agreed and 5 
disagreed). The administrators were unanimous in their opinion that citizens usually were 
afforded an effective opportunity to confront adverse evidence before decision-making.  The 
result obtained in the "practitioners and developers" category (i.e. 50: 50) was in line with the 
researchers own experience. 
 
The majority of respondents (60%) felt that the authorities generally provided sufficient 
opportunity for professional consultants' participation in deliberative processes of government. 
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Notably the practitioners were unanimous in their disagreement with this statement and 1 
developer shared their point of view. In the researcher's experience, developers rarely 
attended meetings of the authorities where land use planning and development applications 
were considered and the opinion expressed by the developers therefore had to be 
approached with caution. The researcher's earlier comment that it was not always fully 
comprehended what was meant by "participation in the deliberative processes" equally 
applied in this instance. Although the administrators tended to regard participation in 
deliberative processes as a mere opportunity or invitation to lodge and objection or comment, 
this could not be equated to participation in the deliberative processes. In the circumstances 
the researcher verily believed that the response of the practitioners was the best available 
indication of the factual position in this respect. 
 
The researcher has specifically attempted to emphasise the word debate in the statement that 
decisions by municipal councillors were usually taken "after debate of agenda items". It 
seems that the point has been missed by respondents. There is a difference between 
"discussion" and "debate". In the researcher's experience of many years, councillors pass 
comments on agenda items, but real debate is an extremely rare occurrence. A slight majority 
of respondents (53%) have indicated that council decisions are usually taken without debate. 
The researcher argues that only in exceptional cases does debate precede decisions within 
the municipal sphere and that this causes difficulty for officials who are required to provide 
reasons for decisions when formulating some form of response that would hopefully withstand 
a court challenge.  
 
The vast majority of respondents (80%) indicated that the authorities usually provided 
reasons for decisions when informing applicants and objectors of their decisions. This was to 
be expected as the authorities were by law required to provide reasons when requested. It 
was disconcerting that the authorities, when required to provide explanations in respect of the 
reasons given by them, were not cooperative. The Vumazonke court case, for example, 
concerns applications for social grants that have not been granted by government. The court 
applicants found the failure or refusal of government to deliver adequate reasons within a 
reasonable time to explain why their applications have not been granted, unacceptable. The 
slackness of the authorities to explain themselves, of which the Vumazonke case is a sad 
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example, confirms the experience of the respondents in my research that alleged that 
government has failed or refused to deliver reasons within a reasonable time.   
 
With the exception of 1 administrator and 1 developer the respondents (86%) were of the 
opinion that based on the councillor debates and reasons given for decisions, the decision-
makers were not fully conversant with all the relevant facts. If so, how could one expect 
proper decisions to be made? 
 
Nine of the fifteen respondents indicated that when the authorities were requested to provide 
reasons for decisions, such requests were not promptly complied with. National legislation 
stipulates time periods within which inter alia requests for reasons have to be complied with 
(e.g. PAIA). Yet 60% of the respondents state that such requests are not promptly complied 
with.  In a similar question relating to the promptness with which the authorities complied with 
requests for access to information, eleven out of the fifteen (73%) respondents indicated a 
moderate to strong view that such requests were not promptly complied with.  
 
Only two respondents in the "practitioners and developer" category agreed mildly with the 
statement that the reasons given for decisions by the authorities included adequate 
substantiation in support of the decisions; 81% of the respondents in that category were of the 
opinion that adequate substantiation was generally not included.  The four administrators 
have, as expected, indicated that they thought that adequate substantiation was usually 
included in the reasons given for decisions. The difficulty was that a mere statement of 
something as fact (e.g. that a proposed building may be unsightly) was in itself insufficient 
substantiation, without an explanation as to why the decision-maker held such an opinion.   
 
The researcher observed that of the five respondents that expressed the opinion that the 
reasons for decisions given by the authorities usually set out the reasoning that has led to the 
conclusions reached, three were administrators (notably two from the provincial government). 
Provincial officials were only rarely exposed to municipal land use decisions (i.e. when LUPO 
appeals were lodged with the provincial authority). For this reason and based on the 
researcher's own experience, he does do not regard the response of the two provincial 
officials as a true reflection of the practical reality. Even the mild agreement of the 3rd 
administrator with the statement should be regarded with some measure of doubt, on the 
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basis of the doctrine of reactivity. Even if their responses could be regarded as truthful, 66% 
of the respondents would still disagree with the statement that the reasoning that has led to 
conclusions reached were usually provided. 
 
The practitioners were unanimous that the reasons given for decisions were not rationally 
related to the decisions taken and five out of the seven developers supported this view. It was 
surprising to find that one of the administrators also agreed with this view. The researcher did 
not attach much value to the point of view of the three administrators that mildly agreed with 
the statement that reasons given for decisions are rationally related to the decisions taken. 
This was mainly due to the fact that in his experience it was usually those very same officials 
that were required to formulate some form of response that would hopefully withstand a court 
challenge once a decision has been taken, that were now required to say whether they 
believed that they generally were doing a fine job at writing reasons for decisions taken by 
others. 
 
Only two developers were of the opinion that statutory codes of conduct provided effective 
means to enforce accountability of officials and councillors. The researcher believes that their 
responses have been based on speculative theory rather than fact and submit that the 
majority view (86%) that those codes do not provide effective means to enforce accountability 
represents the factual situation.  A case in point was the recent shock-decision of Minister 
Pierre Uys (as he then was) relating to a local councillor of Stellenbosch.133  It was alleged 
that a contractor required a certain amount of money for undertaking certain work on behalf of 
the municipality, that according to the documents on the municipal files the figure owing to the 
contractor exceeded the actual contract sum by more than R20 000,00, that the higher figure 
was paid out to the contractor, that a councillor subsequently recovered the difference 
between the actual contract sum and the amount paid to the contractor from the contractor, 
but retained that sum of money.  The minister refused to take action and the councillor is 
currently facing criminal charges.    
 
The researcher was surprised to find that 3 of the administrators regarded the current 
methods and existing tools available to monitor the conduct of the authorities as inadequate, 
                                                 
133
  Reported in "Die Burger" of 29 November 2008 on p 6 :"Meer as R20 000 van die stadsraad se geld 
 het glo in sy sak beland". 
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a view with which the practitioners strongly agreed and which was shared by all but 1 
developer. Overall 86% of the respondents regarded those methods and tools as inadequate. 
 
Only the four administrators and two of the developers regarded the institutions created by 
law to oversee the exercise of statutory powers as adequate. The bulk of the practitioners and 
developers (81%) regarded those institutions as inadequate. 
 
One of the administrators mildly agreed that the current methods and existing tools available 
for achieving effective oversight were adequate, whilst one developer was of the opposite 
view. All the practitioners and the remaining six developers regarded those methods and tools 
as inadequate - a view held by 73% of the respondents and if the responses from the 
administrators should be disregarded, a view held by 90%. 
 
Only one of the respondents (an administrator) was of the moderate opinion that our system 
of political accountability was effective. The other fourteen respondents disagreed, ten out of 
the fourteen expressing strong disagreement. Their response confirmed the opinion of the 
writers (e.g. Cheibub & Przerworski, 1999: 230) that the assertion that democracy induces 
accountability was at least far too broad.  A similar pattern of response to the questionnaire 
was observed in respect of the statement that the introduction of party politics in the municipal 
sphere has resulted in the general improvement of accountability. 
 
One developer expressed moderate agreement that our system of legal accountability is 
effective, whilst all the other respondents disagreed. A draw occurred between mild and 
strong disagreement on this score. 
 
The one practitioner that expressed the opinion that our system of professional accountability 
was effective had less than 5 years experience as a town planner. (The researcher was under 
the impression that he had more years experience when he was included into the target 
group).  It is not known on what the developer that expressed moderate agreement that the 
system of professional accountability was effective, based his opinion. It is noteworthy that all 
the administrators regarded this system of accountability as ineffective and that three of the 
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practitioners and three of the developers held strong views that the system of professional 
accountability was ineffective. 
 
It was again surprising to find that three of the four administrators regarded the current 
methods available to restrain the authorities from abusing their powers as ineffective. The 
practitioners strongly agreed with this view and six out of the seven developers also regarded 
those methods as ineffective. Overall 86% regarded those methods as ineffective. 
 
Three out of the four administrators were of the view that the corrective mechanisms of the 
system to obtain correction or redress when government performance was deemed 
unacceptable were inadequate. All the practitioners concurred and so did six out of the seven 
developers. Overall 86% regarded those mechanisms as ineffective. 
 
Only one administrator regarded the existing statutory provisions as adequate for citizens to 
impose sanctions on the authorities in cases of manifest conduct. All the other respondents 
(93%) disagreed, the practitioners which once again recorded strong disagreement.  
 
Only one out of the four administrators was of the mild opinion that national and provincial 
governments ensure the effective performance by municipalities of their planning functions.   
 All the other respondents (93%) disagreed moderately to strong. 
 
The majority view in response to the questions relating to the contribution of the listed factors 
to the erosion of government accountability was that all of the listed factors made a high 
contribution in this regard. It is noteworthy that the practitioners regarded the restraint 
practices by our courts in examining the substance of decisions as of medium importance 
only. Five out of the seven developers regarded the contribution of the fragmented character 
of service delivery as of only medium importance, whilst all the practitioners marked this 
factor as of high importance. The difference in approach may be ascribed to the fact that it is 
the practitioners that in practice normally have to face the problems of fragmentation and only 
to a lesser degree the developers. The same argument may apply in respect of the 
contribution which the factor "no demonstrated competence for position to which appointed" 
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makes to the erosion of government accountability. Three of the practitioners gave this factor 
a high rating, whilst three of the developers gave it a medium rating. 
 
From the comments made in response to the open-ended questions the researcher gained 
the impression that the respondents adopted a balanced and truthful approach (e.g. the 
comment by a practitioner that "[I]f the public had clarity regarding process and practice, 
challenging would be easier"). 
 
Twelve of the respondents (80%) indicated that the processing of rezoning applications by the 
authorities took 12 months or longer to finalise. It is submitted that if local government should 
promote socio-economic development,134 a drastic reduction in the time period required to 
decide rezoning applications are essential. This is not a new thought. As far back as 1983 the 
Venter Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into township establishment and related 
matters135 made similar comment, clearly with little or no lasting effect. 
 
Eight of the respondents indicated that it took on average between 6 and 12 months to obtain 
decisions relating to subdivision, whilst seven respondents indicated that it took more than 12 
months. Only one respondent (notably an administrator) indicated that it took less than 6 
months to finally decide an application for departure, whilst eight indicated that it took 
between 6 and 12 months and six respondents indicated that it took longer than 12 months. A 
drastic reduction of the time period required for processing and taking decisions by the 
authorities in respect of applications for subdivisions and departures is needed. 
 
Although the Building Act requires every municipality to approve or refuse building plan 
applications within thirty or sixty days (depending on the architectural area) eight of the 
respondents (53%) confirmed that it took on average six months or longer to obtain building 
plan approval.  The response of the three developers that indicated that it took between 6 and 
12 months to process and finalise an application for removal of restrictive title conditions have 
not been regarded as factually correct. All the practitioners have indicated that it took longer 
                                                 
134
  A local government objective in terms of the Constitution. See supra. 
135
  "The extremely long time taken by the township establishment process at present is one of the most 
 critical factors that hamstring the rapid and effective production of residential sites. A drastic reduction 
 in the period required to complete establishment is necessary if the industry is to function on a sound 
 basis at all." See par 2.2.10 of the Venter Report (1984: 11). 
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than 12 months and the three administrators that responded confirmed this point of view. Be 
that as it may, even requiring more than 6 months to process applications of this nature and 
to come to a decision is much too long if the authorities are to be development-orientated as 
required by law.  Based on the researcher's own experience he submits that the 10 
respondents (66%) that indicated that on average it takes longer than 12 months to process 
and obtain authorisation in terms of the environmental legislation reflects the factual situation 
correctly. 
  
In terms of section 62 of the MSA municipal managers are required to "promptly" submit 
appeals in terms of that Act to the internal appeal authority and the latter is required to 
"commence with an appeal within six weeks and decide the appeal within a reasonable 
period".136 Eight of the respondents have indicated that it took between 6 and 12 months to 
process and decide such an appeal and 3 respondents have indicated that it took more than 
12 months to obtain a decision on appeal.   
 
Applicants are expected to first exhaust their internal remedies before they may approach the 
court with an application for judicial review.137  The lengthy time periods associated with High 
Court litigation have been discussed above. In the Strydom-matter 138 the court reserved 
judgment and only gave judgment more than a year after the hearing, refusing the application 
on the basis that the nuisance complained about was a private (as opposed to a public) 
nuisance. The important fact is that even once the court hearing has eventually taken place it 
may take a considerable further period of time before the judgment is handed down. 
 
Only two of the respondents indicated a time period of between 6 and 12 months to process 
and decide appeals in terms of LUPO, whilst the other thirteen respondents indicated that on 
average it took longer than 12 months to process and decide such appeals.  
 
                                                 
136
  See sub-section 62(2) and (5) of the MSA. 
137
  See discussion under sub-paragraph 3.9 above. 
138
  Johan Hendrik Strydom v The City of Cape Town: Supreme Court (CPD) Case Number 7015/2001 
 (unreported). The court was requested to grant an "order to compel" (a so-called  "mandamus") against 
 the City of Cape Town who failed or refused to enforce the provincial noise-control regulations, but 
 declined the application even though the municipality's own noise-control officer gave evidence that the 
 permissible noise levels were exceeded.  
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It should be clear against the above background why the company in the Helderberg 
judgment (discussed in par 1.3.3) was not prepared to lodge an appeal against an invalid 
condition requiring the cession of land free of charge to the municipality. Such an appeal 
would have suspended the development approval (which meant that the company would have 
been unable to convert the opportunity into income). Although the company would not be able 
to derive immediate income from the investment, it would have had continuing expenditure 
(i.e. serving the interest payments on the development bond) pending an appeal decision. 
The appeal decision could have been negative, requiring a subsequent court challenge.  
 
Eight of the fifteen respondents rated the national government accountability at between 0 - 
20%, whilst one rated it between 21 - 30%. It is noteworthy that three of the four 
administrators rated the national government accountability to be between 11 - 20%. 
 
The provincial government fared better in the ratings, although the majority of respondents 
(53%) rated provincial government accountability to be below 50%. Again notably was that 
three of the four administrators rated provincial government accountability to be between 51 - 
60% and the fourth rated it between 41 - 50%. 
 
The administrators awarded the best rating to municipal government (i.e. 1 between 51 - 
60%, 2 between 71 - 80% and 1 between 81 - 90%). The practitioners, however, were far 
from agreement and two rated municipal government between 0 - 10%, one between 21 - 
30% and one between 71 - 80%.  
 
On the basis of the response to the statements made in section 1 of Part II of the 
questionnaire (the list of characteristics or dimensions denoted by the concept 
"accountability") the findings of this study indicated that the majority view of respondents was 
that the proverbial house of the authorities was not in order.  If adequate planning is not in 
place to serve as a basis for decision-making, for example, how is arbitrary or capricious 
decision-making to be avoided? Whilst some of the statutory plans are enforceable, policy 
which is a guideline only is not.139 Would the constitutional requirement140 that public 
participation in policy-making should be encouraged serve a useful purpose if policy failed to 
                                                 
139
  E.g. so-called "Guide Plans". 
140
  Section 195(1)(e) 
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crystallise into planning?  In the absence of planning how is local government to promote 
socio-economic development? If planning is not to take place, those people that have largely 
been excluded from land use planning and development processes in the past will continue to 
be so excluded. 
 
If the authorities fail to provide adequate substantiation in support of decisions, should it be  
required of applicants to beat the air in an attempt to discover the reasoning supportive of 
conclusions reached and would their rights of appeal in those circumstances be anything 
more than merely symbolic? The comment by one respondent that "[f]inal planning decisions 
are more influenced by political considerations rather then applying good planning practice" 
seemed to hit the nail on the head. 
 
The majority view of respondents was that our system of political, legal and professional 
accountability was not effective and that the current methods available to restrain the 
authorities from abusing their powers were ineffective. The same goes for the corrective 
mechanisms available to citizens to obtain redirection or redress when state performance was 
deemed unacceptable. It is not necessary to again run through the whole list. Suffice it to say 
that the lengthy delays in deciding applications and appeals are irreconcilable with the 
requirement to promote socio-economic development or the concept of "good government". 
 
The findings of this study on the basis of the ratings of the listed factors in section 2 of Part II 
of the questionnaire have been equally illuminating. In terms of the majority view all those 
factors with the exception of 4 (i.e. court restraint, the fragmented character of service 
delivery, lack of demonstrated capacity and public official immunity) were rated as making a 
high contribution to the erosion of government accountability. If the possible explanations 
which the researcher suggested for the perceived inaccurate ratings by the developers in 
respect of the "fragmented character of service delivery" and "lack of demonstrated capacity" 
would be accepted, it would only leave "public official immunity" and "court restraint" as the 
odd ones out. Notably, if the opinion of the administrators would be ignored, the "public 
immunity" factor would also be rated as making a high contribution to the erosion of 
government accountability.  
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Without sounding overtly negative it was something of a miracle that Mrs Grootboom and the 
other applicants (see par 1.4) managed to obtain a positive judgment against the odds as 
explained above and that some of the successful applicants even managed to receive houses 
within eight years after that judgment. 
 
This thesis raise as a particular concern two factors that the respondents indicated as 
contributing to the erosion of accountability in government, to wit "officials are racist" and 
"racial discrimination". Unfortunately the respondents did not provide further motivation. It is 
not open to speculate about what they might have had in mind. What is clear, however, is that 
"our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying 
equal rights and opportunities".141  The success of BBBEE has been questioned and its 
criticism is growing (see par 2.7). Suffice it to say that the BBBEE legislation that the new 
government has adopted discriminates against people of this country on the basis of colour 
and fails to convert the Freedom Charter vision for the future to a constitutional reality. 
Skjelten's claim (2006: 164) that the "constitution guarantees ... racial equality" is not 
compatible with reality.  As discriminatory laws of the previous regime have damaged and 
undermined the reputation of the judiciary and destroyed respect for the law, discriminatory 
laws of the current regime can reasonably be expected to have the same result. 
 
4.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter showed in more detail how the researcher approached the supplementary study 
that was undertaken to obtain the views of persons active in the field of study on government 
unaccountability within land use and planning context. It described the actual process of fact-
finding involving a target group, analysed the data obtained and described and discussed the 
research findings.  It was shown that in the majority view of the respondents the available 
systems of government accountability and the mechanisms for achieving same were 
regarded as ineffective and that the majority of respondents gave the national, provincial and 
municipal spheres of government a low rating on accountability.  
                                                 
141
  The Freedom Charter of the Congress of the People, June 26, 1955. See Dugard, J (1992:162). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research was to assess the measure of government accountability within 
the land use planning and development context in the Western Cape and more particularly, to 
assess the effectiveness of the available mechanisms for achieving a reasonable measure of 
government accountability.  To this end it aimed (a) to provide an understanding of the 
accountability requirements as encountered in theory and in legislation; (b) to provide an 
understanding of the available mechanisms for achieving government accountability; and (c) 
to contribute to the existing body of scientific knowledge regarding government accountability.  
 
The purposes of this chapter are to describe the contemporary position regarding government 
accountability on the basis of insights from practical examples, to explore contextual 
challenges (e.g. understanding the complexities of accountability) and to reflect on the 
problems of diversity and clashes of interests in the context of the problems experienced and 
the difficulties that arise with government accountability in the Western Province. 
Consideration is given to the changes required to achieve and maintain effective government 
accountability. Some key challenges facing those who wish to achieve a continuous 
improvement in effective accountability to the local population are described. 
 
5.2 THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION  
The purpose of this section is to provide a crude overview of the current state of government 
accountability and the effectiveness of some of the mechanisms aimed at achieving such 
accountability within land use planning and development context in the Western Cape.  There 
seems to be general agreement that the state has a key role to play in growing and 
developing the economy and fighting poverty. Various factors impact negatively on the ability 
of the state to effectively initiate, formulate and implement policies with good judgement.  
 
5.2.1 Elections 
Politicians are not legally compelled to abide by their platforms in any democratic system and 
there are no institutional devices to force elected administrators to be faithful to their 
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platforms. Clearly elections are not a sufficient mechanism to insure that governments will 
perform adequately to maximise citizens' welfare.   In this research only one of the 
respondents (an administrator) was of the moderate opinion that our system of political 
accountability is effective. The other fourteen respondents disagreed, ten out of the fourteen 
expressing strong disagreement. Within the land use planning and development context 
elections are not an effective mechanism for enforcing accountability. 
 
5.2.2 Legislation 
The introduction of legislation to provide a legal framework within which accountability is to be 
achieved, to provide for fundamental rights and to set requirements, with which the authorities 
are required to comply, is a necessary pre-condition for government accountability.  There is 
no shortage of legislation for this purpose, but currently the legislation falls short in many 
important respects, of which a few are highlighted below.   
 
1. Permissive legislation 
Legislation is often drafted in permissible rather than peremptory fashion. So for example the 
provincial executive may intervene when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive 
obligation in terms of legislation,142 but it need not interfere. A further example of 
empowerment lacking a clear obligation to act is the provision that national and provincial 
government have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance 
by municipalities of their functions by regulating the exercise of municipal executive 
authority.143  However, they need not exercise their legislative powers in this regard. The 
authorities may either fail to act in terms of such permissive powers or are slow to do so, yet 
they can not be held accountable for failure to act or slowness, as the legislature did not 
create clear responsibility. 
 
From personal observations over many years it is clear that although land use planning is 
popular in rhetoric, government has to date practically achieved very little land use planning in 
South Africa. Only recently the belief in spatial planning gained more importance, starting with 
the NSDP and the creation of various spatial planning posts in the Department of Land 
Reform and Rural Development. Yet in this country land use planning exists for the most part 
                                                 
142
  Section 139(1) of the Constitution. 
143
 Section 155(7) of the Constitution. 
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in theory only. Amongst the possible explanations for this phenomenon is the arguments put 
forward against planning, e.g. that government regulation and planning are unnecessary and 
often harmful “… because they stifle entrepreneurial initiative, impede innovation, and impose 
unnecessary financial and administrative burdens on the economy” (Klosterman, 1985: 150 et 
seq).144  Other plausible explanations for this phenomenon may relate to the lack of ability of 
planners to perform their craft; staff shortages, and day-today pressures of work as opposed 
to long-term pressures.  In addition this may be the result of the institutional, legislative and 
political frameworks within which government officials must operate, the extent to which 
educators have not succeeded in equipping planners for their work, lack of personal attributes 
and funding, lack of adequate staff made available, lack of support for planning from higher 
spheres of government, and complexity.  
 
2. Inadequate legal requirements 
Legislative requirements may in themselves be inadequate, e.g. requirements relating to the 
undertaking of land use planning. It is currently only required of the municipal sphere of 
government to undertake spatial planning, which includes land use planning,145 but no such 
requirement applies to the other two spheres of government.146   
 
In terms of the findings of this research, all the practitioners consulted regarded the existing 
spatial and land use planning as basis for decision-making in the national sphere as 
inadequate, whilst five out of seven developers thought the same.  In the provincial sphere 
the adequacy of existing spatial and land use planning as basis for decision-making received 
a better rating than national planning, with three practitioners and four developers regarding it 
as inadequate, whilst one practitioner and three developers regarded it as adequate. 
However, as pointed out in paragraph 1.1 national and provincial policies and guidelines 
abound, whilst national and provincial spatial and land use planning is basically non-existent. 
 
                                                 
144
  A counter argument would be that actual planning may make a major contribution to cut out extensive 
 delays and to promote socio and economic development. 
145
  Section 25 of the MSA. See the provisions of LUPO relating to structure plans and the definition of 
 “planning” in the glossary.. 
146
  Requirements such as those found in section 11 of NEMA, to wit that specified national departments 
 exercising functions which may affect the environment and every province must prepare an 
 "environmental implementation plan", are not regarded as requiring land use planning per se. 
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Just re-writing the laws is not sufficient to secure real changes (Parnell & Pieterse, 1998: 19). 
Even if legislation did require all three spheres of government to undertake spatial and  land 
use planning, the legislation would not guarantee that it would be done properly. Local 
government functions have for example been expanded to include the eradication of poverty 
and LED. The IDP is the institutionalised mechanism for local authorities to achieve these 
responsibilities and provides them with an enabling tool to negotiate with the population.  
However, the general trends with the preparation of IDPs seem to be that it is more of a 
technical emphasis on producing the IDP document than on ensuring that an effective 
strategic planning process is engaged in. One of the respondents in the research remarked 
that Spatial Development Frameworks (a component of an IDP in terms of the MSA) are 
nothing more than a "wish list" where there is no connection between the environment, 
planning, infrastructure, finances and so forth.  
 
The inspiring theories that conceptualised planning as a process of developing a shared 
vision, a “more collaborative and inclusive approach" to the decision making in a 
representative democracy  and so forth, are clearly meaningless if actual land use planning is 
not undertaken.  In the Western Cape, there is generally no noteworthy "intervention with an 
intention to alter the existing course of events" in terms of planning undertaken, only policy 
and guidelines without ‘teeth’. As a result the marginalised and oppressed groups and 
minorities that have over time been systematically excluded from land use planning have not 
yet been embraced. Due to the lack of planning, the way in which local governments operate 
within the land use planning and development context have thus not changed much and the 
potential contribution which planning otherwise could have made to remaking urban and rural 
communities remain potential only. Sustainable development will not take place without 
appropriate planning and the theories regarding sustainable planning and sustainable 
development serve no practical purpose (other than perhaps serving as window-dressing in 
political speeches and policy statements) if actual land use planning is not undertaken. 
 
The legislature generally shies away from setting time periods within which the authorities 
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must finalise the processing of applications and inform applicants of decisions.147 In the 
research 80% of the respondents indicated for example that the processing of rezoning 
applications by the authorities took 12 months or longer to finalise.  If the municipal decision 
was taken under delegated authority and the applicant was dissatisfied with the decision, she 
should first have to exhaust her right of appeal in terms of the MSA before moving on to other 
legal remedies. In the research 8 of the respondents have indicated that it takes between 6 
and 12 months to process and decide such an appeal and 3 respondents have indicated that 
it takes more than 12 months to obtain a decision.   Once the MSA appeal has been decided 
and if the applicant or an objector was dissatisfied with the appeal decision, any one or more 
of them could lodge a LUPO appeal with the provincial authority.  In the research only 2 of the 
respondents indicated a time period of between 6 and 12 months to process and decide 
appeals in terms of LUPO, whilst the other 13 respondents indicated that on average it took 
longer than 12 months to process and decide such appeals.  
 
3. Government culture 
Legislation does not necessarily change the mind-sets and attitudes of administrators. The 
extensive legislation that was introduced by the new government in South Africa in recent 
years did not automatically change the mind-sets and attitudes of all administrators. The 
many government initiatives are therefore constrained by governance culture which provides 
the way governance processes operate in any context.   
 
Coupled with this phenomenon is the tendency of officials to focus on their own dimension of 
interest or competency. Although the silo nature of approach has rightfully been criticised (see 
par 2.5), it may also be said that without that approach the authorities might have been even 
less successful in providing basic services. At the moment, sustainability is everybody's 
responsibility, but no one's responsibility in particular, which is a major weakness in the 
struggle for a more sustainable way of life. The value systems and underlying processes of 
urban governance and planning need to be reformed to reflect a sustainability agenda and 
legislation is required that will ensure that land use applications are evaluated holistically. 
 
4. Ineffective mechanisms 
                                                 
147
  The requirement in the Building Act relating to building plan approvals is a rare example in land use 
 planning context.  
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The mere setting of legal requirements is in itself inadequate to guarantee accountability.  
Effective mechanisms must be in place to compel almost immediate compliance with those 
requirements. Without such mechanisms the authorities are likely to continue ignoring those 
legal requirements. The requirements relating to the approval of building plans may serve as 
an example.  It was shown that although authorities are legally required to either approve or 
refuse building plans within 30 or 60 days, depending on the architectural area of a proposed 
building, 8 of the respondents (53%) have indicated that on average it takes 6 months or 
longer to obtain building plan approval.  
 
Section 9 of the Building Act provides for a right of appeal to an aggrieved applicant in certain 
circumstances. In the researcher's experience it may take six months or more to finalise such 
an appeal. If the applicant is then still not satisfied with the result, she may approach the 
court.  The facts in example number 1 described in paragraph 3.7.1 show how ineffective the 
current mechanisms are if one is dissatisfied with decisions taken relating to building plans. 
The Hayes-judgment serves as a further practical example of how judicial restraint may 
impact on potential development (see par 3.7.3).  
 
Against the above background it is understandable that even three of the four administrators 
in this research regarded the current methods available to restrain the authorities from 
abusing their powers as ineffective, a point of view with which the practitioners strongly 
agreed and with which six out of the seven developers agreed. It was also established that 
three out of the four administrators were of the view that the corrective mechanisms of the 
system to obtain correction or redress when government performance is deemed 
unacceptable, are inadequate. All the practitioners concurred and so did six out of the seven 
developers.  
 
5.2.3 Courts 
Judicial restraint results primarily from the impact of the doctrine of separation of powers. It 
materially restricts the role of our courts in the quest for accountability. It was shown that the 
courts consider themselves bound to give due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions 
made by those in the executive with special expertise and experience in the field and not to 
attribute to itself superior wisdom in matters entrusted to other branches of government.   
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Judge O'Regan who wrote the majority judgment in the Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA (CC) (discussed in par 3.4.1) pointed out that judicial 
restraint "… does not mean that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in 
the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not 
reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision".148  
The reference to “facts’ creates the hope that the courts may in future enquire into the merits 
of a case, yet the point of departure remains that the courts will afford due deference "to the 
other arms of government, especially when the matter relates to complex procedures beyond 
the expertise of this Court". 
 
Dunn (1999b: 338) argues that the abuse of public power can be shown to be accountable 
only if it is put on trial in an effective and well-secured judicial system, but that "the most 
formidable challenge is to get it to court in the first place".  The argument equally applies in 
South African context (see par 3.7.1).  Dunn suggests that one cannot prosecute for "lethargy 
or stupidity, or even for gross cowardice as such, let alone for hardness of heart, but only for 
well-formed acts, consciously recognised by their perpetrators as breaching public law". 
 
In this research 80% of the respondents regarded the formality of proceedings in our courts, 
their remoteness and inaccessibility (high costs of litigation and so forth) to make a major 
contribution to the deterioration of government accountability. The long delays before cases 
are decided in court were rated as making a major contribution to the deterioration of 
government accountability by 80% of the respondents. 
 
Barnard (1999: 171) argues that in theory the potential of legal rights of persons adversely 
affected by environmental impacts was never realised in South Africa. This was inter alia due 
to the courts that failed the people as "their doors were effectively closed to litigants". If one 
wishes to challenge a municipal decision in the High Court, the attorney representing the 
court applicant will normally require an initial deposit of between R30 000,00 and R50 000,00, 
depending on the facts of the matter. The deposit requirement in itself puts litigation beyond 
the means of the vast majority of South Africans. A number of legislative changes are making 
                                                 
148
  Paragraph 48 of the judgment, also quoted with approval by Madala J in the Nyathi-judgment at par 
 88 et seq. 
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it possible that the court doors are slowly opening.   For one the legislature has provided in 
some instances for legal standing to overcome problems that otherwise would have made the 
courts inaccessible to potential litigants.149 Section 32(2) of NEMA empowers a court to 
decide not to award costs against a person who fails to secure the relief sought in respect of 
any threatened breach of environmental management legislation. This it may do if the court is 
of the opinion that the person acted reasonably out of concern for the public interest or in the 
interest of protecting the environment and has made due efforts to use other means 
reasonably available for obtaining the relief sought.  
 
A similar provision is not to be found in legislation regarding the enforcement of other 
fundamental rights, with the result that prohibitive costs are likely to exclude potential litigants 
in most instances from attempts to enforce their other fundamental rights.   De Waal (2001: 
173) argues that the object of a court awarding a remedy should include vindication of the 
Constitution and deterrence of future infringements. It is clear from the case law that although 
development in this direction is possible, it may take many years before anything meaningful 
may be accomplished in this regard due to the practice of judicial restraint. 
 
If one manages to raise the necessary funds for litigation, is able to overcome the many 
hurdles in the way of litigants (e.g. requirements relating to standing, remoteness and 
mootness) and eventually obtains a court date (which may be 12 or 18 months down the line) 
it is possible that after the court hearing, judgment may sometimes be reserved for a year or 
more. Even if judgment was obtained much earlier, the court will normally remit the matter to 
the executive authority for reconsideration. In other words, after all the risks involved with 
litigation, the effort, time taken and considerable expense (all of which will not be recovered 
even in the event of a successful court challenge) one could end up back where you started 
say two years or longer previously. 
 
Not surprisingly 93% of the respondents in this research did not regard our system of legal 
accountability (which relies mainly on the courts and audits in holding the authorities 
accountable) as effective. The majority of respondents held moderate to strong views in this 
regard. 
                                                 
149
  E.g. section 32(1) of NEMA that provides for legal standing to enforce environmental laws.   
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It was shown that as a constitutional principle for governance, the state must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights contained in the Bill of Rights (see par 3.2).  Furthermore that the 
Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the judiciary.  One would therefore expect the 
judiciary, when required to interpret the constitutional requirement that the public 
administration should be accountable, to find in favour of an interpretation that would require 
a more direct form of accountability than mediated democratic accountability.  
 
5.3 KEY CHALLENGES AND PRINCIPLES 
It is unlikely that an acceptable degree of judicial liberalism (see par 3.4) sufficient to 
overcome all the current shortcomings in the judicial system will emerge. It is equally unlikely 
that the various legislatures will coordinate their legislative activities perfectly or that they will 
start making perfect laws that will overcome all the current shortcomings in legislation.  
 
Many arguments put forward in the literature regarding elections referred to above assume a 
civic-minded and capable public, but what would it take to get that?  Is it required that we first 
have to establish all priorities and build consensus before anything may be done? It is unlikely 
that diverse attitudes, values and often conflicting preferences in society will totally disappear 
and that NGOs and social groups will obtain perfect cooperation amongst members of the 
collective.  
 
Government policies and guidelines will remain open to different interpretations by different 
administrators.  Within the current structure, political accountability will never be direct and 
reliable, but will remain very elaborately mediated.  Elections will not by some miracle 
suddenly become a sufficient mechanism to insure that governments will perform adequately 
to maximise citizens' welfare.  It is unlikely that all politicians will become entirely virtuous and 
that institutions will evolve endogenously in such a manner as to encourage accountability.  
 
We do not have the luxury of time to really turn the problems of inadequate legal and 
institutional reform into opportunities. The key challenges for accountability revolve mainly 
around mobilisation of the people and institutional design. Accountability is first and foremost 
an individual responsibility and a key challenge is to mobilise and maintain sufficient public 
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support across party-political lines for proposals aimed at curing the problems within the 
current system and mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a need to mobilise and maintain 
active public engagement of a sufficiently large number of members of the public with 
politicians, focussed on exerting enough political pressure to influence the lawmaker's 
willingness to tackle the issues and to bring about the desired changes.  
 
The current problem of inculcating citizenship (i.e. civic minded, able and capable members of 
the public) should be reduced to civic-minded and willing members of the public only. In other 
words, lack of personal ability and capability should not stand in the way of anyone to require 
and obtain government accountability. The idea of an epistemic community, promoted by 
Pieterse (2006 and discussed in par 2.4) comes into play in this regard. It concerns the idea 
of empowering the people to challenge fundamentally the conventional mainstream about 
what is possible and impossible in terms of transformative urban development agendas. The 
case for the establishment of deliberative forums to imagine and plot alternative approaches 
to urban development, connects usefully with Pieterse's own argument for a vibrant radical 
democratic politics in the city.  The deliberative forums should serve to give back "a voice" to 
the people, to act as communicative links between the private and public spheres, to build a 
strong relationship between the state and civil society by providing debate and diversity and 
should be aimed at establishing shared reality.  It should ensure that authority is vested in the 
people themselves, the real actors of positive change.  The underlying guiding principle of the 
deliberative forums process should be as expressed by the slogan "nothing about us without 
us" coined by Cyril Ramaphosa during the constitution-making process (Skjelten, 2006: 28). It 
will be a formidable challenge to mobilise the population back to the public arena to make 
claims for accountability in the management of local affairs, yet a possible task.  The current 
system of ward committees however does not create an adequate deliberative platform for 
matters concerning the national and provincial spheres of government (see par 3.3), although 
it could with appropriate statutory amendments serve as deliberative forums. 
 
The second key challenge relates to institutional design (see Manin et al, 1999: 50 and other 
sources referred to in par 2.4). This thesis is not an argument against democracy. It is an 
argument for institutional reform and for institutional innovation in addition to, and supporting 
democracy. The scale of the obstacles to any endeavour to cure the weaknesses of the 
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current system within the existing structures only, is all too obvious. A system of 
accountability that relies for its success on elections, cooperation between members of 
society, the building of sufficient capacity amongst administrators, and so forth, should not be 
expected to eventually become sufficiently effective. As the electoral and other mechanisms 
do serve a purpose they may be retained but should be supplemented, e.g. by a new 
institutional structure aimed at the progressive realisation of the rights of everyone to 
accountable government. Such an institutional structure should not be hampered by the 
shortcomings evident in the current system and would require appropriate principles and 
rules.  What is necessary, as Montesquieu long ago exclaimed, is "that one power should be 
in a position to stop another: to bring it to a halt".150   
 
Constituency offices and accountability agencies as suggested by Manin et al and Gilbert 
respectively (referred to in par 2.4) and the establishment of administrative courts (discussed 
in par 2.6) are examples of institutional reform that may potentially contribute to improved 
government accountability. This thesis argues that at least the following important principles 
and rules should apply in respect of the proposed new institutional structure. 
 
1. A tribunal should be created within the proposed new institutional structure for hearing 
all complaints against the authorities within the land use and development context. 
Members of the tribunal should be sufficiently representative to ensure that 
environmental, social and economic considerations will receive due consideration and 
that a holistic approach is adopted to the evaluation of applications or complaints.  
Amongst those members should be persons with a sound legal background and 
practical experience in the various authorities. 
 
2. The method of nomination and appointment of members of the new entity should 
ensure detachment from undue party political influence to improve credibility of 
decisions and to insulate the new entity from undue political influence. It should be 
independent of other branches of government (similar to administrative courts abroad) 
and may be subject to some form of direct popular control (e.g. non-party political 
elections).  
                                                 
150
  Quoted by Dunn (1999b: 336). 
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3. A challenge of public authority should not have to rely on the cooperation of different 
members of the public or on the ability and capability of individual members of the 
public for its success. An illiterate individual should be able to enforce accountability, 
even in the face of opposition from a majority in the local community. 
 
4. The new entity and its officials should be empowered to investigate, on own initiative or 
on receipt of a complaint, specified matters (i.e. comparable with but going beyond the 
powers of public protectors described in chapter 3). Such matters may inter alia include 
any alleged maladministration in connection with government affairs, abuse or 
unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious or other improper conduct, undue 
delay by a person performing a public function or any act or omission by a person 
employed in government, which results in unlawful or improper prejudice to any other 
person. Such power should include the right to consider the merits of decisions and to 
enquire into the reasons supportive of decisions reached.  
 
5. The procedure relating to challenges to government action or inaction should be 
informal and the new entity and its officials must be empowered to ascertain any 
relevant fact in such manner as they deem fit.  The aim should be to avoid a process 
that is so specialised and so academic that it becomes just another intellectual puzzle.  
 
6. The new entity must be empowered to make rules aimed at facilitating proof of 
allegations (e.g. that every authority shall, upon receipt of a land use application, issue 
an acknowledgement of receipt confirming the date of receipt and the reference 
number under which it will be dealt with by the authority; that the tribunal may require 
that the relevant case file of the authority be handed to it immediately for inspection151 
or requiring that administrators develop a record of proceedings that can be examined 
by outsiders, which must bear some systematic relationship to subsequent decisions). 
  
                                                 
151
  The current provincial practice is that when an application is received for access to information, the case 
 file is first referred to the internal legal advisors for scrutiny before such access is made available. The 
 researcher regards this approach as sinister.  
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7. The tribunal should serve as the appeal authority for all appeals available in terms of 
the relevant legislation, but excluding the MSA appeal which should remain in place 
(see “self-rectification” in 2.6). The intention should be to replace the current 
successive rights of appeal on the same set of facts to several different appeal 
authorities.  In the event of an appeal against the decision of an authority to the new 
entity, the former should lose its decision-making powers and should become a 
commenting authority only (comparable with the section 38(8) procedure discussed 
above).  Even though rules should be drafted as if they were universally valid and 
timeless, the tribunal should re-evaluate those rules each time they are applied, 
requiring an ethical choice (in line with the thinking of Cilliers, 1998:122).  
 
8. The grounds for judicial review for the findings of the new entity and its officials should 
be restricted to interest in the cause, bias, malice, gross irregularity with the 
proceedings and failure of the administrator to apply his/ her/ its mind. 
 
9. Anyone should be entitled to bring a charge of say "misconduct in office" before a 
special official of the new entity, who could render a formal provisional condemnation if 
she considers it well founded.152 The special official should proceed inquisitorially to 
ascertain the relevant facts.153  The complainant must submit acceptable proof that the 
administrator or authority concerned received written notice of the complaint but failed 
to remove the cause of the complaint within say thirty days from date of notification. 
 
10. If a provisional condemnation was granted, the authority against which it was granted 
should be afforded the opportunity to correct its action within a specified but limited 
time period (see the principle of “self-rectification” referred to in 2.6). If the authority 
concerned failed to respond within the stipulated time period, the condemnation will 
automatically become final. 
 
                                                 
152
  A similar procedure was available in the Athenian model (Elster, 1999: 268). It could serve as a 
 preparatory examination or what is known as a "rule nisi" (a provisional order with a return date). In other 
 words, it will not be a final condemnation, but the result of which has to be confirmed by the return date 
 or which could be passed on to the entity's tribunal for consideration.   
153
  I.e. a similar approach to that prescribed in section 26(3) of the Small Claims Court Act, No. 61 of 1984. 
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11. If the special official is not prepared to grant a provisional condemnation, the aggrieved 
person must be able to challenge the officials refusal by way of internal appeal and 
subject to payment of an appeal fee, which will be refundable if successful on appeal. 
 
12. If the special official is not prepared to grant a provisional condemnation as the 
evidence produced is regarded as inconclusive or if the authority challenges the 
provisional condemnation, the special official should allow the aggrieved party and the 
authority concerned the opportunity to file supplementary papers and to have the 
matter considered by the tribunal.  
 
13. It should be cheap to enforce accountability.  The high costs associated with litigation 
coupled with the ineffectiveness of the judicial remedies and the practice of judicial 
restraint have to date ensured that many an abuse of public power has gone 
unchallenged. If the situation was to be turned around and more effective and efficient 
instruments were put in place to challenge decisions of the authorities, the government 
machinery might grind to a halt if the system was not properly constructed and 
managed. The operation of the tribunal should gradually be phased in with appropriate 
slowness to prevent overload.  An initial deposit requirement of say R2 000,00 might 
assist in order to achieve the progressive implementation of the new order. Persons 
requiring the tribunal to enquire into government action or inaction would be required to 
pay such deposit, which sum should be refundable in the event of a successful 
challenge. The amount of the deposit should over time be reduced substantially to 
bring the new remedy within reach of everyone.  
 
14. All reasonable expenses incurred by the aggrieved party (including the costs of 
professional consultants that assisted with the matter) must in all instances be 
recoverable from the authority whose decision is overturned on review or from the 
administrator personally in circumstances as described below.  The legislation aimed 
at restricting state liability should not apply to costs orders made by the tribunal and 
legal provision should be made to obtain prompt execution.154 
                                                 
154
  Japta J said at 452G-H in the Mjeni-judgment that "[t]he constitutional right of access to courts would 
 remain an illusion unless orders made by the courts are capable of being enforced by those in whose 
 favour such orders were made". 
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15. In addition to recovery of reasonable expenditure the payment of a solatium should be 
prescribed by law (not leaving it to the discretion of the courts) to serve as vindication 
of the Constitution and to deter future infringements. This should also apply in the case 
of a successful application to the courts for judicial review or a mandamus. See in this 
regard De Waal’s argument (2001: 188) in par 3.4 for the development of damages as 
a remedy for certain violations of fundamental rights. 
 
16. Whilst it is important that costs related to the adjudication of disputes should not serve 
to withhold complainants from challenging unacceptable decisions, appropriate 
arrangements should be put in place to discourage frivolous challenges to applications 
or decisions of the authorities (see the concept of graphe in par 2.4). The same penalty 
should be imposed if a party that challenged an application or a decision taken in the 
exercise of public power abandoned the challenge after starting it, as a blackmailer 
might do if he succeeded in getting a bribe from his victim.  
 
17. If an administrator (of if she or he can not be identified, the administrative head of the 
relevant government department) fails to comply with an order contained in a final 
condemnation or with an order of the tribunal within the time period stipulated, the 
tribunal should be empowered to make a costs order against the individual personally 
(in other words the individual and not the authority concerned will be held liable for 
payment of costs occasioned by or in respect of the hearing). This should be done if 
the tribunal is of the opinion that the person failed to take reasonable action or failed to 
make due efforts to use other means reasonably available for taking the necessary 
action.  The intention is to create more direct accountable by officials to members of 
the public, to discourage officials that abuse public power from continuing to do so or to 
act inappropriately and to engender office bearers to a culture of accountability in their 
official duties.  The researcher argues that such an approach will contribute to the 
reform of the value systems and underlying processes of government to reflect an 
accountability agenda.  
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18. In the event of repeated final condemnations or orders of the tribunal granted against 
the same administrator or authority for similar conduct and if the tribunal believes that 
reasonable steps have not been taken to ensure that a repetition does not occur, it 
must inform the provincial executive accordingly. In such event the provincial executive 
must be required by law to forthwith intervene effectively in the municipal sphere. 
 
19 Strict time periods should apply within which the authorities and the new entity 
(including the tribunal and special officials) must provide comment, process 
applications, appeals and complaints and inform the parties concerned of the decisions 
reached.  The lengthy delays in deciding applications and appeals are irreconcilable 
with the requirement to promote socio-economic development or the concept of "good 
government". 
 
20. All spheres of government should be required to undertake land use planning and the 
provincial and national spheres of government should be required to align their 
planning with municipal IDPs.  
 
21. Legislative reform by all three spheres of government and co-ordination of their 
legislative activities should support the new initiative. 
  
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Accountability is a legitimate passion.  Yet according to James Madison155 the great difficulty 
with it lies in this: "you must first enable government to control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself". In a 2008 Constitutional Court judgement, the judge also had 
the following to say: "If the foundational values of the constitution are not observed and their 
precepts not carried out conscientiously, we have a recipe for a constitutional crisis of great 
magnitude".156   
 
In terms of the majority view of respondents in this research our systems of political, legal and 
professional accountability are not effective, the current methods available to restrain the 
                                                 
155
  Federalist no.51 as quoted by Manin (1999: 1). 
156
  Per Madala J in Nyathi- judgment at par 80. 
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authorities from abusing their powers are regarded as ineffective and the same goes for the 
corrective mechanisms that citizens could potentially use to obtain redirection or redress 
when government performance is deemed unacceptable.  
 
These research results have confirmed the researcher's existential hypothesis (par 4.1) that 
government was mostly not accountable within the land use planning and development 
context within the Western Cape and that the available mechanisms for achieving 
government accountability are ineffective. The researchers overall finding was that the 
accountability requirement has largely been rendered vain and ineffectual as a result of the 
lack of effective mechanisms and measures to obtain accountability. The mere existence of 
responsibility and accountability mechanisms was not in itself sufficient to ensure effective 
accountability.  The situation calls for an urgent intervention to improve accountability of all 
three spheres of government within the specified context. 
 
A pre-condition for sustainable development is sustainable planning. Sustainable planning will 
not happen by itself. It requires at least a legal and enforceable legal obligation resting on all 
spheres of government to undertake spatial and land use planning and to create effective 
opportunity for everyone to actively engage in government processes. It also remains a 
formidable methodological challenge to institutionalise a comprehensive process of “bottom-
up accountability” which goes beyond representative community action and sporadic 
participation.  Suffice it to say that a combination of various types of intervention (e.g. law and 
institutional reforms, co-ordination of legislative activities amongst the three spheres of 
government, formulation of improved policy directives, undertaking land use planning and so 
forth) are required to if government accountability is to be improved. 
 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends that at least the following law reforms be undertaken to improve 
local-level government accountability within the land use planning and development context 
within the Western Cape. 
 
5.5.1 National or provincial legislation should be adopted to create deliberative forums to 
imagine and plot alternative approaches to urban development and perform the other 
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functions described in par 5.3. The manner in which the current legislation and existing 
guidelines relating to municipal ward committees have been drafted, are considered 
inadequate (as discussed in par 3.3.8). Deliberative forums need to be fiercely  
independent, which will inter alia require that inclusion of topics of discussion in forum 
agendas may not be refused or controlled in any manner whatsoever by elected 
politicians or appointed government officials. 
 
5.5.2 Elected representatives should by law be required to attend regular monthly meetings 
of such forums upon invitation to hear complaints, to answer queries and to report back 
to those in attendance on government matters.  
 
5.5.3 Legislation should provide for a new structure as contemplated in par 5.3 to be 
established to serve inter alia for the monitoring and support of local government and 
the promotion of the development of local government capacity to perform their 
functions and manage their own affairs. 
 
5.5.4 The new structure proposed in par 5.3 above should by law also serve as an 
independent accountability agency.  The main difficulty in judging what government 
has done is that the public just do not know enough. Public information must therefore 
not depend on what the government wants the public to know and the public should be 
able to rely on the expertise and independence of the entity for credible assistance.  
 
5.5.5 In the event that elected office-bearers and their officials disagree on the outcome of 
applications and the elected office-bearers approve such applications against the 
recommendations of their officials, this should be recorded in a register open to public 
scrutiny and include motivated reasons for rejecting the advice of the officials.  
 
5.5.6 The current land use legislation should be amended in accordance with the approach 
adopted in section 38(8) of the Heritage Act. In terms of that section, the heritage 
authority is converted from a decision-making authority into a commenting authority in 
the event that environmental authorisation is required, whilst the provincial 
environmental authority is the decision-making authority. The latter is, however, 
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required to take into account comment made by the former when taking a decision. 
The proposed amendment should achieve greater coordination and speedier decision-
making.  
 
5.5.7 Legislation that discriminates against people on the basis of the colour of their skins 
should be repealed.  State structures should be transformed and de-racialised as 
proposed by Davids and Maphunye (2005: 62). In general there should be a thorough 
review of all pre 1994 legislation by all 3 spheres of government to see what can be 
scrapped. 
 
5.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The researcher pointed out that it could be expected that the BBBEE laws of the current 
regime may damage and undermine the reputation of the judiciary and destroy respect for the 
law as did the discriminatory laws of the previous regime.  In the research, fourteen of the 
fifteen respondents disagreed that the introduction of party politics in the municipal sphere 
has resulted in a general improvement of accountability, ten of which strongly disagreed 
indicating that it rather contributed to the reduction of accountability.  
 
A shortcoming of the study is that it has not sufficiently explored the influence of the 
introduction of party politics on accountability in the municipal sphere, nor the continued 
impact of old and new discriminatory laws on government accountability.  Loss of professional 
capacity (resignations) was identified by fourteen of the fifteen respondents as making a 
major contribution to the erosion of government accountability, but it is not clear whether 
those resignations relate to party-political influences in government, new discriminatory laws 
(which may in the longer term result in a more equal system) or came about for other 
reasons.   Future research on government accountability within South African context should 
explore these subjects. It should also explore the role and functioning of accountability 
agencies, deliberative forums and the use of constituency offices to promote effective public 
participation aimed at promoting improved government accountability. The role of corruption 
on accountability and the role of party politics in land use planning context needs to be 
explored in more detail as well as the role of administrative courts in promoting government 
accountability.  
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ANNEXURE 1 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
I am undertaking a study as part of a Master's Programme in Sustainable Development Planning and 
Management. The tile of my thesis is Improving local-level government accountability - a study of the 
government's accountability within land use planning and development context in the Western Cape. My aim is 
to assess the adequacy of available mechanisms to achieve effective government accountability. 
 
I am interested in learning your opinion about the accountability of government within Western Cape planning 
and development context. In particular, I'm interested in how you, as a person active in the planning and 
development field, personally and professionally experience/ perceive aspects of government's accountability. 
 
For purposes of this study accountability means "to be answerable" or providing an explanation, reason or 
justification for government acts or omissions. It also implies that, in the event of unsatisfactory account-giving, 
"something can be done" by an aggrieved party that would lead to avoidance of a repetition, redress or 
corrective action.  
 
This questionnaire will take only about 15 to 20 minutes of your time. Be assured that you will not be identified 
by name when this survey is completed. Please take a few minutes to respond to this survey - your input is 
greatly appreciated. 
 
Johan Du Plessis 
 
PART I: PERSONAL INFORMATION 
(Please indicate by underlining your choice). 
 
Sex: Male / Female  
  
Sector: Public / private sector:  If public sector, national/ provincial / local government sphere. 
 
Profession:  Town Planner / Property Developer/ Environmental Practitioner/ Engineer/ 
Attorney/ Heritage Consultant / Architect / Other (please specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Professional experience: Less than 5 years/ 5 - 10 years/ 10- 15 years/ 15 - 20 years/ more 
than 20 years 
 
Today's date:  ……………………….. 2008 
 
 
PART II: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
There are no right and wrong answers! Your perceptions are what are important. Do not 
ponder over the questions; answer with your first instincts. 
 
1. Read each of the following statements and then circle the number that best 
represents your opinion. (1 - strongly disagree; 2 = moderately disagree; 3 = 
mildly disagree; 4 = mildly agrees; 5 = moderately agrees; 6 = strongly agrees). 
  
 Adequate land use planning exists that may serve as a basis for  
 decision-making in the following spheres of government: 
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 National: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .      1  2  3  4  5  6 
  
 Provincial: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .      1  2  3  4  5  6 
  
 Municipal: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .      1  2  3  4  5  6 
  
 The authorities are generally responsive to external 
 stakeholders                           1 2  3  4  5  6  
 
 The authorities generally provide sufficient opportunity for  
 citizen participation in the deliberative process of government       1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 Usually citizens are afforded an effective opportunity to  
 confront adverse evidence before a decision is taken         1  2  3  4  5  6 
  
 The authorities generally provide sufficient opportunity for  
 professional consultants' participation in the deliberative  
 process of government.                1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 Decisions by municipal councillors are usually taken  
 without any discussion of agenda items                     1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 Decisions by municipal councillors are usually only taken  
 after debate of agenda items                      1  2  3  4  5  6 
  
 The authorities usually provide reasons for decisions when  
 informing applicants and objectors of those decisions                    1  2  3  4  5  6   
 
 It is evident from councillor debates and the reasons given  
 for decisions that the decision-makers are usually fully  
 conversant with all the relevant facts           1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 When the authorities are requested to provide reasons for  
 decisions, such requests are promptly complied with.                    1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 The reasons for decisions given by the authorities include  
 adequate substantiation in support of the decisions.                    1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 The reasons for decisions given by the authorities set out  
 the reasoning that has led to all conclusions reached                     1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 The reasons given for decisions are rationally related to 
 the decisions taken                         1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 Statutory codes of conduct provide for effective means  
 to enforce accountability of officials and councillors         1  2  3  4  5  6 
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 The current methods and existing tools available to 
 monitor the conduct of the authorities are adequate                   1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 When the authorities are requested to provide access to  
 information, such requests are promptly complied with                   1  2  3  4 5  6  
 
 The institutions created by law to oversee the exercise of 
 statutory powers (e.g. the public protector) are adequate        1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 The current methods and existing tools available for  
 achieving effective oversight are adequate                                1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 Our system of political accountability (which relies on the 
 theoretical possibility of poor performers not being re- 
 elected) is effective              1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 The introduction of party politics in the municipal sphere  
 has resulted in a general improvement of accountability               1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 Our system of legal accountability (which mainly relies on 
 the Courts and audits in holding the authorities accountable) 
 is effective               1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 Our system of professional accountability (which relies on 
 professional bodies in holding officials accountable) is  
 effective               1  2  3  4  5  6  
  
 The current methods available to restrain the authorities  
 from abusing their powers are effective           1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 The current system has adequate corrective mechanisms  
 for citizens to obtain redirection/ correction  when  
 government performance is deemed unacceptable          1  2  3  4  5  6  
  
 Adequate statutory provision exists generally for citizens to  
 impose sanctions on the authorities in cases of manifest  
 misconduct in office              1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 National and provincial governments ensure the effective 
 performance by municipalities of their municipal planning  
 functions through adequate regulation, monitoring & support         1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
2. Please rate the following factors to indicate what contribution they make (if any) to 
the erosion of accountability in government. Use possible ratings of low (1), 
moderate (2), or (3) high in a comparative sense, and then circle the number that best 
represents your opinion. A high rating (3) would indicate a major contribution whilst a 
low rating (1) would indicate little or no contribution. 
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 The formality of proceedings in our Courts, their remoteness 
 and inaccessibility (high costs of litigation, etc)    1  2  3 
 
 The restraint practiced by our Courts in examining the  
 substance of decisions       1  2  3 
 
 The long delays before applications are decided    1  2  3 
 
 The long delays before appeals are decided     1  2  3 
 
 The long delays before cases are decided in Court   1  2  3 
 
 Duplicative and wasteful procedures in public administration  1  2  3 
 
 Fragmented character of service delivery    1  2  3 
 
 Absence of a performance regime & culture    1  2  3 
 
 The regulatory burden        1  2  3 
 
 The complexity of the statutory framework    1  2  3 
  
 Loss of professional capacity (resignations)    1  2  3 
 
 Understaffing        1  2  3  
 
 Lack of visible qualifications      1  2  3 
 
 Lack of experience, skill and knowledge     1  2  3 
 
 No demonstrated competence for position to which appointed 1  2  3 
 
 Lack of will to enforce requirements     1  2  3 
 
 Public official immunity from civil suits for official action/ inaction 1  2  3 
 
 Inadequate time, information & resources on part of citizens  1  2  3 
 
 Are there other factors that in your opinion contribute to the erosion of 
accountability in government? 
 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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3. Please indicate the average time taken by the authorities to finalise processing 
the following, using the possible ratings indicated and then circle the number 
that best represents your opinion (1 = less than 6 months; 2 = between 6 and 12 
months; 3 = more than 12 months). 
 
 Rezoning applications   .. .. .. .. ..  1  2  3 
 
 Subdivision applications .. .. .. .. ..  1  2  3 
 
 Departure applications  .. .. .. .. ..  1  2  3 
 
 Applications for building plan approval .. .. ..  1  2  3 
 
 Applications for removal of restrictive title conditions ..  1  2  3 
 
 Applications for environmental authorisation .. ..  1  2  3 
 
 Appeals in terms of the Municipal Systems Act .. ..  1  2  3 
 
 Appeals in terms of the Land Use Planning Ordinance   1  2  3 
 
 
4. How do you rate the current measure of accountability of the three spheres of 
government in the planning and development field in the Western Cape 
(expressed as a percentage)? Please circle the category that best represents 
your opinion 
 
 National government: 
 
 0 -10% 11-20% 21-30% 31 - 40% 41 - 50% 
 
 51 - 60% 61 - 70% 71 - 80% 81 - 90% 91 - 100% 
 
Provincial government: 
 
 0 -10% 11-20% 21-30% 31 - 40% 41 - 50% 
 
 51 - 60% 61 - 70% 71 - 80% 81 - 90% 91 - 100% 
 
Municipal government: 
 
 0 -10% 11-20% 21-30% 31 - 40% 41 - 50% 
 
 51 - 60% 61 - 70% 71 - 80% 81 - 90% 91 - 100% 
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5. Please briefly motivate your choices in 4. 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
6. Do you have any suggestions as to what is required to improve the 
accountability of the three spheres of government in the planning and 
development field generally? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
I want to thank you for your time and help with this survey. 
 
 
Please return to J P Du Plessis at jp@jdpprop.co.za or by facsimile to 021-851 4852 by not 
later than 14 December 2008.  
 
 
  
